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The public schools in the United States fail to deliver a curriculum that adequately 
addresses religion in general and the many world religions in particular. This lacuna does 
not represent the constitutionally required neutrality of schools toward religion(s) and 
non-religion, but instead indicates the existence of what the author terms the hostility of 
neglect. When the curriculum privileges non-religious epistemologies, ideologies, and 
worldviews, such as secularism and scientism, often to the exclusion of religious ways of 
knowing and making meaning, then the schools violate the First Amendment of the 
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In this dissertation, the dominant myths 
of America’s founding are examined historically in an effort to provide a thick 
description and critical analysis of the reigning meta-narratives that influence the debate 
concerning religion in American public schools (chapter 1). Then, turning to the 
particular, some current models of inclusion or exclusion of religion(s) in/from the 
curriculum are identified and examined, with a brief proposal for a new way forward 
called the Meaningful Inclusion Approach (chapter 2). To demonstrate the 
constitutionality of this new proposal, a careful study of the Constitution and its 
interpretation by the Supreme Court is presented, highlighting especially the demand for 
neutrality and the Court’s positive opinion concerning teaching about religion(s) in public 
schools as part of a secular program of education that is considered complete (chapter 3). 
The constitutional question is followed by a critique of the reigning educational 
paradigm, which is unduly subservient to the market economy, too narrowly focused on 
STEM technical knowledge, and hyper-individualistic. In an exploration of alternative 
educational philosophies, warrant is found for not only teaching about religion(s) but also 
learning from religion(s), thus taking seriously the demands of neutrality and the promise 
of a holistic, liberal education (chapter 4). The author then proposes resituating the 
educational project in terms of the common good. A basic framework is proposed for 
education that is rooted in a healthy understanding of the human person in society, and 
which calls for a problem-posing approach to education that values cooperation, building 
bridges through dialogue to encourage the virtue and commitment of solidarity, and 
openness to both religious and non-religious contributions to human knowledge and 
wisdom (chapter 5). Finally, a consideration of the unique circumstances of our post-
secular age and the urgency of the need for religious literacy in a globalized world is 
presented as a major rationale for changing the curricula of our public schools without 
delay. The dissertation concludes with a proposal for the Meaningful Inclusion Approach 
(MIA) to learning about, from, and with religion(s) in age-appropriate ways from 
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“Establishing a lasting peace 
is the work of education.” 
 






CHAPTER 1: America’s Founding Myths 
 
1.1 Introduction and Thesis 
 
In the United States today public schools are, by and large, failing to include the 
topic of religion and the study of religions1 adequately in the curriculum, resulting in an 
education that likewise fails to meet the needs of a pluralistic, democratic society and an 
increasingly globalized world. Moreover, by neglecting to treat religion(s) as worthy of 
in-depth academic study, the schools fail to deliver a truly liberal curriculum, a 
curriculum that is holistic in its approach and broad in its sweep. Students are often 
graduated with a significant lacuna in their academic knowledge of religion(s)2 and may 
be left with an inferred sense that religion(s) is not important or worthy of study, and that 
it has nothing to contribute to the important public conversations about the human person, 
                                                          
1 Hereafter, I will abbreviate the related concepts of religion generally and particular religions specifically 
with the designation “religion(s).” 
2 Gabriel Moran refers to “a scandalous ignorance of religion” in American society, and quotes Carey 
McWilliams concerning the need for religious education in the schools: “In an era when religion and 
morals are less a matter of habits and givens, religious education is a critical part of civic education; 
secularity calls for schooling in the sacred.” (Gabriel Moran, “Religious Education in United States’ State 
Schools,” in K. Engebretson et al. (eds.), International Handbook of Inter-religious Education, International 
Handbooks of Religion and Education 4 (Springer Science+Business Media B.V., 2010), p. 141). Damon 
Mayrl calls American public education “extraordinarily secular in comparative perspective.” (Damon 
Mayrl, Secular Conversion: Political Institutions and Religious Education in the United States and Australia, 
1800-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 248). Diane Moore writes, “Though the 
Unites States is one of the most religiously diverse nations in the world, the vast majority of citizens are 
woefully ignorant about religion itself and the basic tenets of the world’s major religious traditions.” 
(Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 3). Warren Nord writes, “It is true that 
over the last several decades a new national consensus has developed about the role of religion in public 
schools—yet this agreement on principles has resulted in few changes in practice. School textbooks still 
largely ignore religion except in the context of distant history. The national content standards for K-12 
education essentially ignore religion (except, again, in the context of history). Courses in religion are not 
even elective possibilities in most public schools… American education proceeds on the assumption that 
God is either dead or irrelevant… it borders on secular indoctrination.” (Warren A. Nord, Does God Make 
a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in our Schools and Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2010), pp. 4-5).   
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society, morality, and our knowledge about the world. Yet, any informed person looking 
at the world today understands that religion is a powerful force for good and evil; a 
powerful motivator and source of meaning in life; a significant factor in elections and the 
making of public policy; a critical factor in diplomacy, war, and peace; and an influential 
factor in epistemology, i.e. the philosophical underpinnings for deciding what counts as 
knowledge and truth. Religions have also been important historically, in this country and 
worldwide, and students are left without an adequate understanding of who we are as 
peoples without grasping these roots. Culturally, religions have been tremendously 
important; and art, literature, music, architecture, and other forms of cultural expression 
are incomprehensible, in many cases, without an understanding of religious influences 
and meaning. 
 An education that fails to address religion(s) in a sufficient manner can hardly be 
considered comprehensive, liberal, or holistic. It does not prepare students to critically 
inherit the knowledge and traditions of the past, nor to contribute meaningfully to the 
ongoing development of knowledge regarding religion(s) and religious-philosophical 
questions of faith, morals, and meaning in our time. In a world suffused with spiritual 
epistemologies, practices, and identities, a deficient education regarding religion(s) leaves 
students impaired when it comes to critically assessing truth-claims and recognizing the 
boundaries and limited scope of the various fields of knowledge. Science, for instance, 
may become scientism when it is presented as the sole reasonable source of knowledge, 
making truth-claims beyond its legitimate competency. An incomplete education leaves 
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students religiously illiterate,3 unprepared to understand the complex discourses of the 
contemporary world, and ill equipped to contribute meaningfully as citizens having the 
tools for making sense of religious people and religious ways of making meaning in life. 
By treating religion(s) in only a cursory manner, we may also leave students with a 
skewed understanding, such as when Islam is mentioned only in light of terrorism or 
when Catholicism gets the spotlight only for the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition. 
Finally, by neglecting to take religion(s) seriously in the curriculum, we disregard the 
evidence that human persons, historically and currently, are spiritual beings whose faith 
and spirituality, however they are defined and practiced, are critical components of their 
being and, hence, of their political sensibilities, i.e. their being-in-community.4 
 In short, by failing to give religion(s) the serious recognition it warrants in the 
curriculum, the public schools in the United States are largely failing students and society 
                                                          
3 Diane Moore considers this the “minimal standard necessary for achieving religious literacy”: “Religious 
literacy entails the ability to discern and analyze the fundamental intersections of religion and 
social/political/cultural life through multiple lenses. Specifically, a religiously literate person will possess 1) 
a basic understanding of the history, central texts, beliefs, practices and contemporary manifestations of 
several of the world’s religious traditions as they arose out of and continue to be shaped by particular 
social, historical and cultural contexts; and 2) the ability to discern and explore the religious dimensions of 
political, social and cultural expressions across time and place.” (Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious 
Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2007), pp. 56-57). Stephen Prothero offers a different, though related, definition: “…religious 
literacy refers to the ability to understand and use the religious terms, symbols, images, beliefs, practices, 
scriptures, heroes, themes, and stories that are employed in American public life… religious literacy is not 
just the accumulation of facts… religious literacy includes narrative… It is the ability to participate in our 
ongoing conversation about the private and public powers of religions.” (Stephen Prothero, Religious 
Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know—And Doesn’t (New York: HarperOne, 2007), pp. 17-18). 
4 Michael James, Thomas Masters, and Amy Uelmen quote Thomas Groome to remind us that the 
problem extends not only to students but to educators: “In Educating for Life, Thomas Groome suggests 
that American culture imposes a subtle but clear expectation upon educators that their work must 
transcend the influence of their own spirituality, thus precluding a prime source of humanizing influence. 
Groome argues that ‘Without spiritual foundations, educators are left with only philosophical ones, and 
although the latter are necessary and valuable, they are neither ‘innocent’ by way of objectivity nor 
‘sufficient to the task.’ He continues, ‘Ironically, American education has drawn most heavily, almost 
exclusively, from one school of philosophy—pragmatism—and yet has been phobic about its spiritual 
neutrality.’” (Michael James, Thomas Masters, and Amy Uelmen, Education’s Highest Aim: Teaching and 
Learning Through a Spirituality of Communion (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2010), pp. 27-28).  
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by neglecting an important component of history, culture, philosophy, politics, ethics, and 
personal life/human development—that is to say, an important aspect of life and human 
experience. Our ability to live together in peace depends, significantly, on rectifying this 
problem. 
 In addition to the points already listed—and this will likely amaze many 
readers—the current situation is also in violation of the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. As we shall see in chapter 3, the Court 
has made clear that devotional practices and proselytizing are unconstitutional when led 
by public school officials. Academic study about religion(s), on the other hand, is not 
only in line with the First Amendment, but is seen by the Court as a natural component of 
a complete education. Any such study must have a secular academic purpose. 
Furthermore, the Court requires neutrality: the government through its schools cannot 
favor one religion over another, nor can it favor religion over non-religion. However, far 
from treating religion(s) with neutrality, the schools have de facto favored non-religion 
and non-religious ways of knowing over religion(s) and religious epistemologies. They 
have promoted secularism and denigrated the value of faith and spirituality. The result is 
a “hostility of neglect”5 by which the schools, overwhelmingly, have implied to students 
                                                          
5 Warren Nord led the charge against the secularist bias in public education. He, too, saw hostility: “No 
doubt most educators do not intend to be hostile (or even indifferent) to religion and they often respond 
to critics by testifying to their own religious convictions… The hostility at issue is not only unintended, it is 
unrecognized. It is the result, for the most part, of a deep naïveté, a result of educators’ own limited, 
illiberal educations.” (Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our 
Schools and Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 293n3). Richard John Neuhaus 
wrote (in 1984) that possibly “…overt hostility to religion is no longer in good taste because it is no longer 
necessary. Rather than attacking religion, cultural elites quietly assume its irrelevance.” (Richard John 
Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. 
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984, second ed. 1997), p. 95). In 1993, Stephen Carter agreed with 
Neuhaus, perhaps more than he realized, when he wrote: “Richard John Neuhaus… tells us that in 
America, the public square has become openly hostile to religion. I am not sure that Neuhaus has it quite 
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that religion is not to be taken seriously in our pursuit of knowledge and in our ongoing 
preparations for (and engagement with) civic, social, and professional life. Stephen Carter 
refers to this situation as the trivializing of religion in American public life, and decries 
the treatment of religion as a mere hobby unworthy of anything but private life, and even 
then unworthy of “intelligent, public-spirited adults.”6 Clearly, this is not a stance of 
neutrality as the Supreme Court has required. This violation of the First Amendment 
demands to be remedied. 
 Of course, any suggestion that religion(s) should be included in the curriculum of 
the public schools in America is immediately met with significant resistance or, 
alternatively, with unwelcome alliances. The question of religion in the public square has 
largely been dominated in the last number of decades by two opposing voices, which I 
term the secularist and the restorationist. On the one hand are those secularists who 
would like to see religion eliminated entirely from American public life and discourse, 
including any place in the curriculum of the public schools. These voices demand a “high 
wall”7 separating church and state and envision a radically secularized America, akin to 
laïcité in France. On the other hand are restorationists who have never accepted the 
                                                          
right—nowadays, religion is treated more as a hobby than as an object of hostility…” (Stephen L. Carter, 
The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion (New York: 
BasicBooks, 1993), p. 51).  
6 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p. 22. 
7 According to Yale legal scholar Stephen Carter, “Justice Hugo Black, in Everson v. Board of Education 
(1947), often is said to have started the ball rolling when he wrote these words: ‘The First Amendment 
has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not 
approve the slightest breach.’” Carter notes wryly, “There is nothing wrong with the metaphor of a wall of 
separation. The trouble is that in order to make the Founders’ vision compatible with the structure and 
needs of modern society, the wall has to have a few doors in it.” (Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of 




Supreme Court decisions of the mid-20th century that took official prayer and devotional 
Bible reading out of the schools. They often envision America as a “Christian nation” 
(sometimes giving a token nod to Judaism as well by claiming a “Judeo-Christian” 
heritage), and they desire a return to schooling that gives an official place to Christian 
prayer and traditions (such as Christmas pageants, Christian holy days off, and moral 
traditions such as those which guide sex education). They especially want to see a central 
place in the schools for the (Protestant) Bible. These voices, as we shall see, arise out of 
different myths concerning the origin and meaning of “America.” 
While these two voices dominate the public debate and perception, there is need 
for another voice, one that seeks to treat religion(s) with the neutrality required by the 
First Amendment and which recognizes its importance in society and in the life of the 
human person, hence, its worthiness as a subject of study. Without proselytizing, 
educators are well suited (when adequately trained) to give access to a curriculum in 
religion(s) that secularists need not fear, but with which restorationists will not find a 
perfect ally. 
 This, then, is the thesis of the present dissertation. I perceive and propose a dual 
purpose of American public education: 
1) to provide a liberal and liberating education that nurtures the holistic growth of 
    the young person into a healthy, mature, productive, moral, and responsible 




 2) to promote the civic virtues, vision, knowledge, and abilities required for our 
                common life together, with justice and peace, in this Republic and as members 
                of an increasingly pluralistic and globalized society. 
To these good purposes, the curricula of our public educational institutions must 
address religion(s) in an explicit and intentional, integrated, fearless, and unbiased 
manner. It must be explicit and intentional so that religion(s) is handled with serious 
academic preparation and is neither overlooked nor presented in an uneven manner due to 
unsystematic, inconsistent, and even haphazard inclusion in the curriculum. It must be 
integrated as well, so that religion(s) is understood precisely in its connection with the 
larger curriculum and socio-academic project, and not isolated in a silo as a disjointed 
“subject” that leaves students wondering, “Why do we have to study this?” Our approach 
must also be fearless, which is to say, all educators—whether professionals and students 
in the classroom, parents, administrators, school board members, or concerned 
community members—must have a firm grasp of the requirements and limitations 
imposed by the First Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court. I purposely 
include students because students are, indeed, both educators and learners, and they 
deserve to understand the Constitutional basis for their study of religion(s). This 
knowledge will allow for a bold and rich approach to religion(s) in the curriculum, 
appropriate to a liberal education, without unnecessary hedging due to trepidation 
concerning complaints and lawsuits. Finally, the approach must be unbiased, or to use the 
Court’s term, neutral. The goal must be neither to promote one religion over another, nor 
to promote religion over nonreligion, or vice-versa. The approach must also avoid 
painting the rosy picture of relativism and indifferentism, glibly asserting that in the end 
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all religious and non-religious worldviews are basically the same and are all equally 
good. An unbiased approach will not hesitate to recognize real differences, to examine 
aspects of various religious and nonreligious ways of being in the world that are not 
worthy of respect or emulation (even as they demand understanding and study), and, 
conversely, to cull wisdom for personal growth and our public life together from both 
religious and non-religious sources. Special care must be taken to avoid the twin traps of 
cultural appropriation and government endorsement. Cultural appropriation refers to “the 
unacknowledged or inappropriate adoption of the practices, customs, or aesthetics of one 
social or ethnic group by members of another (typically dominant) community or 
society.”8  Government endorsement refers, of course, to a violation of the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment, which we will examine in detail in chapter 3. 
In sum, to fail to include religion(s) in the curriculum of our public schools in this 
sophisticated and substantial way represents a “hostility of neglect” that implicitly or, in 
some cases, explicitly, demeans religion(s), religious people, and/or religious 
epistemologies. It fails to take faith seriously, and implies that faith and spirituality are 
unsophisticated, childish or foolish, and irrational—a mere “hobby” that is unimportant at 
best and dangerous at worst. When religion is left strictly to the private sector and to 
one’s personal life, it is effectively denied a rightful voice in the public forum; or it finds 
a public voice with which the public is not adequately prepared to engage. This situation 
represents a violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
                                                          
8 Katherine Connor Martin, “New Words notes March 2018,” Oxford English Dictionary online blog, March 
29, 2018, https://public.oed.com/blog/march-2018-new-words-notes/ [Accessed 27 January 2020]. An 
example of cultural appropriation is the American takeover of the Hindi term “Namaste,” discussed on 
NPR by Kumari Devarajan in “How ‘Namaste’ Flew Away from Us,” January 17, 2020, 
https://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2020/01/17/406246770/how-namaste-flew-away-from-us 
[Accessed 27 January 2020]. 
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diminishes our ability to provide a liberal education that provides for both personal 
growth as well as for the common good. On the other hand, a robust inclusion of 
religion(s) in the curriculum, delivered by highly qualified educational professionals, will 
contribute to the intellectual and holistic development of students, to their preparedness 
for participation as citizens in a highly pluralistic democracy and a globalized society, 
and, most importantly, to our common effort to secure a more peaceful future. 
 
1.2 Two Competing Myths of Origins 
 In order to comprehend the current situation regarding religion and public 
education, it is necessary to survey the historical road that led us to this point. A 
particular lens I find useful in interpreting this history is the concept of a founding myth. 
The two dominant myths of origins that are at play in America’s culture wars and, hence, 
in questions of religion in public education, are The Myth of Christian Origins and The 
Myth of Religious Diversity. By myth, I do not mean something that is not factual or 
historical. Both foundational myths are historical and grounded in American traditions. 
By myth of origins, then, I mean a particular historical narrative and lens that 
predominates in giving meaning to the history that follows and to the discussions of 
national identity that continue to this day. Discussing the “myths that made America,” 
Heike Paul defines what I mean by founding myths and myths of origins: “popular and 
powerful narratives of US-American national beginnings which have turned out to be 
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anchors and key references in discourses of ‘Americanness,’ past and present.”9 The 
Christian origins myth and the religious diversity myth demand our attention precisely 
because they are dominant national myths in our society, and they feed the narratives 
surrounding questions of religion and public education. It is important to note that these 
two are not the only myths of origin. Some African-Americans and Native Americans 
(and those who view American history in solidarity with them), for example, would 
likely subscribe to very different myths of origin, which may have points of both 
divergence and convergence with the two more dominant myths I present here.10 
 In the exploration of the two dominant myths that follows, I will conclude each 
section with a hermeneutic of suspicion. In that subsection, we look more carefully at 
what the followers of each particular myth often leave out of the telling. There are indeed 
dangerous memories, some of which the non-dominant myths preserve but which are 
often missing in the popular narratives deriving from the two dominant myths. To prevent 
these dangerous memories from becoming a dangerous amnesia, the hermeneutic of 
                                                          
9 Heike Paul, The Myths that Made America: An Introduction to American Studies, Volume 1 (Bielefeld, 
Germany: transcript Verlag, 2014), p. 11, http://oaresource.library.carleton.ca/oa-
America9783839414859.pdf [Accessed 11 April 2021]. 
10 Consider the words of Chief Red Jacket of the Seneca Tribe in 1805: “There was a time when our 
forefathers owned this great island. Their seats extended from the rising to the setting sun. The Great 
Spirit had made it for the use of Indians. He had created the buffalo, the deer, and other animals for food. 
He had made the bear and the beaver. Their skins served us for clothing. He had scattered them over the 
country and taught us how to take them. He had caused the earth to produce corn for bread. All this He 
had done for His red children because He loved them… But an evil day came upon us. Your forefathers 
crossed the great water and landed on this island. Their numbers were small. They found friends and not 
enemies. They told us they had fled from their own country for fear of wicked men and had come here to 
enjoy their religion. They asked for a small seat. We took pity on them, granted their request, and they sat 
down among us. We gave them corn and meat; they gave us poison in return… They wanted more land; 
they wanted our country… Wars took place… our seats were once large and yours were small. You have 
now become a great people, and we have scarcely a place left to spread our blankets. You have got your 
country, but are not satisfied; you want to force your religion upon us.” (Chief Red Jacket, “We also have a 
religion,” in Living History America: The History of the United States in Documents, Essays, Letters, Songs 




suspicion will help us to raise up suppressed and forgotten stories and perspectives, and 
to keep them in mind as we consider the nature of this place we call America, and the 
place of religion(s) in American public education. 
 
1.2.1 The Christian Origins Myth 
 The first myth is captured in the refrain: “America is a Christian nation.” Because 
it is either embraced as obviously true or dismissed as patently false, especially by those 
who hope to advance a pluralistic and multicultural society, I intend to explore the claim 
in some depth.11 I call this the Christian Origins Myth of the founding and meaning of 
America. It looks to the pre-Constitutional, colonial era for its inspiration, though it is 
often expressed in more recent terms. Touchstones for this myth include the national 
motto, “In God We Trust,” and the words of the Pledge of Allegiance, “One nation, under 
God,” although both expressions are recent in American history, dating to the 1950’s12 —
manifestations of America defining itself as a godly nation in contrast to the atheistic 
regime of the Soviet Union and of communism in general. Nonetheless, the phrases are 
                                                          
11 How much has changed since 1960 when John Courtney Murray could confidently write that “The 
authentic voice of America” acknowledges “the sovereignty of God over society as well as over 
individual[s].” He recognized very little resistance to this hegemony of belief: “The United States has had, 
and still has, its share of agnostics and unbelievers. But it has never known organized militant atheism…” 
In fact, what little push-back he found mid-century, he found to be the error that proves the rule: “There 
is, of course, dissent from this principle, uttered by American secularism (which, at that, is a force far 
different in content and purpose from Continental laicism). But the secularist dissent is clearly a dissent; it 
illustrates the existence of the American affirmation.” (John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: 
Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1960), p. 
45). 
12 “The president [Eisenhower] backed the Knights of Columbus’s proposal to insert ‘under God’ into the 
Pledge of Allegiance, which Congress enshrined by statute on Flag Day, June 14, 1954. The administration 
issued a 1954 stamp bearing the motto ‘In God We Trust’ as an international ‘postal ambassador.’ A year 
later, Eisenhower approved adding the motto on U.S. currency.” (Allan J. Lichtman, White Protestant 




seen to capture something more fundamental that dates to the first European conquests of 
the Americas, something expressed in part by the concept of “manifest destiny.” America 
is a nation “under God,” which puts its trust in God because God is seen as having 
providentially directed the development of the country.13 The rationale is scriptural—
nations that remain faithful to God are blessed and increase: “Blessed is the nation whose 
God is the LORD, the people chosen as [God’s] inheritance” (Psalm 33:12).14 Americans 
are, in this line of thinking, “recipients of the choicest bounties of Heaven.”15 Appropriate 
public gratitude is required to continue to secure what the Constitution calls “the 
Blessings of Liberty.” 
 If “the nation whose God is the LORD” is blessed, then conversely, the nation for 
whom the Lord is not acknowledged as God is bound to suffer curses: “Just as the Lord 
once took delight in making you prosper and grow, so will the Lord now take delight in 
ruining and destroying you, and you will be plucked out of the land you are now entering 
to possess” (Deuteronomy 28:63). Maintaining the nation’s public status, then, as a God-
fearing land is existentially critical according to this myth of origin. 
 The term or name “God” in this formulation is ambiguous. In the Christian myth 
of origin, though, it clearly refers to the God of Christianity. There is plenty of historical 
                                                          
13 There is an important eschatological tone to this understanding of Divine providence and missionary 
zeal. In Scripture, we read, “But the gospel must first be preached to all nations” (Mark 13:10) before 
Christ’s second coming at the end of time. Far from being perpetrators of deculturalization, then, 
Christian missionaries are seen by some Christians to have succeeded in Christianizing the land precisely 
because Christianity is superior to Native religions and has God’s blessing. The success, they believe, 
brings us that much closer to the longed-for Parousia. For more on deculturalization, see Joel Spring, 
Deculturalization and the Struggle for Equality: A Brief History of the Education of Dominated Cultures in 
the United States, Sixth edition (Boston: McGraw-Hill, 2010). 
14 Unless noted otherwise, all Scripture quotations are from the New American Bible Revised Edition 
(NABRE). 
15 Abraham Lincoln, “Proclamation Appointing a National Fast Day,” March 30, 1863, 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/fast.htm [Accessed 16 February 2019]. 
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evidence to back up the claim that America is not only a godly nation, but specifically a 
Christian godly nation.  For example, in Christopher Columbus we find a complex 
identity that included being a missionary whose purpose, in part, was to convert the 
native peoples to Christianity. Columbus himself justified gifts he gave to the native 
people: “In order to win the friendship and affection of that people, and because I was 
convinced that their conversion to our Holy Faith would be better promoted through love 
than through force…” He concluded that the native people “...must be good servants and 
very intelligent, because I see that they repeat very quickly what I told them, …they 
would easily become Christians, for they seem not to have any sect.”16 Likewise, 
Francisco Vasquez de Coronado, exploring the regions of what today are the American 
Southwest and Mexico, wrote about a gift exchange with the “Indians,” saying, 
They brought me some turquoises and poor mantles, and I received them in His 
Majesty’s name with as good a speech as I could, making them understand the 
purpose of my coming to this country… that they and all others in this province 
should become Christians and should know the true God for their Lord…17 
 
These Catholic leaders, of course, brought their Catholic faith in an age just prior to, or 
soon after, the Protestant Reformation, and they may, therefore, be more readily called 
upon in the mythic imagination of Catholics than of Protestants. 
 For Protestants, the myth of origins depends more emphatically on the colonists 
of the thirteen original colonies, especially those Protestants seeking freedom to worship 
                                                          
16 Christopher Columbus, in Living History America: The History of the United States in Documents, Essays, 
Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 
1999), pp. 30-31. 
17 Francisco Vasquez de Coronado, in Living History America: The History of the United States in 
Documents, Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black Dog & 
Leventhal Publishers, 1999), p. 36. 
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with what they considered purity. Thus, no origin myth would be complete without a 
reference to the Pilgrims and other Puritans. Their voyage to the New World was a 
distinctly religious expedition, as the very word pilgrim implies, and it was understood to 
be fulfilling God’s will and to be under God’s protection. Thus, “…they resolved to bear 
up again for the Cape [Cape Cod], and thought themselves happy to get out of those 
dangers [of the sea route to the Hudson River] before night overtook them, as by God’s 
providence they did.” This theme of God’s providence is central to the Christian origins 
myth, as are the themes of gratitude to God and evangelical mission. “Being thus arrived 
in good harbor and brought safe to land, they fell upon their knees and blessed the God of 
heaven, who had brought them over the vast and furious ocean, and delivered them from 
all the perils and miseries thereof…”18 In The Mayflower Compact, the majority of men 
aboard the ship had agreed that the purpose of their settlement was “the Glory of God, 
and Advancement of the Christian Faith…”19 
 A decade later, John Winthrop would pen words that get to the very heart of this 
idea that America was founded as a Christian nation. (It is no accident that President 
Ronald Reagan, knowing his base to be committed to this particular myth of our 
country’s founding, would famously quote from this “City on a Hill” document). 
Winthrop wrote: 
When God gives a speciall commission he lookes to have it strictly observed in 
every article; When he gave Saule a commission to destroy Amaleck, Hee 
indented with him upon certain articles, and because hee failed in one of the least, 
                                                          
18 William Bradford, in Living History America: The History of the United States in Documents, Essays, 
Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 
1999), p. 48. 
19 “The Mayflower Compact,” in Living History America: The History of the United States in Documents, 
Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal 
Publishers, 1999), p. 47. 
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and that upon a faire pretense, it lost him the kingdom... Thus stands the cause 
betweene God and us. We are entered into Covenant with Him for this worke… 
Wee have hereupon besought Him of favour and blessing. Now if the Lord shall 
please to heare us, and bring us in peace to the place we desire, then hath hee 
ratified this covenant and sealed our Commission, and will expect a strict 
performance of the articles contained in it; but if wee shall neglect the observation 
of these articles which are the ends wee have propounded, and, dissembling with 
our God, shall fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnall 
intentions, seeking greate things for ourselves and our posterity, the Lord will 
surely breake out in wrathe against us; be revenged of such a [sinful] people and 
make us knowe the price of the breache of such a covenant.20 
 
Of course, if they remained faithful to their end of the bargain, then “The Lord will be 
our God, and delight to dwell among us, as his oune people, and will command a blessing 
upon us in all our wayes.”21 The covenant, significantly, had implications beyond the 
colony of Puritans: “For wee must consider that wee shall be as a citty upon a hill. The 
eies of all people are uppon us. Soe that if wee shall deale falsely with our God in this 
worke wee haue undertaken, and soe cause him to withdrawe his present help from us, 
wee shall be made a story and a by-word through the world.”22  
Among the first things that the Massachusetts Bay colonists did was to found a 
college, the nation’s oldest (and older than the nation). “Like many of America’s private 
colleges,” writes Diana Eck,  
Harvard College began as a religious school with a normative, Christian vision of 
itself. In 1636 the Puritans of New England founded it to educate Christian clergy. 
In their own words, so often quoted from New England’s First Fruits, published 
in 1643, “After God had carried us safe to New England, and we had builded our 
houses, provided necessaries for our livelihood, reared convenient places for 
God’s worship, and settled the civil government, one of the next things we longed 
for and looked after was to advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity; 
dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministers 
                                                          
20 John Winthrop, “A Modell of Christian Charity,” 1630, 





shall lie in the dust.” Harvard was a Christian college, as exclusively and 
unapologetically as Massachusetts was a Christian commonwealth.23 
 
It was not only the college that was dedicated to Christian learning either. 
“Massachusetts was the first colony to impose educational requirements… In 1642, the 
colony required parents and masters to take responsibility for teaching their charges to 
read and write. Five years later Massachusetts passed the first law requiring communities 
to establish schools…”24 The law makes clear that the Christian reason for education was 
to promote the ability to read the Bible: “It being one chief project of that old deluder 
Satan to keep [people] from the knowledge of the Scriptures…”25 In 1690, the New 
England Primer was first published to help accomplish these educational goals. Cullen 
Schippe and Chuck Stetson write in their popular The Bible and Its Influence, “The New 
England Primer was by far the most commonly used textbook for almost 200 years.”26 A 
few samples from the reader will give a sense of its Biblical and Christian religious 
orientation: 
The Dutiful Child’s Promises, 
I will fear God, and honour the King… 
I will forgive my Enemies, and pray to God, and obey the Holy 
Commandments. 
I will learn my Catechism. 
I will keep the Lord’s Day Holy. 
                                                          
23 Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a ‘Christian Country’ Has Become the World’s Most 
Religiously Diverse Nation (New York: HarperOne, 2001), pp. 14-15. 
24 Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds., Living History America: The History of the United States in Documents, 
Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 1999), p. 57. In 1836, 
Massachusetts became the first state to make school attendance mandatory. This time, the nemesis that 
spurred the legislation was not “that old deluder Satan,” but rather the factories that were employing 
children and taking them away from school. (p. 289). 
25 “First Massachusetts School Law,” in Living History America: The History of the United States in 
Documents, Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black Dog & 
Leventhal Publishers, 1999), p. 57. 
26 Cullen Schippe and Chuck Stetson, eds., The Bible and Its Influence (New York: BLP Publishing, 2006), 
 p. 9. 
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I will Revere God’s Sanctuary, For our God is a consuming fire.27 
 
A reading lesson arranged alphabetically is equally religious in nature and purpose: 
A wise Son makes a glad Father, but a foolish Son is the heaviness 
of his Mother. 
Better is a little with the fear of the Lord, than great treasure and 
trouble therewith. 
Come unto Christ all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and He 
will give you rest…28 
 
 
 For Catholics, despite the battles they fought against the Protestant establishment 
and despite the waves of anti-Catholic sentiment they endured, by at least the 19th century 
their bishops also considered America to be providentially established. 
In 1884 the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore made this statement: “We 
consider the establishment of our country’s independence, the shaping of its 
liberties and laws, as a work of special Providence, its framers ‘building better 
than they knew,’ the Almighty’s hand guiding them.”29 
   
It is not surprising, then, that Jay Sekulow, the Chief Counsel for the American 
Center for Law and Justice (ACLJ)30—an organization dedicated to fighting for the 
vision of religious liberty espoused by those whose myth of origin is the Christian 
version—would write that “It is time to regain our common Christian memory.” What is 
that memory? It sounds like a synopsis of the influential Christian myth of origin: 
Look at our national beginnings… On Virginia’s sandy beaches where the 
Chesapeake Bay joins the Atlantic Ocean is the site where the unfolding drama of 
the United States began. On April 29, 1607, British colonists landed at what they 
                                                          
27 “The New England Primer,” in Living History America: The History of the United States in Documents, 
Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black Dog & Leventhal 
Publishers, 1999), p. 71. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Qtd. in John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1960), p. 46. 
30 “About Jay Sekulow,” ACLJ website (Washington, D.C.: American Center for Law and Justice, 2021) 
https://aclj.org/jay-sekulow [Accessed 11 April 2021]. Also note: the ACLJ “…is a d/b/a for Christian 
Advocates Serving Evangelism, Inc.” 
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called Cape Henry. The first act of these 120 initial immigrants was to plant a 
wooden cross in the ground, kneel, and ask for God’s blessing on this land. They 
arose to pursue their mission to bring morality to these shores through education 
and religion. In their charter of colonization they stated their intent clearly. They 
wanted to propagate “Christian Religion to such people, as is yet in Darkness and 
miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and worship of God...” Clearly, the 
United States of America began as a culture of conviction, not neutrality.31 
 
The Christian myth of origin has a strength to its argument besides its 
chronological precedence over the second myth we will discuss. It has the benefit of 
continuity. There has been no period in American history when public prayers were not 
offered to (the Christian) God;32 and only recently has this diminished in favor of either 
secular expressions on the one hand (the thoughts in “thoughts and prayers”) or 
religiously plural but bland expressions on the other (the prayers in “thoughts and 
prayers” as a type of civic religion). We will examine this modern period more closely a 
bit later. For now, let us consider the continuity of the Christian origins myth. 
Contrary to a popular understanding, the terms religious liberty and the 
separation of church and state have not always been near-synonyms in American history. 
In his exhaustive study of the history of the meanings of the concept separation of church 
and state, Philip Hamburger writes, 
…the idea of separation of church and state was very different from the religious 
liberty desired by the religious dissenters whose demands shaped the First 
Amendment... The dissenters were the adherents of minority denominations that  
refused to conform to the churches established by law. These established churches 
                                                          
31 Jay Sekulow and Keith Fournier, And Nothing But The Truth (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson Publishers, 
1996), p. 34. 
32 See Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious 
Devotion (New York: BasicBooks, 1993), pp. 100-101. “Religion has always been in the public square. The 
rhetoric of religion has always issued from the mouths of the nation’s political leaders. And it has always 
been a part of the public dialogue of others, too.” (p. 100). “Indeed, as such historians as Jon Butler and 
Cushing Strout have argued, there has been no era in the history of the United States when religion did 
not feature prominently both in the moral lives of citizens and in the public life of the nation.” (p. 101). 
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(Episcopal in the southern states and Congregationalist in most New England 
states) were established through state laws that, most notably, gave government 
salaries to ministers on account of their religion. Whereas the religious liberty 
demanded by most dissenters was a freedom from the laws that created these 
establishments, the separation of church and state was an old, anticlerical, and, 
increasingly, antiecclesiastical conception of the relationship between church and 
state. As might be expected, therefore, separation was not something desired by 
most religious dissenters or guaranteed by the First Amendment. Indeed, it was 
quite distinct from the religious liberty protected in any clause of an American 
constitution, whether that of the federal government or that of any state.33 
 
Though Thomas Jefferson famously explained the First Amendment as creating 
“a wall of separation” between church and state in his 1802 letter to the Danbury 
Baptists,34 his contemporaries, including the Baptists to whom he wrote, did not largely 
agree with that sentiment.35 Historically speaking, “Separation became a substantial part 
of American conceptions of religious liberty only in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, when Americans expressed a growing fear of institutional churches, especially 
the Catholic Church.”36 Concerning the “wall” metaphor for religious liberty, Hamburger 
writes, “…in the history of separation, Jefferson is but a passing figure, less important for 
what he wrote than for the significance later attributed to it.”37 
                                                          
33 Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
pp. 9-10. 
34 Ibid., p. 1.  
35 Ibid., pp. 163-180. In sum, “Thus Jefferson sowed a truth or principle that was not likely to flourish 
among the Baptists—let alone other dissenters. As in the past Jefferson took a phrase developed in one 
context and brought it to bear in another, and he surely hoped… that his words would ‘delight the 
Dissenters.’ Undoubtedly, he said something original about the religious liberty protected by the U.S. 
Constitution, but he did not assist the dissenters. Nor did he ‘delight’ them. Instead, he asserted an idea 
that, at best, proved awkward for the Baptists and, more seriously, conflicted with much of what they 
sought.” (p. 180).  
36 Ibid., p. 480. 
37 Ibid., p. 482. 
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It may surprise many modern Americans that Jefferson’s contemporaries did not 
receive his metaphor of a “wall of separation” between church and state with enthusiasm. 
James Fraser reminds us that, 
For the most part, Colonial European settlers did not come to England’s North 
American colonies seeking religious freedom writ large. The majority who came 
for religious reasons came for the freedom to practice their own form of religion 
and to impose it on all other residents of their colony.38 
 
By Jefferson’s time, although the federal government was prohibited by the First 
Amendment from establishing a religion, the various states were not. Or, more 
accurately, according to Yale legal scholar Stephen L. Carter, “The language of the 
Establishment Clause… prohibits Congress from making any law ‘respecting an 
establishment of religion.’” This key word, which he italicized, had an “evident purpose,” 
which was 
…to prevent the Congress from interfering with state establishments of religion. 
Indeed, there is good reason to think that the principal purpose of the 
Establishment Clause, and maybe the sole one, was to protect state religious 
establishments from disestablishment by the federal government.39 
  
These state religions, of course, were variations on a Christian theme, rooted in 
colonial history. “Puritanism—which became, eventually, Congregationalism—was the 
established religion in all of New England except Rhode Island. Anglicanism—the 
Church of England—was the established church in most of the southern colonies.”40 In 
words that echo the sentiments of many who hold to the Christian origins myth, former 
                                                          
38 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 9. 
39 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p.118. 
40 Warren A. Nord, Religion & American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 100. 
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Speaker of the House and Presidential hopeful Newt Gingrich wrote, “…these important 
words [of the First Amendment] were written to protect freedom of religion, not freedom 
from religion.”41 The states would eventually disestablish religion on their own and not 
because of the First Amendment.42 
In his bestselling book (and accompanying video presentation), Gingrich does a 
fine job of summarizing the continuity of faith in God as a public aspect of American 
history. Though he makes concessions to non-Christians and non-theists,43 his thesis is 
clear: America is a Christian nation (or, at very least, a theistic nation whose God is the 
God of the Bible), dependent upon a public profession of faith in God, and built on 
biblical values. Gingrich cites many examples to support his thesis. For example, he 
mentions George Washington’s first act as president: kissing the Bible upon which he 
swore the oath of office—an oath he extended to include the words, “So help me God.”44 
He mentions the first president’s Thanksgiving Proclamation: “It is the duty of all 
Nations to acknowledge the Providence of Almighty God, to obey His will, to be grateful 
for His benefits, and humbly to implore His protection and favor.”45 He quotes the “Chief 
                                                          
41 Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History 
and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. 7. 
42 “Protestant Christianity was formally disestablished early in the nineteenth century, Massachusetts 
being the last state to disestablish its state church in 1833. But it was so prevalent in American culture up 
to that time, that it could be said that the state was secular, but the nation was Christian.” (David W. 
Machacek and Phillip E. Hammond, “Unsecular Humanism: The Supreme Court and American Public 
Culture,” in Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously: Spiritual Politics on America’s Sacred Ground, Barbara A. 
McGraw and Jo Renee Formicola, eds. (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2005), chapter 12, p. 236). 
43 “All Americans—both those who believe in God and those who do not share this belief—are equal in 
rights and duties under our Constitution and equal in deserving the respect of their fellow citizens.” Newt 
Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History and Future 
(Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. 113. 
44 Ibid., p. xvi. 
45 George Washington, Thanksgiving Proclamation, October 3, 1789, in Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God 
in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas 
Nelson, 2009), p. xvii. 
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Architect of the Constitution,” James Madison: “And to the same Divine Author of every 
good and perfect gift (James 1:17) we are indebted for all those privileges and 
advantages, religious as well as civil, which are so richly enjoyed in this favored land.”46 
Concerning Lincoln, Gingrich speaks of the Second Inaugural Address, engraved 
on the Lincoln Memorial, saying, 
Although a mere 703 words, the address mentions God fourteen times and 
references the Bible four times… Lincoln reflects that the course of the Civil War 
was not controlled by man, but by the Almighty… [and then Lincoln’s own 
words:] “The Almighty has his own purposes.”47 
 
From Calvin Coolidge, we hear: “The foundation of our society and our government rest 
so much on the teachings of the Bible that it would be difficult to support them if faith in 
these teachings would cease to be practically universal in our country.”48 
 There are many more examples, of course, but Gingrich summarizes his 
argument by going back to the very beginning: 
We should ensure that every student’s understanding and appreciation of America 
is enriched by learning about the significant meaning of the founding documents, 
beginning with the Declaration of Independence in which Jefferson wrote the 
original proposition that we are endowed by our Creator with unalienable rights. 
It was this single acknowledgement by the Founders that established the firm 
foundation upon which our Republic was created and has endured for more than 
two and a quarter centuries.49 
 
                                                          
46 James Madison, in Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our 
Nation’s History and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. 92 (Brackets changed to parentheses 
around the scripture verse). 
47 Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History 
and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. 30. 
48 Ibid., p. 50. 
49 Ibid., pp. 116-117. 
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Thomas Jefferson and the founders wrote more than just “their Creator” into the 
Declaration. The document is rooted in a political philosophy dependent on “the Laws of 
Nature and Nature’s God.” Furthermore, the founders appealed “to the Supreme Judge of 
the world for the rectitude” of their cause, and they sought protection from “Divine 
Providence.”50 
Robert H. Bork also argued for this understanding of America’s religious origins. 
He sees the recent decades as marking a fundamental discontinuity. In his book, 
Slouching Toward Gomorrah, he writes: 
The first Congress, which proposed the First Amendment for ratification by the 
states, also appointed chaplains for the House, Senate, and the armed forces. The 
early Congresses regularly petitioned the president to issue Thanksgiving Day 
proclamations addressed to God. The framers and ratifiers could not conceivably 
have anticipated that the Supreme Court, sitting in a courtroom with a painting of 
Moses and the Ten Commandments, would hold it unconstitutional establishment 
of religion for a high school to have a copy of the Ten Commandments on a 
wall.51 
   
For those who agree with Bork and Gingrich, this sense that continuity and 
faithfulness to our origins requires recognition of the United States as a Christian/biblical 
nation is bolstered by court decisions that affirm as much. Indeed, even as the march 
towards greater secularization took place, the Christian identity of the nation was 
sometimes affirmed. For example, the “Illinois Supreme Court… in striking down Bible 
reading [in public schools] in 1910, declared that ‘All stand equal before the law – the 
Protestant, the Catholic, the Mohammedan, the Jew, the Mormon, the free thinker, the 
                                                          
50 The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, in Living History America: The History of the United 
States in Documents, Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems, Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds. (New York: Black 
Dog & Leventhal Publishers, 1999), pp. 147-150. 
51 Robert H. Bork, Slouching Toward Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline (New York: 
ReganBooks, 1996), p. 289. 
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atheist.’ …while conceding that ‘this is a Christian State… [even] a Protestant state’…”52 
Gingrich quotes Justice David Joseph Brewer (1837-1910) as saying, “The American 
nation from its first settlement at Jamestown to this hour is based upon and permeated by 
the principles of the Bible.”53 In the case Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States 
(1892), “…a unanimous [U.S.] Supreme Court made reference to ‘a volume of unofficial 
declarations’ that added weight to ‘the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian 
nation.’”54 Later  as Gingrich points out, “...Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas 
wrote in Zorach vs. Clauson just two years before the Congress added the words ‘under 
God’ to the Pledge: ‘We are a religious people and our institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being.’”55  
With this history and even official stamp of approval by presidents, courts, and 
the founders of the country, it is not surprising that the myth of Christian origins 
continues to have a hold on a large section of the American “social imaginary.”56 In the 
controversy concerning the place of religion in the public schools, the myth strikes a 
chord with those whom I have called restorationists, for it often provokes a nostalgic 
                                                          
52 Damon Mayrl, Secular Conversions: Political Institutions and Religious Education in the United States 
and Australia, 1800-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 162. 
53 Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History 
and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. 68. 
54 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p. 86. Carter also notes that “Justice David J. Brewer, the author of the 
opinion, later wrote a book entitled The United States as a Christian Nation.” (p. 292n8). 
55 Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History 
and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. xi. 
56 Charles Taylor writes, “What is a ‘Social Imaginary’?... What I’m trying to get at with this term is 
something much broader and deeper than the intellectual schemes people may entertain when they think 
about social reality in a disengaged mode. I am thinking rather of the ways in which they imagine their 
social existence, how they fit together with others, how things go on between them and their fellows, the 
expectations which are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images which underlie these 
expectations.” (Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007), p. 171).  
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approach, “…a longing for a past in which Protestant religion and Protestant values 
dominated all aspects of the nation’s life, especially the curriculum and moral tone of the 
public schools.”57 
 To those who interpret American history and culture through this lens, recent 
history (especially since the Supreme Court decisions of the 1960’s that removed official 
prayer and devotional Bible reading from the public schools) seems like a discontinuity 
and a rupture in our public philosophy or public consensus, to borrow a phrase from John 
Courtney Murray.58 The great threat to the Christian myth of origins is secularization, 
often specified as secular humanism and/or atheism, and sometimes expressed succinctly 
as “kicking God out” of the schools and public life. More recently it is characterized as a 
war on religion and religious freedom.  
 The fear that motivates this group is that without Christian/biblical moral 
foundations, the culture will suffer from a lack of coherence and republican virtue will 
abate. The expected result would be a national decline, a descent that would itself signal 
God’s disfavor. Thus, former Secretary of Education William J. Bennett references 
George Washington’s Farewell Address of September 19, 1796: 
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, Religion and 
Morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of 
Patriotism, who should labor to subvert these great Pillars of human happiness, 
these firmest props of the duties of man and citizens… And let us with caution 
indulge the supposition, that morality can be maintained without religion. 
Whatever may be conceded to the influence of refined education on minds of 
                                                          
57 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a Multicultural America, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 238, where he credits the analysis of Justin Watson. 
58 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1960), p. 87. 
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peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that National 
morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.59 
 
 
Bennett also cites Benjamin Rush’s “Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic” in 
his own collection, Our Sacred Honor. Rush wrote, “…the only foundation for a useful 
education in a republic is to be laid in Religion. Without this there can be no virtue, and 
without virtue there can be no liberty, and liberty is the object and life of all republican 
governments… But the religion I mean to recommend… is that of the New Testament.”60 
If America ceases to be a Christian/biblical nation, then, the fear is not only moral 
decline but the resulting destruction of the foundation needed for self-government. This 
decline would signal the loss of God’s blessing. Thus, the Christian origins narrative sees 
recent decades in American history (especially since the 1960’s) as “Slouching Toward 
Gomorrah”61 to use Robert Bork’s vivid expression, evoking both the moral decay of 
biblical Gomorrah and the severe punishment inflicted by God.62 
Politicians and preachers, among others, have picked up on this narrative of 
decline and have blamed everything from school shootings to terrorism on the lack of 
                                                          
59 George Washington, “The Farewell Address,” September 19, 1796, in William J. Bennett, ed., The Book 
of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), p. 794.  
60 Benjamin Rush, “Of the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic,” 1798, in William J. Bennett, ed., Our 
Sacred Honor: Words of Advice from the Founders in Stories, Letters, Poems, and Speeches (New York: 
Simon & Schuster, 1997), p. 412. 
61 Robert H. Bork, Slouching Towards Gomorrah: Modern Liberalism and American Decline (New York: 
ReganBooks, 1996). In the front matter of his book, Bork prints William Butler Yeats’ poem, “The Second 
Coming,” to indicate the apocalyptic theme of his text. Certain lines stand out: “Things fall apart; the 
centre cannot hold” and “Surely the Second Coming is at hand.” 
62 There is an inverse parallel here with ancient Rome. When St. Augustine wrote The City of God in 426 
A.D., he was in part refuting the claims that Christian rejection of the traditional Roman gods was the 
cause of Roman decline.  
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public acknowledgement of God, especially through prayer and Bible reading in the 
schools.63 For example, 
[William] Bennett hit on the ingenious device of “quantifying America’s decline.” 
He contrived an “index of leading cultural indicators” to do for values what the 
index of leading economic indicators did for the economy… By 1993, according 
to Bennett’s indicators, soaring rates of violent crime, teenage pregnancy and 
suicides, births out of wedlock, divorce, and other social pathologies revealed a 
nation in cultural decline.64 
 
 
Bennett would go on to edit the popular The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral 
Stories to help counteract this moral decline that he saw. The country, in his opinion, 
needed a stimulus of “moral literacy.”65  
When considering the First Amendment, then, those who hold to the myth of 
Christian origins emphasize the Free Exercise Clause as what demands our attention, 
                                                          
63 For example, Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. 
Norton & Company, 2005), p. 156: “The House majority leader, Tom DeLay… attributed the shootings at 
the Columbine High School in Colorado to the fact that our schools teach the theory of evolution.” Former 
Governor of Arkansas and Christian minister Mike Huckabee said, “We ask why there is violence in our 
schools but we have systematically removed God from our schools. Should we be so surprised that 
schools would become a place of carnage?” Likewise, “On his radio program on American Family Radio, 
Brian Fischer blamed the lack of prayer in public schools for the tragic shooting of 20 children and six 
adults at an elementary school in Connecticut…” Fischer said, “I thought God cared about the little 
children, God protected the little children. Where was God when all this went down? And here’s the 
bottom line: God is not gonna go where he’s not wanted. Now we have spent, since 1962, this, we’re 50 
years into this now, we have spent 50 years telling God to get lost.” (Huckabee and Fischer qtd. in Chris 
Rodda, “No, Mr. Huckabee, It’s Not Because God Has Been Removed From Schools,” Huffington Post, 
December 17, 2012, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/chris-rodda/no-mr-huckabee-its-not-
be_b_2311607.html [Accessed 16 February 2019]). The Guardian reported after the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001: “The Rev Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson set off a minor explosion of their own 
when they asserted on US television that an angry God had allowed the terrorists to succeed in their 
deadly mission because the United States had become a nation of abortion, homosexuality, secular 
schools and courts, and the American civil liberties union.” (Laurie Goodstein, “Falwell: blame 
abortionists, feminists, gays,” The Guardian, September 19, 2001, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/19/september11.usa9 [Accessed 16 February 2019]. 
64 Allan J. Lichtman, White Protestant Nation: The Rise of the American Conservative Movement (New 
York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2008), p. 418. 
65 William J. Bennett, ed., The Book of Virtues: A Treasury of Great Moral Stories (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1993), p. 11. 
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precisely because they interpret the rupture they see as an attack on religious liberty. 
Philip Hamburger, writing from his position as Professor of Law at the University of 
Chicago, adds scholarly weight to their position: 
…separation [of church and state as it has developed] has had a severe effect, 
particularly upon individuals whose religious beliefs lead them to worship and 
otherwise act as part of a religious group. The federal and state constitutional 
provisions designed to protect religious liberty have, ironically, come to be 
understood in terms of an idea that substantially reduces this freedom.66 
 
 
Gingrich summarized the feelings of this group very well when he wrote, “Contrary to 
those who want to eliminate religious expression from the public square, these important 
words [of the First Amendment] were written to protect freedom of religion, not freedom 
from religion.”67 
 
1.2.2 A Hermeneutic of Suspicion and a Dangerous Memory Re: The Christian 
Origins Myth 
 
A hermeneutic of suspicion refers to an approach to interpretation that keeps a 
careful eye out for what has been overlooked, suppressed, distorted, forgotten, or simply 
left out, often by centuries of androcentric, white, middle-class, European and American 
Christian scholarship and cultural narrative, which did not value the missing knowledge 
and voices. Thomas Groome summarizes the approach saying, 
The… task in hermeneutics of suspicion is first to look out for false consciousness 
and distortions in original texts and/or their accepted interpretations, to un-cover 
negative consequences they may have had over history or still legitimate now… 
                                                          
66 Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
p. 14. 
67 Newt Gingrich, Rediscovering God in America: Reflections on the Role of Faith in Our Nation’s History 
and Future (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2009), p. 7. 
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[and ultimately] to un-cover from the texts of tradition the subjugated or forgotten 
memories that can give new life.68 
 
As we look at the two dominant myths of origins, we do well to employ a 
hermeneutic of suspicion. What is typically left out or suppressed in the telling? What 
does justice require us to reclaim in order to establish a more authentic understanding of 
the past? In the case of the Christian myth of America’s origins, a hermeneutic of 
suspicion brings into relief what theologian Johann Baptist Metz popularized as 
dangerous memories, a recollection or anamnesis regarding the suffering, the oppression, 
the injustice, the resistance, and the victims of history—those who do not write the 
official accounts.69  
It is important to note that the Christian myth has had a decidedly intolerant 
dimension. While the mythic version emphasizes the coming to America for religious 
freedom, the historical reality demands more nuance. “The Puritans came to America for 
religious liberty—their own, not anyone else’s,” writes Warren Nord. “Moved by a sense 
of divine mission and confident of the truth, they, like most believers of that day, were 
decidedly intolerant.” Thus,  
…the New England Puritans saw fit, on occasion, to brand, bore the tongues, or 
cut the ears off heretics, and between 1649 and 1651 they hanged four Quakers. A 
                                                          
68 Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral 
Ministry, The Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1991), p. 232. 
69 Groome writes, “As people uncover the social history of present praxis, an emancipatory interest also 
prompts them to search out the ‘dangerous memories’ embedded in the communal narrative behind this 
present praxis. These life-giving memories are ‘dangerous’ (popularized by Metz) in that they subvert 
rather than legitimate oppressive and unjust aspects of present praxis.” He quotes Russell Butkus: 
“Dangerous memory refers to the remembrance of suffering and injustice and to the remembrance of 
freedom as it takes shape in commitment to and action for justice.” (Ibid., p. 204). See also Candace 
McLean, “Theology 101: Dangerous Memories,” Daily Theology, December 11, 2015, 
https://dailytheology.org/2015/12/11/theology-101-dangerous-memories/ [Accessed 5 May 2021]. 
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few years later, Puritans in Maryland outlawed Roman Catholicism, plundered 
Catholic estates, banished priests, and executed four Catholics.70 
 
Sometimes, intolerance did not issue in violence, but in biased laws. For example, 
in 1659, the Massachusetts Bay Colony passed legislation to ban the public celebration of 
Christmas, declaring that “‘whosoever shall be found observing any such day as 
Christmas or the like, either by forbearing of labor, feasting, or any other way’ was 
subject to a 5-shilling fine.”71 (This is an ironic twist considering that many who hold to 
the Christian myth of origins see the public celebration of Christmas as a significant 
battle in the culture wars today). Christopher Klein notes the anti-Catholic bias that was 
present in the legislation. He quotes historian Stephen Nissenbaum: 
According to Nissenbaum, “Puritans believed Christmas was basically just a 
pagan custom that the Catholics took over without any biblical basis for it. The 
holiday had everything to do with the time of year, the solstice and Saturnalia and 
nothing to do with Christianity.”72 
 
The law was finally repealed under pressure from England in 1681, but the public 
celebration remained prohibited de facto for many years. “Until well into the 1800s,” 
Klein writes, “businesses and schools in Massachusetts remained open on December 25 
while many churches stayed closed. Not until 1856 did Christmas—along with 
Washington’s Birthday and the Fourth of July—finally become a public holiday in 
Massachusetts.”73 It is indeed a dangerous memory to recall that anti-Catholicism was in 
the mix early on, and it would continue to be so. 
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The dangerous memories run deeper still. Theologian Jeannine Hill Fletcher 
makes a strong case for Christian supremacism being the engine that drives White 
supremacism in American history. “The history of the United States,” she writes, “has 
been that of a White Christian nation in which the dominant racial project has been to 
create the category of White, sort some people into it, and assign material benefits on the 
basis of it to the exclusion of non-White others.”74 The connection between Christian 
theology and White supremacism is precisely her interest. We have seen already the 
missionary zeal of Catholic explorers and the sense of Divine Providence and Manifest 
Destiny that accompanied the first European settlers on American soil. Fletcher 
implicates these in her thesis that “Whiteness and Christianness have been twin pillars of 
the dominant religio-racial project.”  More specifically, she claims that “the theology of 
Christian supremacy gave birth to the ideology of White supremacy… The systems and 
structures of White supremacy have been intimately joined with Christian supremacy, 
such that undoing White supremacy will also require relinquishing the ideologies and 
theologies of Christian supremacy.”75 
In short, there is a tragic underside to the idea that the United States is a Christian 
nation. Fletcher writes: 
As the architects of a foundling nation struggled to extend Christendom, they 
employed their theological heritage to construct what will become a lasting 
dominant way of thinking, what Joe Feagin calls the “white racial frame.” In 
Feagin’s explanation, this long-term and persisting way of framing reality was 
created in the origins of the United States as a way of justifying the exploitation 
on non-White, non-Christian peoples during the era of land theft from Native 
peoples and labor theft by enslavement.76 
                                                          
74 Jeannine Hill Fletcher, The Sin of White Supremacy: Christianity, Racism, & Religious Diversity in America 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017), p. 3. 
75 Ibid., p. 5. 




The Christian supremacist view allowed for a theology by Catholics and Protestants alike 
that saw God’s hand in the expansion of Christian territory—into the lands of Native 
Peoples—and saw God’s will in the rule of Christians over non-Christians.  
The cosmology of a “great chain of being” functioned as a hierarchy with God, 
Christ, and Christians at the top, and the remainder of humanity hierarchically 
ordered below. Since Christians were almost exclusively White, the sliding scale 
reflected this Whiteness… The hierarchy of humanity with White Christians at 
the top reflected God’s favor on virtuous human beings. If it was to Christians 
that God’s favor was granted, non-Christians clearly had received the opposite in 
God’s curse. If it was White Christians who demonstrated evidence of God’s 
favor, Blackness could mark God’s curse as well. The religious and the racial 
came together in the theo-logic of the “curse of Ham” that was mobilized by 
White Christians to justify enslaving Africans…77 
  
Thus, Fletcher argues that “Christian supremacy underwrote White supremacy.” 
In the Christian myth of origins, this is an important dangerous memory to reclaim and 
acknowledge. The devastation and deculturalization of the Native tribes, and the 
kidnapping, torture, and oppression of Black people and families as slaves are both part 
of America’s original sin of racism.78 That racism was justified and amplified by 
associating Whiteness with Christianity, and Christianity with God’s supreme will. 
Perhaps this was never better expressed than on the floor of the Senate in a speech by 
Sen. Thomas Hart Benton regarding the annexation of Oregon in 1846, which Fletcher 
includes in her study: 
                                                          
77 Jeannine Hill Fletcher, The Sin of White Supremacy: Christianity, Racism, & Religious Diversity in America 
(Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2017), pp. 9-10. 
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“It would seem that the White race alone received the divine command, to subdue 
and replenish the earth! For it is the only race that has obeyed it—the only one 
that hunts out new and distant lands, and even a New World, to subdue and 
replenish… Three and a half centuries ago, this race, in obedience to the great 
command arrived in the New World, and found new lands to subdue and 
replenish.” Benton employs a theo-logic of Christian supremacy to affirm “this 
Christian people” of the White race replacing “the wigwam” and “the savages,” 
moving across the land in a God-ordained drive to perfection that Christianity 
brings to the world.79 
 
For those whose narrative of American history includes and depends upon the 
myth of Christian origins, there is plenty to celebrate. Even John Courtney Murray wrote 
that “The American Bill of Rights is not a piece of eighteenth-century rationalist theory; 
it is far more the product of Christian history.”80 Nonetheless, this brief application of a 
hermeneutic of suspicion reminds us that the myth is not innocent, and that dangerous 
memories must be retrieved and embraced in our understanding as we move forward. The 
dark side of the myth, after all, is not absent today. The Ku Klux Klan as it was re-
organized in the 20th century and the White nationalism/alt-right of today (people like the 
politically and socially influential Steve Bannon, of Breitbart News and early Trump 
administration fame) continue to rely on the myth of Christian origins to fuel their racist 
propaganda under the guise of innocent White pride and defense of Western values. Even 
in academia, we find writers at elite institutions who rely on the Christian myth in order 
to promote an arguably anti-immigrant and, admittedly, waspy view, such as the late 
Samuel P. Huntington at Harvard.81 These views, decidedly adverse (even neuralgic in 
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some cases) to religious pluralism, multiculturalism, and diversity,82 directly impact how 
we think about religion(s) and education in our public schools. 
 
1.2.3 A Second Myth of Origins: Religious Diversity 
 As we consider the place of religion in American public life, and especially in the 
public schools, it is imperative to examine a second myth of origins. Whereas the first 
myth focused on the United States being a Christian country, and at very least, a country 
dedicated to the God of the Bible, the second myth focuses on religious diversity as a 
foundational narrative. 
 Those who hold to the religious diversity myth of origins hold much in common 
with those whose primary lens is the Christian myth. Both groups recognize the religious 
motivations (among others) that impelled the first European settlers to come to these 
shores. Both would acknowledge the role of Christianity in shaping the country, its 
institutions, its laws, and its culture(s). Both acknowledge the demographic dominance of 
Christianity throughout our history, and the persistent presence of Christianity in the 
                                                          
importance of Anglo-Protestant culture, not for the importance of Anglo-Protestant people, I believe one 
of the greatest achievements, perhaps the greatest achievement, of America is the extent to which it has 
eliminated the racial and ethnic components that historically were central to its identity and has become 
a multiethnic, multiracial society in which individuals are to be judged on their merits.” (p. xvii). His 
distinction seems to me to be untenable and his assessment of racial and ethnic progress a long way off 
from reality.  
82 For example: “Multiculturalism represented the culmination of a long erosion of the emphasis on 
national identity in American education.” (Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to 
America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), p. 174). Of course, his 
“national identity” is what he calls “Anglo-Protestant” (p. xv, ff). Stephen Macedo gives a more nuanced 
view along the same lines, “…liberal institutions and practices shape all of our deepest moral 
commitments in such a way as to make them supportive of liberalism. That work is both legitimate and at 
odds with the notion that our basic commitment is to difference, diversity, or versions of multiculturalism 
designed without keeping civic aims in view.” (Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in 
a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 164).  
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public square. Both groups would claim that the United States must respect religious 
liberty. This, though, is where they begin to differ. For example, to those whose myth of 
origins is the religious diversity version, the Pilgrims came to the so-called New World 
(which was not so new to those Native Peoples already living here!) precisely for 
religious liberty. It was not their Christianity, per se, that dominates in this narrative, but 
rather their search for peace and freedom to practice their religion; the Christianity is 
incidental.  
The term religious liberty carries different meanings depending on one’s myth of 
origins. In the Christian origins myth, it is primarily interpreted as freedom to bring one’s 
faith (read: Christianity) into the public square; there is scant toleration for non-Christian 
religions, and virtually none for atheism and secular humanism. Martha Nussbaum 
describes the situation this creates quite well:  
Liberty of conscience is not equal… if the government announces a religious 
orthodoxy, saying that this, and not that, is the religious view that defines us as a 
nation. Even if such an orthodoxy is not coercively imposed, it is a statement that 
creates an in-group and an out-group. It says that we do not all enter the public 
square on the same basis: one religion is the American religion and others are not. 
It means, in effect, that minorities have religious liberty at the sufferance of the 
majority and must acknowledge that their views are subordinate, in the public 
sphere, to majority views.83 
 
 
George Washington had said as much in a letter to a Jewish synagogue in 1790. Linda 
Monk summarizes the key portion of his letter this way: “…toleration implied the 
unacceptable premise that ‘it was by the indulgence of one class of people that another 
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enjoyed the exercise of their natural rights.’”84 Religious liberty, according to some in the 
Christian origins group, is a gift of a Christian nation, and one cannot undo the Christian 
foundations without threatening the liberty it bestows.85 Hence, there is a preferential 
treatment of Protestant Christianity within this understanding.  
 On the other hand, those who subscribe to the religious diversity myth of origins 
understand religious liberty to have a more expansive meaning that embraces non-
Christians and atheists as well. To this group, there is no discontinuity in what is seen as 
a gradual unfolding of the implications of the founding and the First Amendment over 
time. Instead, there is a continuous, though not always smooth, movement in American 
history to live up to the ideals of religious liberty in an increasingly religiously diverse 
society. 
 The religious diversity narrative emphasizes not the monolith of Christian 
missionary and colonial settlement work and foundations, but rather the diversity of those 
who came to America, who were violently brought to America and enslaved, and who 
were here already when Europeans arrived. John Courtney Murray put it concisely: 
“…pluralism was the native condition of American society.”86 The early Catholic 
explorers and the Puritan colonists were joined by…  
 
…Quakers and Moravians and Mennonites and Methodists and Lutherans and 
free-thinkers and the religiously indifferent and a few Jews and, on the colonial 
margins, Native Americans with their own religions. Even within the Calvinist 
tradition there were Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Baptists, and the Dutch and 
French Reformed, and there was constant warfare between the “Separationist” 
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and “Non-Separationist” Puritans as there would be between New Light and Old 
Light Congregationalists… And there were Anglicans… In America, there were, 
almost from the start, twenty or thirty sects, and with the Great Awakening non-
established religions flourished.87 
 
Over time, this pluralism of religions (and spiritualities and varieties of non-religion) 
expanded. David Machecek and Phillip Hammond describe the growth: 
…there is no doubt that nineteenth century America experienced a vast 
multiplication of religions. Not only did Protestant groups proliferate, but Jews 
also increased in number and Roman Catholics came in massive waves. 
Meanwhile, Transcendentalists, Spiritualists, Millerites, Mormons, and many 
more religious groups added to the obvious religious heterogeneity. Pluralism 
took a quantum leap during this period.88 
 
Diana L. Eck, the scholar responsible for Harvard’s Pluralism Project, writes, 
“…America has always been a land of many religions… A vast, textured pluralism was 
already present in the lifeways of the Native peoples—even before the European settlers 
came to these shores...” and she concludes, “The United States has become the most 
religiously diverse nation on earth.”89     
                                                          
87 Warren A. Nord, Religion & American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma (Chapel Hill, NC: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 100. 
88 David W. Machacek and Phillip E. Hammond, “Unsecular Humanism: The Supreme Court and American 
Public Culture,” in Barbara A. McGraw and Jo Renee Formicola, eds., Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously: 
Spiritual Politics on America’s Sacred Ground (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2005), chapter 12, p. 237. 
89 “Historians tell us that America has always been a land of many religions, and this is true. A vast, 
textured pluralism was already present in the lifeways of the Native peoples—even before the European 
settlers came to these shores... The people who came across the Atlantic from Europe also had diverse 
religious traditions—Spanish and French Catholics, British Anglicans and Quakers, Sephardic Jews and 
Dutch Reform Christians… this diversity broadened over the course of three hundred years of settlement. 
Many of the Africans brought to these shores with the slave trade were Muslims. The Chinese and 
Japanese who came to seek their fortune in the mines and fields of the West brought with them a mixture 
of Buddhist, Taoist, and Confucian traditions. Eastern European Jews and Irish and Italian Catholics also 
arrived in force in the nineteenth century… Punjabis from northwest India came in the first decade of the 
twentieth century. Most of them were Sikhs who settled in the Central and Imperial Valleys of California, 
built America’s first gurdwaras, and intermarried with Mexican women, creating a rich Sikh-Spanish 
subculture… The immigrants of the last three decades [of the twentieth century], however, have 
expanded the diversity of our religious life dramatically, exponentially. Buddhists… Hindus… Muslims… 
Sikhs and Jains… Zoroastrians… Afro-Caribbean traditions, blending both African and Catholic symbols and 
images… the internal diversity of American Judaism is greater than ever before… Pentecostal 
communities… Indian Mar Thomas, and Egyptian Copts… The United States has become the most 
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The First Amendment developed as a compromise necessitated by the religious 
diversity of the times and by the desire to live in peace. The historical moment, following 
years of bloody religious wars in Europe, is the essential context. Religious liberty in this 
reading is both freedom from oppression and freedom of conscience. It is about living 
together in peace in a religiously plural society. James Fraser writes, 
…full religious freedom and equality came to the new nation because it was 
everyone’s second choice… Everyone wanted religious freedom for themselves, 
and the only way they saw to get it was to grant it, however grudgingly, to others. 
Thus religious freedom came to the new United States not by ideology or design 
but by compromise and accident.90 
 
 For this very reason, Jesuit theologian John Courtney Murray referred to the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment as “Articles of Peace.” He explained: 
If history makes one thing clear it is that these clauses were the twin children of 
social necessity, the necessity of creating a social environment, protected by law, 
in which [people] of differing religious faiths might live together in peace.91 
 
He enumerated four reasons why the First Amendment became necessary: 
First, there was the great mass of the unchurched… The fact may be embarrassing 
to the highminded believer, but it is nevertheless a fact that the development of 
religious freedom in society bears a distinct relationship to the growth of unbelief 
and indifference… The second factor was the multiplicity of denominations… 
The sheer fact of dissent and sectarian antagonisms was a particularly important 
motive of the Federal constitutional arrangements… Thirdly, the economic factor 
                                                          
religiously diverse nation on earth.” (Diana L. Eck, A New Religious America: How a “Christian Country” 
Has Become the World’s Most Religiously Diverse Nation (New York: HarperOne, 2001), pp. 3-4). John 
Dewey call this religiously plural setting in America “the greatest change that has occurred in religion in all 
history.” (John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 61). 
90 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a Multicultural America 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 17. He argues that this hasn’t changed much either: “We would 
prefer an establishment of our particular beliefs, many seemed to say, but if we cannot have that, at least 
give us tolerance and do not establish someone else’s beliefs. How little has changed in 220 years?” 
(p. 238). 
91 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1960), p. 69. This, Murray claims, is why the First 
Amendment is good law. “All law,” he wrote, “looks to the common good, which is normative for all law. 
And social peace, assured by equal justice in dealing with possibly conflicting groups, is the highest 
integrating element of the common good.” 
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was by no means unimportant… Persecution and discrimination were as bad for 
business affairs as they were for the affairs of the soul… A fourth factor of lesser 
importance was the pressure… exerted by the widening of religious freedom in 
England… These four factors, taken as a sociological complex, made it 
sufficiently clear to all reasonable [people] that under American conditions any 
other course but freedom of religion and separation of church and state would 
have been disruptive, imprudent, impractical, indeed impossible.92 
 
 The First Amendment, of course, has its precursors, and to those who hold to the 
religious diversity myth of origins, there is no figure more important than Thomas 
Jefferson. The touchstone of their argument is the famous “wall of separation” letter to 
the Danbury Baptists that we noted earlier. Philip Hamburger begins his thorough study, 
Separation of Church and State, with our third president: 
Jefferson’s words seem to have shaped the nation. Beginning with his draft of the 
Declaration of Independence, Jefferson’s taut phrases have given concentrated 
and elevated expression to some of the nation’s most profound ideals… Few of 
Jefferson’s phrases appear to have had more significance for the law and life of 
the United States than those in which he expressed his hope for a separation of 
church and state. In 1802, in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association, he 
quoted the First Amendment and interpreted it in rather different words: “I 
contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people 
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a 
wall of separation between Church & State.” … In the minds of many, his words 
have even displaced those of the U.S. Constitution, which, by contrast, seem 
neither so apt nor so clear.93 
   
This metaphor of a wall took on special significance in the mid-twentieth century 
when the Supreme Court gave it legal standing. As we saw earlier, Stephen Carter noted 
that  
Justice Hugo Black, in Everson v. Board of Education (1947), often is said to 
have started the ball rolling when he wrote these words: “The First Amendment 
                                                          
92 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1960), pp. 70-71. 
93 Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
p. 1. Italics in the original. 
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has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept high and 
impregnable We could not approve the slightest breach.”94 
 
Carter would admit, though, that the ball which Justice Black got rolling made its way to 
the Supreme Court in the previous century when it ruled against polygamy in Reynolds v. 
United States (1878). The Court unanimously found that the government could not 
interfere with beliefs, but could, in fact, make laws regarding actions. Otherwise, the 
justices argued, even human sacrifice could be construed as beyond the scope of 
legislation under the mantle of religious liberty and the First Amendment. To reach their 
decision, the justices turned to none other than Jefferson and “even treated Jefferson’s 
letter to the Danbury Baptist Association as an authoritative interpretation of the First 
Amendment.”95 
The concept of separation of church and state was not really “rolling” until 
Everson, though, for, in Hamburger’s words, “the Court did not clearly rely upon 
separation and thus did not yet elevate it to constitutional law…”96 Nonetheless, even the 
dissenting opinion, written by Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, affirmed the basic principle: 
“we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation 
between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion.”97 This harkens 
back to James Madison, that great proponent together with Jefferson of religious liberty 
                                                          
94 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p. 109. Carter quotes Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).  
95 Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
p. 260. 
96 Ibid. Hamburger also alludes to the fact that Nativism was in the air, and while he does not expressly 
say it, it seems implied that the fear of Catholic immigrants giving allegiance to church law over civil law 
may have been in the background of this decision as well.  
97 Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, dissenting opinion in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/330/1#writing-USSC_CR_0330_0001_ZD1 [Accessed 15 
December 2018].  
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in Virginia, who declared, “Religion and government will both exist in greater purity, the 
less they are mixed together.”98 
Madison joined primary author George Mason to give us the Virginia Declaration 
of Rights in 1776; this would influence both the Declaration of Independence and the Bill 
of Rights. In paragraph sixteen we read: 
That religion, or the duty which we owe to our Creator, and the manner of 
discharging it, can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or 
violence; and therefore all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, 
according to the dictates of conscience; and that it is the mutual duty of all to 
practice Christian forbearance, love, and charity towards each other.99 
 
 
It is clear that expansive language regarding religious liberty, though seen through a 
Christian lens, was prominent in our political philosophy even before the First 
Amendment, and helped to shape it. It included freedom from oppression (“not by force 
or violence”) as well as freedom of expression (“the free exercise of religion”) and 
conscience (“according to the dictates of conscience”). 
 This would be echoed in Jefferson’s famous Virginia Statute for Religious 
Freedom, ratified ten years later. In that document, Jefferson spoke of religious liberty as 
a “natural right,” and Virginia established his words as law: 
…no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, 
or ministry, whatsoever, nor shall be enforced, restrained, molested, or burthened 
in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious 
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to 
                                                          
98 Qtd. in Alan Colmes, Red, White, & Liberal: How Left is Right & Right is Wrong (New York: ReganBooks, 
2003), p. 217. 
99 Virginia Declaration [of Rights] (1776), in Erik Bruun and Jay Crosby, eds., Living History America: The 
History of the United States in Documents, Essays, Letters, Songs and Poems (New York: Black Dog & 
Leventhal Publishers, 1999), p. 146. For the sake of preserving the historical context, I have not changed 
“men” to inclusive language. 
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maintain, their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no wise 
diminish enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.100 
 
By this act, Virginia effectively disestablished the Church of England and opened itself to 
religious pluralism, not merely tolerating non-Anglicans, but expressing the full embrace 
as equal citizens before the law of religious people of every stripe. Jefferson himself 
understood this act to include not only the various denominations of Christians, but Jews, 
Muslims, and others as well. James Hutson writes: 
In his autobiography, Jefferson recounted with satisfaction that in the struggle to 
pass his landmark Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786), the Virginia 
legislature “rejected by a great majority” an effort to limit the bill’s scope “in 
proof that they meant to comprehend, within the mantle of its protection, the Jew 
and the Gentile, the Christian and Mahometan.”101  
 
 
The “effort to limit the bill’s scope” was quite specifically an attempt to restrict religious 
liberty to Christian liberty: “Efforts to delete the entire preamble—an endorsement of 
Enlightenment principles and religious freedom—were defeated, as was an effort to 
modify Jefferson's generic reference to ‘the holy author of our religion’ so that it 
specified ‘Jesus Christ.’”102 
 Madison, the Father of the Constitution, was first a Virginian, making the case for 
religious liberty writ large. Even after the passage of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, 
the state decided to impose a religious tax to benefit the various Christian sects. Madison 
                                                          
100 Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (1786), in Alf J. Mapp, Jr., The Faiths of Our Fathers: What 
America’s Founders Really Believed (New York: Fall River Press, 2003), pp. 159-60. See fn. 99 regarding 
inclusive language. 
101 James H. Hutson, “The Founding Fathers and Islam,” May, 2002, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20050427225400/http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/0205/tolerance.html 
[Accessed December 15, 2018]. 
102 John Ragosta, "Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom (1786)," Encyclopedia Virginia, 
Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, July 2, 2014, 
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Virginia_Statute_for_Establishing_Religious_Freedom_1786#its2 
[Accessed December 15, 2018]. 
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responded to this with his famous “A Memorial and Remonstrance” of 1785: “Who does 
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other 
Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion 
of all other Sects?”103    
In recent years, Alan Colmes, a popular media personality who offered one face 
of the American culture wars, represented the religious diversity myth of origins by 
reflecting on our founders: 
…our founding fathers realized that religious differences, which might become 
more pronounced down the road, could lead to division, as they did when the 
Puritans left England to form the Massachusetts Bay Colony, or even violence, as 
they did during the English civil war in the seventeenth century.104 
 
He specifically refuted the Christian myth of origins, citing George Washington: 
The Treaty of Tripoli, which affirmed our friendship with the Barbary Coast 
nation, was negotiated during the administration of our nation’s founder, George 
Washington, and signed on June 10, 1797, by our second president John Adams. 
Article XI of the treaty states, “As the government of the United States of 
America is not in any sense founded on the Christian Religion… no pretext 
arising from religious opinions shall ever produce an interruption of the harmony 
existing between the two countries… The United States is not a Christian nation 
any more than it is a Jewish or a Mohammedan nation.”105   
 
Thus, like the myth of Christian origins, the myth of religious diversity is rooted 
in American history and has its own canon of presidents, founding documents, and court 
decisions to back up its claim. Like the Christian myth, it must be taken seriously as we 
consider the place of religion(s) in public education.  
                                                          
103 James Madison (anonymously), “‘Memorial and Remonstrance’ by James Madison (1785),” 
https://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/A_Memorial_and_Remonstrance_by_James_Madison_1785 
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1.2.4 A Hermeneutic of Suspicion and a Dangerous Memory Re: The Religious 
Diversity Myth 
 
 When we look at the religious diversity myth of origins with a hermeneutic of 
suspicion, our attention is brought to two extremes that are often left out of the telling. In 
both cases, the extremes represent a forgetfulness, intentional or not, about the origins 
and nature of religious liberty in American history. 
 
1.2.4a. One Extreme of the Religious Diversity Myth: Secularism106 
 
 On one extreme is secularism. In this sub-grouping are those who subscribe to 
something akin to French laïcité. Symbolic of this approach is Michael Newdow, who 
                                                          
106 I follow Charles Taylor, Warren Nord, and Damon Mayrl in discussing secularization. From Taylor, I find 
a worthwhile threefold distinction (see footnote 108 and its referent in the text). From Nord, I find this 
differentiation helpful: “Secularization is the multifaceted process by which people and institutions 
become secular. Secularism is an ideological or philosophical position; secularists favor secularization. But 
secularization may result from causes other than the actions and arguments of secularists.” (Warren A. 
Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 76). Mayrl details the complex process by which American society, 
which is so religious in some senses of the word, has become uniquely secular in its institutional 
arrangements, especially in the schools. He attributes this largely to the ready access Americans have to 
the levers of democracy and to seeking redress from the courts. “When it comes to religion, therefore, I 
argue that American political institutions should be understood as engines of conflict, whose very 
structure encourages regular contestation. The issues may change, but the structure of the conflict has 
remained consistent since the late nineteenth century: conflict is channeled through those institutional 
vehicles most open and accessible to political actors—courts and local government.” (Damon Mayrl, 
Secular Conversions: Political Institutions and Religious Education in the United States and Australia, 1800-
2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p. 252. Emphasis in the original). Also, “Why is 
American Education so Secular?... I have shown that the decentralized, democratic, accessible American 
state made the difference. It was not pluralism alone that led to American secularity, but where and how 
that pluralism found political expression. And it was not just America’s strong constitutional protections, 
but how those protections shaped American culture and provided opportunities for controversies to make 
their way into the courts. America’s strict separation in education thus reflects the democratic, permeable 
character of the American state as much as its demographics or Constitution.” (Ibid., p. 248. Emphasis in 
the original as a section heading).  
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has worked for a solid wall of separation, in which the state is stripped of any religious 
accoutrements, and where religious voices are not welcomed, qua religious voices, in the 
public square.107 The goal is total secularity, what Charles Taylor calls “secularity-1,” 
that is, “secularized public spaces.”108 They adhere to an ideology of secularism,109 and 
theirs is the second loud voice in the culture wars, opposing the Christian restorationists. 
 Some might argue that this sub-group should be a distinct third myth of origins: 
that the United States was founded as a secular nation. Certainly, many of the proponents 
of secularization would like to see the U.S. become a thoroughly secular society. 
However, in terms of a historical narrative, I find it better suited to locate this ideology as 
an extreme of the religious diversity myth. In short, their philosophy does not deny that 
the United States was settled and founded by many religious people (and that religious 
peoples were here before European settlement) and was founded, in part, for religious 
freedom, but defines religious liberty in terms of a strict separation of church and state. In 
this telling, the American solution to accommodating religious diversity, including the 
liberty to have no religion at all, was and is the secular state. The Freedom from Religion 
Foundation (FFRF) explains it this way: 
                                                          
107 Michael Newdow is most famous (or infamous, depending on who is reporting) for challenging the 
words “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance. See Elk Grove United School District v. Newdow, 520 U.S. 1 
(2004) in which the U.S. Supreme Court decided Newdow did not have standing to bring the case: 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-1624 [Accessed 17 February 2019].  
108 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
p. 20. Secularity-2 refers to the “decline of belief and practice.” Secularity-3, which is the main concern of 
his exhaustive study, refers to “a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and, indeed, 
unproblematic, to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not the 
easiest to embrace” (p. 3). 
109 Warren Nord calls these “hard secularists” in Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in 
Our Schools and Universities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 77: “Some secularists hold that 
belief in God is a mistake and a commitment to religious institutions is foolish (if not immoral). They are 




The Foundation recognizes that the United States was first among nations to adopt 
a secular Constitution. The founders who wrote the U.S. Constitution wanted 
citizens to be free to support the church of their choice, or no religion at all. Our 
Constitution was very purposefully written as a godless document, whose only 
references to religion are exclusionary… It is vital to buttress the Jeffersonian 
"wall of separation between church and state" which has served our nation so 
well.110 
 
This view requires adopting a novel understanding of religious liberty that was not there 
during European settlement and the founding, as we have seen. It is this exact position 
that Gingrich and others attack when they speak of the First Amendment as guaranteeing 
freedom of religion, not freedom from religion. 
Forgetting the religious nature of the American founding is a dangerous amnesia, 
for, as James Fraser points out, relying on the work of Michael Apple, “To the degree 
religious people have been marginalized and driven into the arms of political 
conservatives, who are not otherwise their allies, to that degree, educational liberals, 
secular and not quite so secular have failed.” He goes on to quote Apple directly, 
“Making schools more open and responsive [to the various religious and non-religious 
constituencies]… is… absolutely crucial for interrupting the growth of rightist social 
movements.”111 This is not simply a fear that people will become political conservatives; 
rather, the worry is that the overwhelming majority of Americans, who remain religious, 
will feel disenfranchised. Can we deny that the populism of President Donald Trump 
played directly to this sense of religious disenfranchisement in the public square? Just as 
Huntington worried that abandoning an Anglo-Protestant cultural norm would leave the 
                                                          
110 Freedom from Religion Foundation, “About the Foundation, FAQ,” https://ffrf.org/faq/item/12602-
why-is-the-foundation-concerned-with-state-church-entanglement? [Accessed 21 January 2019]. 
111 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a Multicultural America 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 239. 
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country splintered and without a sense of who we are, and Bork quoted the poet William 
Butler Yeats that “Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold,”112 so too Fraser and Apple 
worry that extreme secularism creates the conditions for the possibility of fragmentation 
and extremism. The national social fabric, they fear, will be torn asunder by distrust and 
disenfranchisement. Public education, which is both formative and performative of 
community, might diminish in favor of private and home school arrangements, hurting 
our hopes of e pluribus unum.113   
Fraser had the Christian Coalition in mind when he wrote in 1999. Still, the 
urgency of what Apple called “Making schools more open and responsive” to the Muslim 
population in the United States following the attacks of September 11, 2001 cannot be 
understated if we are interested in “interrupting the growth of rightist social movements.” 
Prior to the terrorist attacks and the socio-political and military responses to the attacks, 
Muslims in the United States were largely becoming what M.A. Muqtedar Khan calls 
                                                          
112 See footnote 61. 
113 Michael Apple worries, in particular, that driving students away from public schools leads to drains on 
economic resources that exacerbate class and racial divisions in society, while also opening the doors for 
public funding being channeled to religious uses precisely because of lack of public oversight (including 
the use of funds to buy home school religious textbooks that denigrate non-Christians, especially 
Muslims). Nonetheless, he is sympathetic to the legitimate complaints that (typically) conservative 
Christian parents have about public education officials being dismissive and even disparaging about their 
values. Concerning the need for democratic engagement that takes both social justice concerns and 
concerns for recognition and representation seriously, Apple writes, “If schools do not do this, there may 
be all too many parents who are pushed in the direction of anti-school sentiment. This would be a tragedy 
both for the public school system and for our already withered sense of community that is increasingly 
under threat. Even though state-supported schools have often served as arenas through which powerful 
social divisions are partly reproduced, at least in the United States such schools have also served as 
powerful sites for the mobilization of collective action and for the preservation of the very possibility of 
democratic struggle (Hogan, 1983; Reese, 1986). As one of the few remaining institutions that is still 
public, struggles over it are crucial.” (Michael W. Apple, “Away with All Teachers: The Cultural Politics of 
Home Schooling,” 2000, published online March 4, 2011, International Studies in Sociology of Education 




“Muslim Democrats.”114 He contrasts them with “Muslim Isolationists [who] hold that 
the United States is an evil empire dedicated to global domination,”115 and to “Muslim 
Assimilators… from the senior generation who chose assimilation, i.e., ‘normalization,’ 
into mainstream American culture, rather than challenging what assimilation entailed.”116 
Muslim Democrats, on the other hand, 
…are… quick to acknowledge that Muslims are better treated in the United States 
than they are in Muslim countries. They have seen democracy, pluralism, and 
cultural and religious tolerance in action, and are fascinated by the ability to 
resolve political differences peacefully in the United States.117  
 
Importantly, Khan notes about Muslim Democrats that 
 
They have emphasized Islamic principles of justice, religious tolerance, and 
cultural pluralism. They have Islamized Western values of freedom, human rights, 
and respect for tolerance by finding Islamic sources and precedence [such as, 
critically, the Quran] that justify them.118  
 
 
Khan then goes on to share two important observations. First, “…in the battle for 
American Islam, Muslim Democrats have enjoyed a resounding success. They have 
gradually marginalized Muslim Isolationists and rendered their arguments and positions 
illegitimate.”119 But, to our point here, he also observes that  
The Muslim Isolationists had receded into the background after the triumph of the 
Muslim Democrats in the debate over participation during the presidential 
elections in 2000. But now, with the systematic profiling of Muslims by the 
Department of Homeland Security, increased negative media attention, and 
Muslims feeling estranged and marginalized, Muslim Isolationists have returned 
with great vigor.120 
 
                                                          
114 M.A. Muqtedar Khan, “American Muslims and the Rediscovery of America’s Sacred Ground,” in 
Barbara A. McGraw and Jo Renee Formicola, eds., Taking Religious Pluralism Seriously: Spiritual Politics on 
America’s Sacred Ground (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2005), chapter 7, p. 138. 
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This exemplifies Apple’s concern that failure to be “open and responsive” leads to 
“growth of rightist social movements.” In and of itself, secularization of the French 
laïcité sort, which bars and/or disparages religious voices from the public square, might 
lead to the sense of marginalization and disenfranchisement that foments radical 
uprisings. Couple that with a particularly anti-Muslim sentiment and the danger is clear. 
This is precisely what New Atheist121 Sam Harris does in his book The End of Faith 
when he writes succinctly, “We are at war with Islam.”122 
In short, a rigid conception of the separation of church and state is not necessarily 
a guarantee of peace and harmony. It could lead religious people to feel marginalized and 
disenfranchised. It could lead to their feeling under attack. It could foment radicalism that 
undermines the common good. 
There is another dangerous memory concerning the religious diversity myth. 
Although the public narrative evokes a secularized public square as a neutral place where 
believers of all sorts and non-believers of all sorts come together as citizens equal in the 
eyes of the law, the history is not so pristine. Hamburger indicates that it was anti-
Catholicism that drove the movement towards conceiving of religious liberty as requiring 
a separation of church and state: “…the separation of church and state became popular 
mostly as an anti-Catholic and more broadly antiecclesial conception of religious 
                                                          
121 I use the term New Atheist to refer to recent, militant anti-theists whose objective is to rid the world of 
religion, which they consider to be a major contributor to violence and war, violation of human rights and 
dignity, and assaults on scientific progress. They see religion as superstitious, unreasonable, and, worse, 
pathological; and they are resolute in their attempt to rid the world of this perceived virus. See James E. 
Taylor, “The New Atheists” in International Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://iep.utm.edu/n-atheis/. 
122 Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2005), chapter 4, “The Problem with Islam,” p. 109. 
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liberty.”123 Mark Massa writes about this in his study Anti-Catholicism in America: The 
Last Acceptable Prejudice. He quotes Lyman Beecher, who helped fire up the anti-
Catholic sentiment in Massachusetts that led to the burning of the Ursuline Convent (and 
school) in Charlestown on August 11, 1834: 
On the extraordinarily hot evening of August 10, 1834, Lyman Beecher delivered 
the last of three virulently anti-Catholic sermons in as many churches in the city 
of Boston… Beecher declared that “the principles of this corrupt church are 
adverse to our free institutions, from the contempt and hostility which they feel 
towards all Protestants.” The mesmerizing preacher announced to a sweltering but 
rapt audience that if Catholics had their way, especially through their crafty ruse 
of running schools like the one in Charlestown, they would “subvert our free 
institutions and bring into disgrace all ideas of an effective government.”124   
 
 The sentiment of anti-Catholicism grew as waves of Catholic immigrants arrived 
in the U.S. It was exacerbated by events in the Catholic Church, such as Pope Pius IX’s 
1864 Syllabus of Errors, which considered an error “That the Church ought to be 
separated from the State, and the State from the Church.”125 Another exacerbating event 
was the First Vatican Council (1869-70), with its definitions of papal infallibility and 
papal supremacy. According to Fraser, 
The first Vatican Council… had moved the church in conservative and 
centralizing directions. Among the council’s actions had been the declaration of 
Papal Infallibility concerning faith and morals. For many American Protestants, 
these actions confirmed deeply held fears of Catholic plans for world conquest 
that were to begin in the United States… American newspapers, overwhelmingly 
Protestant owned and dominated, played up the issue.126 
 
                                                          
123 Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 
p. 252. 
124 Mark Massa, Anti-Catholicism in America: The Last Acceptable Prejudice (New York: The Crossroad 
Publishing Company, 2003), pp. 24-25. 
125 Pope Pius IX, “Syllabus of Errors,” article 55, http://academic.brooklyn.cuny.edu/history/dfg/amrl/syl-
err.htm, [Accessed 14 Jan 2019]. 
126 James W. Fraser, Between Church and State: Religion and Public Education in a Multicultural America, 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999), p. 110. 
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Nativist politics, even after the Know Nothing Party of the mid-19th century, continued to 
be successful, especially by focusing on two related issues: anti-Catholicism and 
education. 
 This long shadow of anti-Catholicism in American history is certainly part of the 
dangerous memory of the particularly Protestant Christian origins myth; but it is also 
related to the religious diversity myth as well. It was fear of Catholic institutions that 
drove the conceptual shift in meaning for our understanding of religious liberty. With the 
influx of Catholic immigrants and the attending prejudices, the American concept of 
religious liberty shifted towards separation of church and state, precisely what Pope Pius 
IX had decried as an error. In other words, the movement towards greater secularization 
of the government, including the schools, was inspired in large part by fear of Catholics 
or even the pope taking control. (Is not much of the current anti-Muslim rhetoric 
strikingly similar, mutatis mutandis?) 
 On this extreme end of the religious diversity spectrum, then, is the idea that 
religious liberty can only exist if religion is privatized, i.e. kept out of the public sphere, 
especially out of government and the schools. Though this may be promoted as 
neutrality, it may very well be hostility. Militant atheists, for example, are convinced that 
religion is ultimately a virus in society, a threat to science and reason, an enemy of 
human rights, and an instigator of division, violence, and war.127 Their myth of 
                                                          
127 This is the central argument of Sam Harris in The End of Faith. Here is a brief selection: “For anyone 
with eyes to see, there can be no doubt that religious faith remains a perpetual source of human conflict. 
Religion persuades otherwise intelligent men and women to not think, or to think badly, about questions 
of civilizational importance. And yet it remains taboo to criticize religious faith in our society, or even to 
observe that some religions are less compassionate and less tolerant than others. What is worst in us 
(outright delusion) has been elevated beyond the reach of criticism, while what is best (reason and 
intellectual honesty) must remain hidden….” (Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the 
Future of Reason (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2005), pp. 236-7). 
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America’s founding is an extreme version of the religious diversity myth that sees in the 
First Amendment a call to secularism and a solid wall between church and state. Their 
vision is what Richard John Neuhaus famously called the naked public square:  
The naked public square is the result of political doctrine and practice that would 
exclude religion and religiously grounded values from the conduct of public 
business. The doctrine is that America is a secular society. It finds dogmatic 
expression in the ideology of secularism.128 
 
Neuhaus warned us, though, that “…the public square will not and cannot remain naked. 
If it is not clothed with the ‘meanings’ borne by religion, new ‘meanings’ will be 
imposed by virtue of the ambitions of the modern state.”129 
 On the other hand, secularism may be the preferred reading of the religious 
diversity myth by religious people as well as atheists.130 In this case, the naked public 
square appears as the best guarantor of their own freedom of religion. By keeping 
religion and religious discussions out of the schools, for example, they hope for a 
situation in which no religious viewpoint gains dominance over others, and where 
religious instruction can be safely guarded by families and religious communities. By 
endorsing a privatizing of religion, they have made unlikely bedfellows with militant 
atheists and other secularists in advocating for public schools that do not treat of 
religion(s) in any substantial way.   
  
                                                          
128 Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, second edition 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984), p. ix. 
129 Ibid. 
130 “Other secularists [as opposed to the “hard secularists” defined in footnote 109] believe only that 
public institutions (including the laws and public education) should be secular. These secularists may be 
deeply religious, but they believe that religion is best kept private. I will call them soft secularists.” 
(Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 77).  
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1.2.4b. The Other Extreme of the Religious Diversity Myth: Diversity Run Amok 
 
On the other end of the spectrum of those who hold to the religious diversity myth 
of origins is the advocate of unlimited multiculturalism and diversity. At this extreme, we 
must ask the question: what are the limits of toleration? Are there certain religious views 
and conceptions of the good (or what John Rawls called “comprehensive doctrines”131) 
that are beyond the pale of toleration, and thus, inclusion in our public schools? If so, 
how do we decide what those limits are without ourselves becoming intolerant? This is 
the famous paradox of tolerance proposed by Karl Popper in his work, The Open Society 
and Its Enemies: 
Unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance. If we extend 
unlimited tolerance even to those who are intolerant, if we are not prepared to 
defend a tolerant society against the onslaught of the intolerant, then the tolerant 
will be destroyed, and tolerance with them.132 
 
Michel Rosenfeld explains: 
Consistent with this paradox, tolerance of the intolerant is ultimately self-
defeating as the latter will inevitably take advantage of being tolerated to gain the 
upper hand, and eventually to abolish tolerance.133    
 
                                                          
131 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 and 
2005), p. 12. “I assume all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception 
they accept is in some way related. But a distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is 
presented as free-standing and expounding apart from, or without reference to, any such wider 
background. To use a current phrase, the political conception is a module, an essential constituent part, 
that fits into and can be supported by various reasonable comprehensive doctrines that endure in the 
society regulated by it.” 
132 Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, in John Zijiang Ding, “Introduction: Pluralistic and 
Multicultural Reexaminations of Tolerance/Toleration,” Journal of East-West Thought, December 2014, 
https://www.cpp.edu/~jet/Documents/JET/Jet13/ding1-12.pdf [Accessed 4 February 2019]. 
133 Michel Rosenfeld, “On constitutionalism and the paradoxes of tolerance: Reflections on Egypt, the US, 
and beyond,” International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 11, Issue 4, October 1, 2013, Pages 
835–841, https://doi.org/10.1093/icon/mot055 and 
https://academic.oup.com/icon/article/11/4/835/698757 [Accessed 4 February 2019]. 
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Long before Popper, John Locke wrote his famous A Letter Concerning 
Toleration (1689) in which he appealed to both Christian faith and human reason to 
defend a position of toleration of religious differences in society. “The Toleration of 
those that differ from others in Matters of Religion,” he wrote, “is so agreeable to the 
Gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the Genuine Reason of Mankind, that it seems monstrous 
for [people] to be so blind, as not to perceive the Necessity and Advantage of it, in so 
clear a Light.”134 Nonetheless, as Stephen Macedo points out, “The limits of a right to 
toleration are reached, for Locke, when religious doctrines are advanced that deny the 
grounds and integrity of the social compact itself.”135 Thus, in the Letter we read, “No 
Opinions contrary to human Society, or to those moral Rules which are necessary to the 
preservation of Civil Society, are to be tolerated by the Magistrate.”136 In his context, he 
found that atheism was beyond the pale: “Those are not to be tolerated who deny the 
Being of a God. Promises, Covenants, and Oaths, which are the Bonds of a Humane 
Society, can have no hold upon an Atheist.”137 While we would likely (though not all) 
agree that atheism deserves toleration (at the very least) in contemporary American 
society, Locke once again begs the question: What are the limits of tolerance? What must 
we consider out of bounds for toleration precisely because it erodes the ground upon 
which tolerance is built?  
                                                          
134 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (October 3, 1689), James H. Tully, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1983), p. 25. 
135 Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 34. 
136 John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration (October 3, 1689), James H. Tully, ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1983), p. 49. 
137 Ibid., p. 51. See also Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural 
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 287n44. 
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Rawls wrote about such limits in Political Liberalism. When discussing the 
priority of right, he expressed one aspect of one particular view of government neutrality: 
“that the state is to ensure for all citizens equal opportunity to advance any conception of 
the good they freely affirm…” Immediately, he rejected this conception of neutrality, 
saying, “The priority of right excludes… [this] meaning of neutrality of aim, for it [the 
priority of right] allows that only permissible conceptions (those that respect the 
principles of justice) can be pursued.”138 In other words, the state is rightfully intolerant 
of those conceptions of the good that are at odds with justice, which is to say, are at odds 
with “certain political virtues—the virtues of fair social cooperation such as the virtues of 
civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and the sense of fairness…”139 Likewise, in A 
Theory of Justice, he wrote, 
Knowing the inherent stability of a just constitution, members of a well-ordered 
society have the confidence to limit the freedom of the intolerant only in the 
special cases when it is necessary for preserving equal liberty itself… only when 
the tolerant sincerely and with reason believe that their own security and that of 
the institutions of liberty are in danger.140 
 
 If “the core value of democracy” is “conscious social reproduction in its most 
inclusive form”141 as Amy Gutmann claims in Democratic Education, then it makes 
sense to recognize some conceptions of the good as incompatible with that core value. 
                                                          
138 John Rawls, Political Liberalism, expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 
pp. 192-193. Rawls also writes, “…the priority of right means… that the principles of justice set limits to 
permissible ways of life… the claims that citizens make to pursue ends transgressing those limits have no 
weight. The priority of right gives the principles of justice a strict precedence in citizens’ deliberations and 
limits their freedom to advance certain ways of life.” (p. 209). Again, he writes, “The priority of right… 
allows that only permissible conceptions [of the good] (those that respect the principles of justice) can be 
pursued.” (p. 193).  
139 Ibid, p. 194. 
140 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971, 1999), 
p. 193. 
141 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987 and 1999), p. 42. 
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Thus, when Gutmann speaks of the commitments of a democratic state, one of those 
commitments is to allocate “educational authority [e.g. of individuals, parents, 
educational experts, the state] in such a way as to provide its members with an education 
adequate… to choosing among (a limited range of) good lives…”142 This “limited range” 
is consistent with Rawlsian principles and Popper’s concerns. 
 Finally, Michael Sandel speaks about the need for a public philosophy 
commensurate with the demands of a democracy. He defines “public philosophy” as “the 
political theory implicit in our practice, the assumptions about citizenship and freedom 
that inform our public life.”143 He worries that contemporary liberalism (writing in 
1996)—the liberalism of what he calls “the procedural republic”144—lacks a sustaining 
civic underpinning, necessary for what Gutmann calls “conscious social reproduction.” In 
other words, “The public philosophy by which we live cannot secure the liberty it 
promises, because it cannot inspire the sense of community and civic engagement that 
liberty requires.”145 This philosophy, precisely as a “political theory implicit in our 
practice,” begs us to ask whether the practice of public education contributes to the 
securing of the liberty it promises and upon which it is based. We saw that Michael 
Apple’s concern was a secularist system that pushes some religious citizens out of public 
education, harming the community. Might not the community also be harmed by 
admission of unlimited religious perspectives into the curriculum? Are there some that 
                                                          
142 Amy Gutmann, Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987 and 1999), p. 42. 
143 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 4. 
144 Ibid. 
145 Ibid., p. 6. 
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should not be tolerated (and therefore, not taught) because they undermine the very 
liberty upon which a tolerant society is structured?  
 As we consider the place of religion(s) in the curriculum of the public secondary 
schools of the United States, this question of the limits of tolerance will remain pertinent. 
Following in the Rawlsian tradition, Stephen Macedo reminds us of the centrality of 
public reason: 
Civic liberalism does not require people to run from their religious faith. It is, 
indeed, prepared to affirm that many religious communities make a vital 
contribution to liberal civil society. Civic liberalism does argue, however, that 
when we seek to shape the political power that is our common property as 
citizens—when, that is, we act as citizens as opposed to private people—we owe 
our fellow citizens reasons that they can share with us. This is not antireligious; it 
is simply a basic requirement of mutual respect. It is also a duty of political 
civility that is in danger of being compromised by a misguided notion of fairness 
and toleration.146 
   
To put it another way, modern American liberalism may have become “…so 
riveted by interesting questions concerning the boundaries and limits of individual rights 
and the content of fundamental justice that we forget the larger project of sustaining 
healthy patterns of liberal democratic social life.”147 Macedo contends that “We should 
adopt an adequately subtle account of the virtues on which a healthy liberal democracy 
depends, and a correspondingly complex account of the institutional means of political 
education.”148 Determining those virtues will necessarily mean limiting our toleration of 
diversity. Macedo captures quite well the danger of the extreme embrace of diversity and 
multiculturalism: 
                                                          
146 Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 186-7.  




By all means, let us celebrate a mutually respectful liberal democratic diversity… 
But let us also recognize that the celebration of peaceful diversity behooves us to 
try and understand what must be done from a political standpoint to keep Sydney 
from becoming Sarajevo, or Boston from becoming Beirut…. There are groups 
and ways of life that thrive on ignorance and the demonization of outsiders. 
Surely, a world in which such groups are marginalized is exactly what we want.149 
 
Richard Dawkins makes an example of Emmanuel College in Gateshead, 
England, a school that received a government subsidy even though it taught “literal 
biblical creationism.” Prime Minister Tony Blair, “…invoked ‘diversity’ when 
challenged in the House of Commons…” about the legitimacy of such an arrangement.150 
Dawkins further reports on a lecture delivered by the school’s head of science, Stephen 
Layfield, on September 21, 2001, entitled, “The Teaching of Science: A Biblical 
Perspective.” In that lecture, Layfield reportedly said, “Let us state then right from the 
start that we reject the notion… that there are ‘Two Books’ (i.e. the Book of nature & the 
Scriptures) which may be mined independently for truth. Rather, we stand firm upon the 
bare proposition that God has spoken authoritatively and inerrantly in the pages of holy 
Scripture.”151 Dawkins assesses the situation with astonishment: “You have to keep 
pinching yourself. You are not dreaming. This is not some preacher in a tent in Alabama 
but the head of science at a school into which the British government is pouring money, 
and which is Tony Blair’s pride and joy.”152 His flabbergasted reaction to the entire 
scenario summarizes well this extreme pole of the religious diversity narrative: 
“Diversity may be a virtue, but this is diversity gone mad.”153
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CHAPTER 2: From Myths to Models- 
Religion(s) and the Curriculum in Current Practice 
 
 The degree to which proponents and opponents of religion(s) in American public 
schools either approve or disapprove of various curricular proposals regarding religion(s) 
varies according to their commitment to one or the other dominant myths we have 
discussed. We see this in four common approaches in our schools today. 
 
2.1 The Subversive Approach 
 For those to whom the Christian origins myth predominates, the nature of public 
schools in the U.S. as decentralized entities under local authority lends itself to 
subversion of the famous Supreme Court cases of the 1960’s that allegedly “kicked God 
out of the schools.” As we shall see in the next chapter, the Court did no such thing. 
Nonetheless, the Court did bring a de iure end to the devotional use of the Bible and to 
school-led prayer in the public schools. The Court’s decisions, however, require 
implementation; and de facto, there have been (and probably still are) schools and school 
systems that have not fully implemented the Court’s decisions. They continue(d) to 
function in a way that favors Protestant Christian hegemony. When this happens in a 
homogenous community, there is likely to be no perceived harm, and no foul is called. 
On the other hand, it only takes one member of a community to recognize the subversion 
of the Court’s decisions and to begin a process for redress of grievances that begins 
usually with the local school’s principal and school board, and might end by making its 
way into the court system, even as far as the Supreme Court. 
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 Concerning the Supreme Court’s decisions about school-led prayer and 
devotional Bible use, Damon Mayrl writes that “Religious and political leaders 
denounced the decision, school officials around the country defiantly vowed to continue 
the practices irrespective of the decision…”1 And yet, Mayrl asserts, “…these efforts 
ultimately failed, and within twenty years official Bible reading and school prayer had 
virtually vanished from schools outside the South, while even in the South their 
frequency had declined substantially.”2 Regardless of the trend, the desire to make public 
schooling a Christian affair has not subsided. In 2019, President Donald Trump tweeted 
his support for Bible literacy classes in the schools. 
Shortly after Fox & Friends aired a segment about proposed legislation to 
incorporate Bible classes into public schools… President Donald Trump cheered 
the efforts on Twitter… The segment followed a USA Today report on January 23 
that conservative Christian lawmakers in at least six states have proposed 
legislation that would “require or encourage public schools to offer elective 
classes on the Bible’s literary and historical significance.”3 
 
While such classes do not inherently violate the First Amendment as interpreted by the 
Supreme Court, they may have the intent of promoting Christianity, which would be 
unconstitutional.  
“It's a historical fact that the Bible has influenced Western civilization and U.S. 
history,” [said John Inazu, a law and religion professor at Washington University 
in St. Louis], “so it’s plausible that you could teach a class like this if it is done in 
a way that promotes cultural literacy.” Inazu added that the courts would also 
likely consider the motive behind instituting such classes. If they determine that 
the motivation behind Bible-literacy bills is to privilege Christianity, the classes 
could be ruled unconstitutional. That’s bad news for those pushing these bills 
                                                          
1 Damon Mayrl, Secular Conversions: Political Institutions and Religious Education in the United States and 
Australia, 1800-2000 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016), p.1. 
2 Ibid. (Mayrl cites Reichard B. Dierenfield. 1986. “Religious Influence in American Public Schools.” The 
Clearing House 59(9): 390-92, p. 391). 
3 Jonathan Merritt, “Teaching the Bible in Public Schools is a Bad Idea—for Christians,” The Atlantic, 
January 30, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/bible-literacy-bills-could-backfire-
on-conservatives/581593/ [Accessed 6 February 2019]. 
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because, as USA Today reported, they are the product of “an initiative called 
Project Blitz coordinated by conservative Christian political groups” who seek to 
“advocate for preserving the country’s Judeo-Christian heritage.”4 
 
For many who believe the Bible is the Word of God, the goal is simply to get the 
Bible into the hands of students, even without officially sanctioned devotional use. 
“‘State legislators should not be fooled that these are anything more than part of a scheme 
to impose Christian beliefs on public schoolchildren,’ said Rachel Laser, president and 
CEO of Americans United for Separation of Church and State.”5 It is the latest in an 
ongoing battle in which those who believe this to be a Christian nation attempt to restore 
the public schools to the (Protestant) Christian and biblical practices and culture that once 
predominated in them. 
Besides these official moves to subvert the decisions of the Supreme Court and to 
restore Protestant Christian hegemony to the public schools, there are likely countless 
individual acts of subversion as well. Stephen Carter addresses one such case (though he 
does not consider the action subversive, and considers the court’s decision to be wrong): 
Roberts v. Madigan (1990). In short, the school district in Denver that includes Berkeley 
Gardens Elementary School “forbade a teacher to display his personal Bible where his 
students could see it, or to read it silently when his students were involved in work that 
did not require his direct supervision…”6 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
                                                          
4 Jonathan Merritt, “Teaching the Bible in Public Schools is a Bad Idea—for Christians,” The Atlantic, 
January 30, 2019, https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/01/bible-literacy-bills-could-backfire-
on-conservatives/581593/ [Accessed 6 February 2019]. 
5 Erin Richards, “Bible Classes in Public Schools? Why Christian Lawmakers are Pushing a Wave of New 
Bills,” USA Today, January, 23, 2019, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/education/2019/01/23/in-
god-we-trust-bible-public-school-christian-lawmakers/2614567002/ [Accessed 6 February 2019]. 
6 Stephen Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p. 189. 
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Tenth District ruled that “…the school district acted for the valid purpose of preventing 
him from promoting Christianity in a public school.”7 In other words, the court 
recognized that Kenneth Roberts was using his position and influence as a public school 
teacher to promote the Bible and Christianity. Even where the official curriculum of a 
school lines up with the demands of the First Amendment, the actual, delivered, and 
implicit curriculum in any given teacher’s classroom may be subversive. Unless there is a 
complaint, the violation of the Supreme Court’s decisions may continue and a de facto 
return to the status quo ante can go on unabated. 
 
2.2 The Non-Inclusion Approach 
 For followers of the religious diversity myth, especially its secularist pole, the 
preferred academic arrangement is to place religion(s) in what Elliot Eisner called “the 
null curriculum.”8  Of course, there is no such thing as perfect non-inclusion. Religion(s) 
is always in the curriculum in one way or another. Diane Moore writes, 
It is important to note… that religion is already being taught in the schools… 
Unintentional sectarianism, antireligious biases and the intentional promotion of 
particular religious worldviews are already manifest in schools across the nation, 
though often unwittingly and/or without understanding the problematic nature of 
these practices.9 
 
                                                          
7Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047 (1990), 
https://www.leagle.com/decision/19901968921f2d104711752 [Accessed 6 February 2019]. 
8 “The null curriculum is what is taught, ironically, by what is not taught. ‘It is my thesis that what schools 
do not teach may be as important as what they do teach… because ignorance is not simply a neutral 
word.’” Thomas Groome quoting Elliot Eisner, The Educational Imagination (New York: Macmillan, 1979), 
p. 74. (Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral 
Ministry, The Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1991), p.453n5. Emphasis in 
the original). 
9 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 6. Emphasis in the original. 
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Nonetheless, there is an approach that attempts to keep religion(s) out of the explicit 
curriculum of our public schools. It may result from ignorance of the demands of the First 
Amendment as outlined by the Supreme Court (an ignorance we will address in the next 
chapter) and/or from fear of litigation, or even just tensions in the community, related to 
the Establishment Clause. Perhaps it comes from an over-zealous concern for separation 
of church and state. 
Diane Moore acknowledges that among the “strong dissenting voices across the 
ideological spectrum,” that are opposed to any inclusion of religion in the public school 
curriculum are sometimes “orthodox practitioners from a variety of traditions [who] 
object on the grounds that they believe the academic approach to the study of religion (as 
opposed to the devotional approach) contradicts their theological convictions.”10 
Additionally, “many do not want their children to be taught about their own faith 
tradition (or others) in school because they feel that is the responsibility of the parents in 
concert with their faith communities.”11 A further example is presented by Richard 
Dawkins, who writes, “Religious apologists themselves realize this [that a study of 
comparative religions might lead to doubts and even disbelief] and it often frightens 
them.”12 He presents as evidence a “negative letter… from ‘The Campaign for Real 
Education,’ whose spokesman, Nick Seaton, said multi-faith religious education was 
extremely dangerous because ‘Children these days are taught that all religions are of 
equal worth, which means that their own has no special value.’”13 Seaton’s valid 
                                                          
10 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 6. 
11 Ibid. 




concerns about what Catholics call relativism and indifferentism are certainly not without 
warrant; but do they necessarily lead us away from any explicit treatment of religion(s) in 
the schools? Ironically, for Dawkins, that very concern leads to an affirmation of 
religion(s) in the curriculum: “Let children learn about different faiths, let them notice 
their incompatibility, and let them draw their own conclusions about the consequences of 
that incompatibility. As for whether any are ‘valid,’ let them make up their own minds 
when they are old enough to do so.”14 
Returning to the voices of opposition to religion(s) in public education, Moore 
finds them on the progressive end of the spectrum as well. She points out that “…many 
progressive religious and secular voices fear that sectarian biases will inevitably prevail 
when religion is taught in public school, in spite of the best intentions of teachers, 
administrators, and school boards.”15 And finally, the Non-inclusion Approach could be 
part of a militant secularization attempt, which seeks to diminish and even eliminate 
religion from public life (or from life altogether). Although Dawkins supports religion in 
the curriculum, including the study of the Bible for literary and cultural reasons,16 it is 
hard to imagine Michael Newdow or Sam Harris doing the same. Their ideology of hard 
secularism fits best with this non-inclusion paradigm. 
When we see such a diversity of voices coming together to affirm the Non-
inclusion Approach concerning religion(s) in public education, it might seem that we are 
                                                          
14 Richard Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), pp. 382-3. In this, 
Dawkins resembles Nel Noddings, an advocate for Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief, whom we 
will bring into the conversation more fully in a later chapter. 
15 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 6. 
16 He concludes, “We can give up belief in God while not losing touch with a treasured heritage.” (Richard 
Dawkins, The God Delusion (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2006), pp.383-7, at 387. 
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heading towards what Rawls demanded of legitimate public policy: “overlapping 
consensus.”17 It seems that many have decided, even if not in Rawlsian terms, that this is 
indeed the case, and that non-inclusion is the only legitimate arrangement, even if the 
myriad parties have come to this political conception by different roads. This is 
unfortunate for at least two reasons. First, it only appears that we have an overlapping 
consensus. The existence of those who embrace the subversive approach are evidence 
already of a lack of genuine overlapping consensus. (We will look at another arrangement 
momentarily, which I call the Superficial Approach, whose members also do not fit into 
this supposed consensus). Second, the Non-inclusion Approach is always an ideal and 
cannot meet the demand of “possibility.” John Courtney Murray explained this problem 
of the law when he considered the moral overreach of civil legislation. He wrote, “A 
legal ban on an evil must consider what St. Thomas calls its own ‘possibility.’ That is, 
will the ban be obeyed, at least by the generality?”18 Whether non-inclusion were to be 
imposed by legislation or judicial decisions, or simply by local school board policy, the 
fact of the matter remains that religion(s) cannot be fully extricated from the curriculum, 
nor will the “ban be obeyed.” In short, the non-inclusion approach is a chimera, and what 
appears in its place is our next topic. 
 
 
                                                          
17 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993 and 2005), p. 134. In a 
society of “reasonable pluralisms,” Rawls explains that “…a reasonable comprehensive doctrine cannot 
secure the basis of social unity, nor can it provide the content of public reason on fundamental political 
questions.” Instead, there must be “…an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. 
In such a consensus, the reasonable doctrines endorse the political conception, each from its own point of 
view.” (pp. 133-4). 
18 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition 
(Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1960), p. 158. 
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2.3 The Negative Inclusion Approach 
 When religion(s) is not explicitly and intentionally addressed in the curriculum by 
teachers who are trained in the subject area as in any other specialty, religion and 
religious topics do not simply disappear. Religion(s) has been and continues to be 
important in our various cultures and in American and world history and civilization; it 
can hardly be disentangled from the curriculum. In this sense, we might have called this 
the Incidental Inclusion Approach or the Unintentional Inclusion Approach. On closer 
inspection, though, when religion(s) is only incidentally included in the curriculum, it 
tends to end up more often in a negative light. Hence, we will call this the Negative 
Inclusion Approach. 
 Among the ways that religion(s) enters into the curriculum without explicit 
endorsement is what Moore described earlier: “Unintentional sectarianism, antireligious 
biases and the intentional promotion of particular religious worldviews…”19 It would be 
difficult, if not impossible, to quantify how many teachers promote religion(s) versus 
how many denigrate religion(s). For our purposes, though, both forms of bias fall short of 
the intellectual rigor and honesty that students deserve when encountering religion(s) in 
the curriculum. 
 A systematic approach to analyzing the problem was taken by Warren Nord. In 
his final book, published in 2010, after a long career as a leading academic voice for 
religion(s) in public education, he wrote, “What do students learn about God and religion 
in American [public] schools and universities? The answer: not much.”20 To back up his 
                                                          
19 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 6. 
20 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 41. 
67 
 
claim, he wrote, “Happily, there is a fairly straightforward way of determining whether 
God measures up to American standards in public schools, for there have been for more 
than a decade now national content standards for K-12 education.”21 Nord also examined 
the standard textbooks (“for the third time”22), including science, history, and economics. 
For a taste of his findings, consider what he discovered looking only at American and 
world history: 
 In the history standards, “…religion comes into play (in some way) in about 10 
percent of the world history standards, and something under 5 percent of the 
American history standards.”23 
 “The history texts say a good deal about religion. Moreover, they’re getting 
somewhat better.”24 
 Nonetheless, “Given everything that must be crammed into the texts, there simply 
isn’t enough space to make religion intelligible. World history texts typically 
devote about three pages (including pictures and charts) to explaining the origins, 
basic teachings, and early development of each of the great world religions.”25 
 “The standards and the textbooks understate the importance of religion in the 
modern world. Religion largely, though not entirely, disappears from both the 
world and the American history standards and texts as we page past the 
seventeenth century.”26 
                                                          
21 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 41. 
22 Ibid, p. 42. 






 “Perhaps because of the frequent focus on military and political history, when 
religion is mentioned it is typically for its contribution to violence or conflict.”27 
 “…the texts encourage students to think of religion in the twentieth century 
largely in the context of war and they typically fail to give religion its due as a 
cause of peace and justice.”28 
 While the standards note that religions “grow and change dynamically,” Nord 
does not see this emphasized enough. He says, “Still, the texts and the standards 
largely freeze the theological development of Christianity in the Reformation, 
while other religions are frozen much earlier in their classical shapes… they 
appear to be fossilized remnants of the past.”29 
Concluding his overview of the history curriculum, Nord writes,  
While it is widely acknowledged that students must learn something about 
religion in the course of studying history, we typically take this to mean that some 
mention of religious leaders, movements, and institutions should be incorporated 
into our historical narratives, but of course those narratives must be secular 
narratives… [we] have not recognized the importance of enabling students to 
understand the events and themes of history from religious perspectives.30 
 
Diane Moore agrees with these assessments, writing, “…most of the depictions 
[of religion in history textbooks] are limited to the origins of the traditions and significant 
moments in political history where religion played a major political role (e.g. the 
Crusades, the witch trials…, the founding of the State of Israel, etc.)”31 She concludes 
that the presentation “reinforces the belief that religion is fundamentally separate from 
                                                          
27 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 44. 
28 Ibid., p 45. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p. 47. 
31 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 70-1. 
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other dimensions of human life except in premodern times and in exceptional modern 
expressions that are often negative or portrayed in a negative light (e.g. religious forms of 
terrorism, the Islamic revolution in Iran, etc.)”32 
 Stephen Carter is also concerned about the negative implications of leaving 
religion(s) in the null curriculum. He worries that we trivialize religion, relegate it to the 
private sphere, and treat it as “just another hobby.”33 Far from being neutral, then, this 
stance amounts to discrimination. He writes,  
One problem with the public school curriculum—a problem, happily, that has 
lately had much attention—is that the concern to avoid even a hint of forbidden 
endorsement of religion has led to a climate in which teachers are loathe to 
mention religion. A number of studies have concluded that the public school 
curriculum is actually biased against religion.34 
 
 
 This is, perhaps, the most pernicious effect of the Negative Inclusion Approach. 
By not including religion in the explicit curriculum of the school, among all the other 
subjects that we consider important as sources of knowledge, wisdom, beauty, goodness, 
meaning, and truth, we make an unwarranted epistemological claim. We deny that 
religious ways of knowing are valid, and that faith perspectives are worthy of thoughtful 
and rational consideration. We implicitly, and without intellectual warrant, denigrate faith 
as old-fashioned, unsophisticated, superstitious, unreasonable, and childish. We deny that 
religion(s) is important and worthy of study, and that religious experience is a serious 
aspect of human existence historically, universally, and still today. We deny the ongoing 
                                                          
32 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 71. 
33 See, for example, Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize 
Religious Devotion (New York: BasicBooks, 1993), pp. 16, 22. 
34 Ibid., p. 206. 
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public significance of religion(s). In all of this, we deny religious people the power to be 
democratic contributors in curriculum building. Michael W. Apple writes, 
Schools do not only control people; they also help control meaning. Since they 
preserve and distribute what is perceived to be ‘legitimate knowledge’—the 
knowledge that ‘we all must have,’ schools confer cultural legitimacy on the 
knowledge of specific groups. But this is not all, for the ability of a group to make 
its knowledge into ‘knowledge for all’ is related to that group’s power in the 
larger political and economic arena.35 
 
All of this, I call the hostility of neglect. It is not a mere lacuna in the curriculum. 
The absence speaks loudly and teaches forcefully. From the void, students learn a 
message that is hostile to religion(s), religious people, and religious epistemologies and 
arguments. 
 
2.4 The Superficial Approach 
 While followers of the Christian origins myth are likely to prefer the Subversive 
Approach (for now, with the hopes of Protestant hegemony restored in the future), and 
while some followers of the religious diversity myth, especially those at the secularist 
pole, are attracted to the Non-inclusion Approach (which, as we have seen, devolves into 
the Negative Inclusion Approach), there is nonetheless a final paradigm to examine. 
Some adherents of each myth prefer to have religion(s) taught in the public schools in 
some fashion. For those who call this a Christian nation, the tolerance of other religions 
in the curriculum is a price worth paying to ensure that Christianity and the Bible make 
an appearance. For those who consider this a nation built on and for religious liberty and 
diversity, a multiculturalist approach to religion(s) in the curriculum seems fair and 
                                                          
35 Michael W. Apple, Ideology and Curriculum (London: Routledge, 1979), pp. 63-4, 
http://newlearningonline.com/new-learning/chapter-8/michael-apple-on-ideology-in-curriculum 
[Accessed 18 February 2019].  
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promotes tolerance. The problem with this arrangement, though, is that in the limited 
cases where religion(s) is introduced into the curriculum in an intentional way, the 
treatment tends to be superficial and lacks the academic rigor and critical thinking we 
would expect in every other course of study. 
 The two most common ways that religion(s) is explicitly introduced into the 
curriculum of public schools are through (elective) courses on the Bible and (less 
frequently) on world religions.36 The elective nature of these courses is the first problem 
that lands this approach in the category of superficiality. If we deem that a subject is 
universally important at some fundamental level, we typically require its study. We 
cannot imagine making mathematics, science, or English classes elective precisely 
because we agree that an educated citizen must have at least a basic familiarity with these 
topics to be a successful, intelligent, and contributing member of the community. When 
religion(s) appears in the curriculum only as an elective, it signals to students that it is 
unimportant, or at least less serious as an academic study. It turns the communal, 
intellectual work of addressing religion(s) into a specialty for those who have the interest 
and aptitude, no different from taking extra classes in a musical instrument. It makes 
religion what Stephen Carter called “just another hobby.”37 
 
                                                          
36 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p 57. He makes another astute observation: “In spite of the 
importance we attach to morality, there are no (or very, very few) high school courses in ethics or 
morality. There are character education programs in many schools—usually in the lower grades—most of 
which ignore religion as too controversial.” Concerning the Bible courses, he writes, “According to one 
survey, about 8 percent of high schools offer courses in the Bible, but they are always elective courses, 
and few students take them.” Concerning world religions courses, he writes, “I don’t know the number of 
schools that offer courses in world religions, but my impression is that they are less common than Bible 
courses (and, with only one exception that I know of, they too are always elective.)” 
37 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(New York: BasicBooks, 1993), p. 22. 
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2.4.1 Bible Courses 
 Turning to Bible courses in particular, we find two further problems. The first we 
already addressed: sometimes the Bible is introduced into the curriculum in a subversive 
manner in order to promote Protestant Christianity. Thus, when Dr. Mark Chancey, a 
professor of biblical studies at Southern Methodist University in Dallas, reviewed the 
2005 The Bible in History and Literature curriculum distributed by the National Council 
on Bible Curriculum in Public Schools (NCBCPS), he concluded, “In my professional 
judgment as a biblical scholar… this curriculum on the whole is a sectarian document, 
and I cannot recommend it for usage in a public school setting.”38 Sectarianism is also a 
form of superficiality when considering the academic rigor required of a public school 
course. As Nord writes, “An introductory Bible course should be neutral among religious 
interpretations and neutral between religious and secular interpretations, a daunting 
task… The purposes of a liberal education require that students be introduced to a variety 
of ways of interpreting Scripture, theological and secular.”39 Failing to achieve, or even 
to aspire to, this level of complexity in the academic study of the Bible is the very 
definition of superficiality.40 
 Even when the Bible is introduced into the explicit curriculum in non-sectarian 
ways, there is still the problem of insufficient depth. The Bible and Its Influence is a 
popular curriculum published by the Bible Literacy Project, and, according to Nord, “has 
                                                          
38 Mark A, Chancey, “The Bible and Public Schools: Report on the National Council on Bible Curriculum in 
Public Schools (NCBCPS),” published by The Texas Freedom Network Education Fund, undated (post-
2005), p. 2. The reach of the curriculum is indicated on p. 4: “The Web site of the NCBCPS claims that it is 
used in 308 school districts in 36 states, including 14 districts in Louisiana, and that more than 175,000 
students have taken courses utilizing it.” 
39 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 236. 
40 Merriam-Webster dictionary app [Accessed 9 February 2019] defines “superficial” in part as, “not 
thorough or complete” and also “not deep or serious.” 
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been favorably reviewed by many religious journals and both secular and religious 
scholars from diverse traditions.”41 Even so, Nord points out some serious weaknesses:  
…it says little about scholarly textual and historical criticism, avoids any 
discussion of the relationship of science and the Bible, says little about the 
relationship of biblical texts to controversial moral issues, and is not very helpful 
in enabling students to understand the differences between the ways conservatives 
and liberals read the Bible.42 
 
These themes are avoided, one infers, for practical reasons: controversy won’t get the 
book into school systems. The question, then, is whether the sacrifice is worth it. 
 One final way in which Bible courses prove to be superficial is the most obvious: 
they are selective about the parts of the Bible to have students read and study. Any such 
selection is already an interpretive act and may, once again, betray a theological bias. 
Moreover, one must wonder whether it is reasonable to expect students to read the whole 
Bible (and which whole Bible: do we stop at the end of the Jewish Tanakh? Do we stop at 
the end of the Protestant canon? Do we include the Catholic texts not in the Protestant 
canon? etc.) How much must be included to avoid superficiality? Nord suggests that 
“Students should read enough of the Bible to acquire some sense of its recurring themes 
and internal emphases, but if they can’t read all of the Bible (an unlikely possibility) 
teachers must be careful in selecting (and interpreting) the parts they do assign.”43 Study 
of the Bible is, of course, an incredibly complex field; and like any other discipline, an 
introductory course is unlikely to avoid being superficial to some extent. To use a biblical 
                                                          
41 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 233. He adds, “Not surprisingly, it has been denounced by 
advocates of the National Council on Bible Curriculum in Public Schools curriculum, often for discussing 
multiple interpretations of the Bible, as well as by (the liberal) Americans United for the Separation of 
Church and State, which finds it too uncritically sympathetic to religion.” 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 234. 
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analogy, St. Paul wrote to the neophytes in Corinth, “I fed you with milk, not solid food, 
for you were not ready for solid food” (1 Corinthians 3:2, NRSV). 
 
2.4.2 World Religions Courses 
 When we look at world religion courses, one model demands our attention above 
all. It is the course required of all students in Modesto, California. Nord, as we saw 
earlier, notes that world religion courses are almost always elective. “The sole 
exception,” he writes, “is a nine-week course required in the Modesto, California schools 
that has been offered since 2001 without incident.”44 Emile Lester has written in depth 
about the Modesto Model. Here is his description of the requirement: “… the course 
takes place in the ninth grade, lasts for nine weeks, and examines six different religious 
traditions. The course involves significantly, although not exclusively, what I would 
describe as a community consensus approach for its deep concern with accommodating 
the interests of Modesto’s religiously pluralistic community.”45 This community 
consensus involved designing a course and then submitting it for review to various 
religious leaders in Modesto.46 Lester remarks that “…the course’s designers cautiously 
confined themselves to, for the most part, describing the religions studied.”47 
Students were to learn about the major beliefs and ritual practices of the seven 
religions studied but they would not be challenged explicitly to contrast or 
evaluate the religions… The course had only one week to devote to each 
religion… The course made students aware of basic denominational differences 
                                                          
44 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 298n29. 
45 Emile Lester, “To Change Society or Reflect It: Comparing the Cultural Studies and Community 
Consensus Approaches to Teaching about Religion,” in Michael D. Waggoner, ed., Religion in the Public 
Schools: Negotiating the New Commons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2013), Chapter 7, 
pp. 111- 128, at 112. 
46 Ibid., p. 114. 
47 Ibid., pp. 114-5. Emphasis in the original. 
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within religions, but focused more on common denominators uniting these 
denominations… Lesson plans and text, for instance, made sure students were 
aware of the difference between Sunnis and Shiites, but devoted more time to the 
five tenets of Islam and the life of Muhammed. Controversial elements of each 
religion, such as the treatment of women in Islam, received sparse treatment lest 
some religions receive more criticism…48 
 
 
 Lester and Patrick Roberts conducted a study of the effectiveness of the Modesto 
Model and found that the program did increase students’ tolerance and willingness to 
stand up against discrimination.49 Significantly, though, Lester writes: 
Rabbi Paul Gordon of Modesto’s Beth Shalom Congregation suggested to us that 
the wariness of administrators about controversy led the course to shy away from 
any critical evaluation of religion in general or the religions studied. Our research 
supports Gordon’s claim that the course tended to bathe each religion in a “warm 
and fuzzy” light. For instance, the initial textbook Modesto used made only scant 




Perhaps because of this “warm and fuzzy” approach and the strong aversion to conflict 
and controversy, Lester remarks that “Indeed, Modesto’s course has not been the subject 
of legal complaints or community protests in the decade since its implementation.”51 
 When students finished the Modesto course on world religions, it appears that the 
lack of controversy and depth led them to the conclusion that all religions have the same 
basic values and that all religions are basically the same.52 Lester admits, “The 
assimilation and valorization of minority faiths may have nudged students toward a soft 
                                                          
48 Emile Lester, “To Change Society or Reflect It: Comparing the Cultural Studies and Community 
Consensus Approaches to Teaching about Religion,” in Michael D. Waggoner, ed., Religion in the Public 
Schools: Negotiating the New Commons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2013), Chapter 7, 
p. 115. Lester mentions six religions on page 112, and then seven on page 115. It appears that seven is the 
correct number: Buddhism, Christianity, Confucianism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and Sikhism. 
49 Ibid., pp. 119-21. 
50 Ibid., p. 120. 
51 Ibid., p. 121. 
52 Ibid., p. 121-2. 
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form of relativism, even as the uncritical attitude toward the faiths may have reinforced 
students’ view of religion as a force for good.”53 Because of this, he also questioned the 
practical outcome: 
The results might even call into question whether the primary benefit of 
Modesto’s approach, the promotion of tolerance, is as substantial as it appears. 
Genuine tolerance involves reconciling ourselves to what we disagree with. If 
students are assimilating other beliefs to their own, what appears as tolerance may 
simply involve students accepting what [others] believe to be slightly divergent 
versions of their own beliefs.54 
  
Nonetheless, Lester appears to accept the “soft relativism” and to accept the finding of 
increased tolerance as genuine and commendable. He seems to be among the Modesto 
Model defenders, whom he says acknowledge that the perfect is the enemy of the good 
and that “…the perfect is truly unobtainable.”55 In a “…community that had been deeply 
split along religious lines over a culture war issue [i.e. homosexuality] just prior to the 
course’s implementation,” Lester is happy to see the very practical result of increased 
tolerance, however thin that tolerance may be. 
The Modesto Model is a clear example of the Superficial Approach. It does not 
give enough time to the study of religion(s), nor does it permit the level of rigor needed to 
examine a complex topic critically. It shies away from controversy. Diane Moore, whose 
own cultural studies approach diverges greatly from the Modesto methodology, is a harsh 
critic of the model. It falls into what she describes as the “phenomenological approach,” 
                                                          
53 Emile Lester, “To Change Society or Reflect It: Comparing the Cultural Studies and Community 
Consensus Approaches to Teaching about Religion,” in Michael D. Waggoner, ed., Religion in the Public 
Schools: Negotiating the New Commons (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education, 2013), Chapter 7, 
pp. 124-5. 
54 Ibid., p. 122. He goes on to say the opposite may be true as well, or that the survey questions may have 
been interpreted in different ways than intended. In short, he suggests “More detailed research… would 
be fruitful” (p. 123). 
55 Ibid., p. 125. 
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which is largely an anodyne, “descriptive study of the beliefs, symbols, practices, and 
structures of religion and religious expression.”56 She gives the Huston Smith classic The 
World’s Religions as an example. What is her (and many other scholars’) critique? She 
worries about “the ahistorical nature of the method itself. Traditions are often presented 
as timeless, uniform, and unchanging systems of belief that betray the social/historical 
dimensions that define all religious expressions and interpretations.”57 In particular, she 
mentions as problematic “essentialized expressions that are uniform as opposed to 
internally diverse” and expressions that are “idealized in that they are represented in an 
uncritical light.”58 
 On the surface, this may seem to promote peace, or tolerance as Lester 
concludes, but we may well wonder whether this is what Martin Luther King, Jr, 
described as “negative peace which is the absence of tension” and whether a less 
superficial approach would yield something deeper, “a positive peace which is the 
presence of justice.”59 
 
2.5 A New Way Forward: The Meaningful Inclusion Approach (MIA) 
 Having exposed some of the inadequacies of the current approaches, I propose a 
fifth way that I call the Meaningful Inclusion Approach (MIA). To have any chance of 
being practical and implemented, without succumbing to the “soft relativism” of a “warm 
                                                          
56 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 68. 
57 Ibid., p. 69. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Martin Luther King, Jr., “Letter from Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963, 
https://www.africa.upenn.edu/Articles_Gen/Letter_Birmingham.html [Accessed 9 February 2019]. 
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and fuzzy” approach, it will have to take seriously the historical perspectives and the 
political philosophies that arise from both the Christian origins myth and the religious 
diversity myth, while also attending to the dangerous memories that are present in both. It 
will take what is good from the current arrangements and add to it, while avoiding the 
deficiencies in each. In the final chapter, I will lay out a detailed proposal and a pedagogy 
for the Meaningful Inclusion Approach. For now, let us examine a framework upon 
which this proposal will be built. 
 To call the proposal Meaningful invites the questions: meaningful in what way; 
meaningful to whom? First of all, it is a meaningful treatment of the subject matter. In 
contrast to the Superficial Approach, which did not give religion(s) its due as a subject 
worthy of in-depth study with critical academic rigor, the MIA treats religion(s) itself as 
meaningful. Religion(s) is recognized as meaningful for its power in people’s lives and in 
world history and world affairs. It is meaningful for its contribution to culture, and for its 
ability to help people to transcend selfish concerns and to connect with others in 
community, with nature, and even with God or gods. It is meaningful for its manner of 
asking and answering the big questions of life concerning our origin, purpose, and final 
end or telos. It engages the perennial questions of good and evil, suffering and death, 
justice and the common good. Religions are not static as they address these questions 
(and the new questions that arise with each age), but rather, they develop dynamically, 
offering new insights and wisdom over time, including the wisdom of letting go those 
ideas deemed to be erroneous or no longer life-giving.60 The MIA treats religions in their 
                                                          
60 John Dewey reflects on this phenomenon in his own age, writing, “The crisis today as to the intellectual 
content of religious belief has been caused by the change in the intellectual climate due to the increase of 
our knowledge and our means of understanding. I have tried to show that this change is not fatal to the 
79 
 
dynamism and diversity. This includes internal diversity, recognizing that there is no one 
Buddhism, for instance, but rather a multitude of expressions of Buddhism that are 
worthy of our study. It acknowledges religions as potential sources of knowledge and 
wisdom. It takes faith and spirituality seriously. Hence, it does not relegate religion(s) to 
history, as if its lingering presence in the world were merely vestigial, but instead 
presents religions as “live options.”61 
 Second, the approach I am proposing is meaningful to students. The trend in 
American education is towards STEM-focused education (Science, Technology, 
Engineering, and Mathematics) and towards ever more high-stakes testing. Without 
denying the importance of STEM subject areas for the common good and also the need to 
assess quality and require accountability in education, I nonetheless fear that we are 
experiencing the reduction of the student to an individual cog in our economic machine 
and an empty mind to be filled with the knowledge needed for that machine.62 We have 
                                                          
religious values in our common experience, however adverse its impact may be upon historic religions.” 
(John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1934), p. 56). Dewey makes a 
distinction between the religious values and the religions themselves that may or may not embody and 
engender those values. To the degree that the historic religions grow and develop, they may survive; the 
religious values, though, under the guidance of intelligence, will persist, and, he says, “the change is 
liberating.” (ibid.) His view of this “natural intelligence” that guides the growth and development includes 
the idea that “we cease to depend upon belief in the supernatural.” (Ibid, p. 57). He really is talking about 
a “humanistic religion.” (Ibid., p. 54). “Religion,” he says, “would then be found to have its natural place in 
every aspect of human experience that is concerned with estimate of possibilities, with emotional stir by 
possibilities as yet unrealized, and with all action in behalf of their realization.” (Ibid., p. 57). While Dewey 
sees this as the endpoint of religious development, I see religions themselves as also demonstrably 
capable of change as they address new situations and new questions. What he says about our ideals, I 
would say is true about religions as well: “It relieves us of the incubus of thinking of them as fixed, as 
without power of growth. It discloses that they develop in coherence and pertinency with increase of 
natural knowledge.” (Ibid.) 
61 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 169.  
62 Nel Noddings writes, “In the past, great educators have devoted much thought to the issue of aims [in 
education], but today we hear little such debate. It is as though our society has simply decided that the 
purpose of schooling is economic – to improve the financial condition of individuals and to advance the 
prosperity of the nation. Hence students should do well on standardized tests, get into good colleges, 
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been losing our sense of holistic education. This is indeed a double loss: on the one hand, 
we lose sight of the child as a whole, complex person who exists always in relationship 
with others and with the natural world, whose very being is spiritual and longs for 
meaning and transcendence.63 On the other hand, we lose sight of the liberal promise of 
education itself. Education becomes a narrow endeavor that is increasingly 
indistinguishable from job and career training. Such preparation is, of course, necessary, 
but it is not sufficient for the demands of a liberal education. Nel Noddings calls such a 
narrowing of what we teach and learn a “trend toward bland and boring curriculum,”64 
and I have to agree. 
Taking students seriously as whole persons brings greater vigor, vibrancy, and 
meaning back into the formal educational project. Noddings says that “the treatment of 
religious topics can contribute to intellectual, moral, and emotional as well as spiritual 
development.”65 John Dewey proposed that the real curriculum for education is nothing 
other than life itself. Education is not preparation for life, but rather an engagement with 
life and experience: life examined, as Socrates called it.66 Bell hooks would agree. She 
                                                          
obtain well-paying jobs, and buy lots of things. Surely there is more to education than this.” Nel Noddings, 
Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 4.   
63 John Dewey argues that we need both the connection to others and the connection to nature. He 
writes, “A religious attitude… needs the sense of a connection of man, in the way of both dependence and 
support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is a universe” and then, “A humanistic 
religion, if it excludes our relation to nature, is pale and thin, as it is presumptuous, when it takes 
humanity as an object of worship.” (John Dewey, A Common Faith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1934), pp. 53-54). 
64 Nel Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), 
p. xv. 
65 Ibid., p. 2. 
66 “In this school the life of the child becomes the all-controlling aim. All the media necessary to further 
the growth of the child center there. Learning? Certainly, but living primarily, and learning through and in 
relation to this living.” (John Dewey, “The School and Society,” in The School and Society and The Child 
and the Curriculum (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), p. 36). “Life is the great thing after 
all; the life of the child at its time and in its measure no less than the life of the adult. Strange would it be, 
indeed, if intelligent and serious attention to what the child now needs and is capable of in the way of a 
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says of her college students something that may easily be applied to younger students as 
well: “They… want knowledge that is meaningful. They rightfully expect that… I will 
not offer them information without addressing the connection between what they are 
learning and their overall life experiences.”67 Anthony Cernera refers to education as “the 
[lifelong] task of becoming human” and praises as wisdom the Catholic tradition which 
proposes that “the education of the person is the education of the whole person.” Through 
this “lifelong project,” he says that “Education at every level must be devoted to 
contributing something meaningful to this task of becoming fully human.”68 
 Education is meaningful and less prone to being dull and boring when it takes 
seriously the real life experience of students, including their concerns and questions, their 
fears and their faith, their doubts and their hopes, and their relationships and longing for 
connection both human and sometimes divine. Noddings proposes that 
Existential questions should form the organizing backbone of the curriculum, and 
they should be appropriate everywhere. We rob study of its richness when we 
insist on rigid boundaries between subject matters, and the traditional disciplinary 
                                                          
rich, valuable, and expended life should somehow conflict with the needs and possibilities of later, adult 
life.” (Ibid., p. 60). “All studies arise from aspects of the one earth and the one life lived upon it… Relate 
the school to life, and all studies are of necessity correlated.” (Ibid. p. 91). Michael Schiro names Dewey as 
one of the key figures of the Learner Centered Ideology regarding curriculum theory. He quotes Roland 
Barth in a line that could have come straight from Dewey: “…the organic school cherishes childhood and 
‘stresses the present, not the future; living, not preparing for life…’” (Michael Stephen Schapiro, 
Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 
98). Dewey wrote, “The ideal of using the present simply to get ready for the future contradicts itself. It 
omits, and even shuts out, the very conditions by which a person can be prepared for his [or her] future. 
We always live at the time we live and not at some other time, and only by extracting at each present 
time the full meaning of each present experience are we prepared for doing the same thing in the future. 
This is the only preparation which in the long run amounts to anything.” (John Dewey, Experience and 
Education: The 60th Anniversary Edition (West Lafayette, Indiana: Kappa Delta Pi, 1998), p. 51). Dewey 
conceived of “teaching and learning as a continuous process of reconstruction of experience.” (Ibid., 
p. 111). 
67 bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom (New York: Routledge, 1994), 
p. 19. 
68 In Michael James, Thomas Masters, and Amy Uelmen, Education’s Highest Aim: Teaching and Learning 
through a Spirituality of Communion (Hyde Park, New York: New City Press, 2010), p. 8. 
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organization makes learning fragmentary and—dare I say—boring and 
unnecessarily separated from the central issues of life.69 
 
These “central issues of life” are what the Meaningful Inclusion Approach addresses. As 
such it connects to the real questions students ask, giving life and meaning to what might 
otherwise be “inert ideas.”70 In this sense, the MIA helps students to see the unity of truth 
and knowledge, a vision associated especially with John Henry Newman.71 With bell 
hooks, it imagines that “the classroom should be an exciting place, never boring” and that 
“learning should be exciting, sometimes even ‘fun’” and further, “that this excitement 
could co-exist with and even stimulate serious intellectual and/or academic 
engagement.”72 
 By taking the student seriously as a whole-person-in-relationship and by taking 
the demands of a liberal education seriously as well, the MIA invites students into the 
meta-cognitive work of making connections and synthesizing knowledge from various 
                                                          
69 Nel Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), p. 8. 
70 Alfred North Whitehead proposed that “inert ideas” were “ideas that are merely received into the mind 
without being utilised, or tested, or thrown into fresh combinations.” (Alfred North Whitehead, The Aims 
of Education and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1929), p. 1). John Henry Newman agrees with 
this sentiment, writing, “The enlargement [of the mind] consists, not merely in the passive reception into 
the mind of a number of ideas hitherto unknown to it, but in the mind’s energetic and simultaneous 
action upon and towards those new ideas, which are rushing in upon it…” (Qtd. in Ian Ker, The 
Achievement of John Henry Newman (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), p. 10). 
71 According to Newman, “all knowledge forms one whole.” He writes, “All that exists, as contemplated by 
the human mind, forms one large system or complex fact, and this of course resolves itself into an 
indefinite number of particular facts, which, as being portions of the whole, have countless relations of 
every kind, one towards another. Knowledge is the apprehension of these facts, whether in themselves, 
or in their mutual positions and bearings. And, as all taken together form one integral subject for 
contemplation, so there are no natural or real limits between part and part; one is ever running into 
another; all as viewed by the mind, are combined together, and possess a correlative character one with 
another…” (Qtd. in Ian Ker, The Achievement of John Henry Newman (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1990), pp. 23-24). What Newman describes as the purpose of a university education, I 
suggest applies to primary and secondary education as well: “real cultivation of mind” by which he means 
“the intellect…properly trained and formed to have a connected view or grasp of things” (Ibid., p. 20).    




fields into a coherent view of the human person and society. They are invited to think 
critically, employing not only secular epistemologies, but religious ways of knowing and 
making sense as well. They are invited to bring their critical thinking skills to every area 
of life; but also to bring their whole lives as spiritual, relational, emotional, physical 
beings to their thinking and meaning-making. 
An important third way in which the MIA is meaningful regards parents and faith 
communities. I agree with Kent Greenawalt when he writes, “Education that disregards 
religion may implicitly communicate its unimportance.”73 Conversely, by including the 
study of religion(s) in the public school curriculum, we signal that religion is something 
we take seriously to parents who value their own religion and their children’s religious 
upbringing. We create stronger public schools, that are more welcoming and inclusive, 
and that are less likely to suffer attrition to sectarian schools and home-schools. This 
further results in a greater religious pluralism within the schools, aiding our project of 
learning about and from one another and learning to live in mutual respect and peace.  
Finally, the MIA will be meaningful to the local community, to our country, and 
to our globalized society. When students develop religious literacy,74 they are more 
capable of rejecting prejudices and stereotypes about the religious “other.” This helps to 
form a community rooted in mutual respect, trust, and cooperation. In a country as 
religiously diverse as the United States, this education is a necessary component of civic 
education. I agree with Diane Moore when she writes, 
                                                          
73 Kent Greenawalt, Does God Belong in Public Schools? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 5.  
74 Stephen Prothero defines “religious literacy” in the United States as “the ability to understand and use 
the religious terms, symbols, images, beliefs, practices, scriptures, heroes, themes, and stories that are 
employed in American public life.” He adds, “religious literacy … is the ability to participate in our ongoing 
conversation about the private and public powers of religions.” (Stephen Prothero, Religious literacy: 
What Every American Needs to know—and Doesn’t (New York: HarperOne, 2007), pp. 17-18). 
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…our lack of understanding about the ways that religion itself is an integral 
dimension of social/historical/political experience coupled with our ignorance 
about the specific tenets of the world’s religious traditions significantly hinder our 
capacity to function as engaged, informed, and responsible citizens of our 
democracy.75 
 
Concerning the place of religion at the world table, Pope Benedict XVI wisely noted: 
The Christian religion and other religions can offer their contribution to 
development only if God has a place in the public realm… Denying the right to 
profess one’s religion in public and the right to bring the truths of faith to bear 
upon public life has negative consequences for true development. The exclusion 
of religion from the public square—and, at the other extreme, religious 
fundamentalism—hinders an encounter between persons and their collaboration 
for the progress of humanity.76 
 
It is precisely this encounter which the Meaningful Inclusion Approach will foster in the 
public schools. The competencies and the wisdom that students gain in this formative 
environment shape young people into caring adults who have the capacity to promote 
“collaboration for the progress of humanity.” On the other hand, according to the pope’s 
analysis, when religion is kept out of public life, serious problems arise: 
Public life is sapped of its motivation, and politics takes on a domineering and 
aggressive character. Human rights risk being ignored either because they are 
robbed of their transcendent foundation or because personal freedom is not 
acknowledged. Secularism and fundamentalism exclude the possibility of fruitful 
dialogue and effective cooperation between reason and religious faith… Any 
breach in this dialogue comes only at an enormous price to human development.77 
 
Inclusion of religion(s) in the curriculum of American public schools will engage 
students in this dialogue between reason and faith and will prepare students to participate 
in this ongoing dialogue long after school is over. They will be well-formed agents of 
                                                          
75 Diane L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 3-4. 




“fruitful dialogue” and “effective cooperation” in the efforts for human development 
worldwide. As former Secretary of State John Kerry wrote, “Leaders in public life need 
to recognize that in a world where people of all religious traditions are migrating and 
mingling like never before, we ignore the global impact of religion at our peril.”78 In a 
democracy, those future leaders are in our classrooms. The world is depending on us to 
teach them well. Nothing less than world peace depends on the quality of this education. I 
can think of nothing more meaningful than that.
                                                          
78 John Kerry, “John Kerry: ‘We ignore the global impact of religion at our peril,’” America: The Jesuit 
Review online, September 2, 2015, https://www.americamagazine.org/issue/religion-and-diplomacy 
[Accessed 14 April 2020]. 
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CHAPTER 3: The Constitutional Question 
 
3.1 The Constitution Itself: Text and Context 
 
 Any proposal to teach religion(s) in the public schools in the United States will 
have to address the requirements of the United States Constitution, and in particular the 
constraints imposed by the First Amendment. That crucial amendment regarding the 
“first freedom” reads: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech… 
 
These three clauses—the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Free 
Speech Clause—together form the constitutional basis for the law regarding the 
relationship between religion(s) and public education.1 
 Concerning the question of whether the founders considered this a “Christian 
nation,” which must necessarily support a Christian educational project, we also have the 
words of the original Constitution, predating the Bill of Rights. In Article VI, part 3, we 
read what Martha Nussbaum calls “a radical statement of religious equality” that is “bold 
and striking, given the prominence of [religious] test oaths in Britain.” It is noteworthy, 
as well, for being “passed without demur” in 1787 when Charles Pinckney introduced it.2 
                                                          
1 Although the first two clauses are, technically, the “religion clauses” of the First Amendment, the 
Supreme Court has also decided religion-related cases based on the Free Speech Clause, especially in 
more recent years. Warren Nord writes, “One result of the Court’s weakening of the Free Exercise Clause 
[in Employment Division v. Smith (1990)] is that the Free Speech Clause has been increasingly called into 
service to protect religious speech.” (Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion 
Seriously in Our Schools and Universities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 155). 
2 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 97. 
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The text reads: “No religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office 
or Public Trust under the United States.” Thus, although the states had established 
(Christian) religions, the Constitution makes clear that the federal government would not 
require Christian faith (or any other) as a prerequisite for public service at the federal 
level. 
 Concerning the states, the situation was different. At the outset, we should notice 
that neither the No Religious Test Clause nor the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment constrained the states but only the “United States” and its “Congress.” The 
various states were allowed to have established religions, and indeed they did. Joan 
DelFattore reminds us, for example, that “Delaware’s 1776 state constitution… required 
officeholders to profess belief in the Holy Trinity and in the divine inspiration of the Old 
and New Testaments.”3 Stephen Carter points out that “The language of the 
Establishment Clause… prohibits the Congress from making any law ‘respecting an 
establishment of religion.’” He argues, “The evident purpose of this… word was to 
prevent the Congress from interfering with state establishments of religion.”4 For most of 
our history, then, the constitutional arrangement concerning church and state was 
interpreted to apply to the federal government only.   
 There is good reason for this long-standing position. After all, the question of 
applying to the states at least some of what became the federal Bill of Rights was debated 
at the founding. Nussbaum writes, “…Madison all along wanted at least some provision 
                                                          
3 Joan DelFattore, The Fourth R: Conflicts Over Religion in America’s Public Schools (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2004), p. 61. 
4 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(BasicBooks: New York, 1993), p. 118. Italics in Carter’s text. 
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of the Bill of Rights to be binding on the state governments…”5 For this reason, he 
proposed an amendment that read: “No state shall violate the equal rights of conscience, 
or the freedom of the press…”6 He considered this “the most valuable amendment in the 
whole list.”7 Though the amendment passed in the House, it was rejected by the Senate 
and the issue was not revisited until after the Civil War.8 
  Nonetheless, the states themselves were prepared to defend religious liberty. 
According to Nussbaum, “All state constitutions had free exercise clauses, and most had, 
or shortly came to have, some type of anti-establishment provision.”9 Massachusetts was 
the last state to disestablish its official religion in 1833. 
                                                          
5 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 98. 
6 James Madison, in Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of 
Religious Equality (New York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 98. 
7 James Madison, in Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of 
Religious Equality (New York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 100. 
8 According to Nussbaum, “…there was an unsuccessful effort in 1875 to amend the Constitution so as to 
‘incorporate’ the religion clauses…” The Blaine Amendment, though, had as its political purpose the 
prevention of public monies flowing to Catholic schools, and used “…the high-minded words of the 
existing First Amendment… to wrap his [former Speaker of the House James Blaine’s] anti-Catholic 
nativism in the mantle of the Constitution.” (Ibid., p. 132). Philip Hamburger gives more context. Congress 
had already defeated similar amendments in 1870 and 1871; and in 1874 (and then again in 1876), 
“Liberals initially proposed a new version of the First Amendment, which would require both the federal 
government and the states to extend equal religious liberty to atheists and unconventional theists.” These 
“Liberals” were “theologically liberal, anti-Christian secularists.” After President Grant called for an 
amendment that would “Keep the Church and State forever separate,” Blaine (like Grant, a Republican), 
saw an opportunity to advance his career. He did not become the party’s next candidate for President, as 
he would have liked, but the platform of Rutherford B. Hayes and the Republican Party included his 
amendment. Hamburger writes, “The Liberals regretted this ‘non-committal’ Blaine amendment because 
it conformed to the Protestant or nativist conception of separation. Although it provided that no public 
lands or public funds devoted to school purposes shall ‘ever be under the control of any religious sect’ or 
‘be divided between religious sects or denominations,’ it thereby would ‘still leave the Protestant sects 
undisturbed in their present collective mastery over the public school system.’” No amendments passed. 
The Blaine Amendment advanced the farthest: it passed in the House, but failed narrowly (28-16, with a 
two-thirds majority needed) in the Senate. (Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), pp. 287ff., at 298n28, 296, 287, 322, 298).   
9 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 130. 
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Disestablishment at the state level was not envisioned in the federal Constitution, 
as we have seen, nor did the Supreme Court claim jurisdiction over the question when 
first given the opportunity to render an opinion. In 1845, the Supreme Court ruled that it 
had no jurisdiction in a case involving a Catholic priest being fined for violating the 
health regulations of New Orleans when he prayed over a corpse. The Court wrote: “The 
Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respective states in their 
religious liberties; this is left to the state constitution and law: nor is there any inhibition 
imposed by the Constitution of the United States in this respect on the states.”10 
 
3.2 Incorporation—The Federal Constitution Applied to the States: Cantwell, Everson, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment 
 
It was only in 1940 that the Supreme Court incorporated the First Amendment 
into the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut. The Fourteenth Amendment, 
passed during Reconstruction, reads: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
 
                                                          
10 Permoli v. Municipality No. 1 of the City of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589 (1845). Qtd. in Martha 
Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: 
BasicBooks, 2008) p. 131. The case was argued that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction because of federal 
laws that later applied to territories within the Louisiana Purchase (specifically, The Ordinance of 1787). 
Since these federal laws predated the Louisiana state constitution (1812), the argument was that they 
were foundational and hence, still operative at some level. The Court decided that state laws now 
supersede those previous federal laws, and hence, dismissed the case: “…the laws of Congress were all 
superseded by the state constitution; nor is any part of them in force unless they were adopted by the 




The Cantwell case involved the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proselytize in the 
streets of New Haven without a permit—proselytizing with anti-Catholic rhetoric in a 
Catholic neighborhood. On the question of whether there was a breach of the peace or 
incitement to violence, which the government could rightly punish even if the speech 
were religious in nature, the Court found none. Then, in a unanimous decision, the Court 
overturned the state’s ruling, which had upheld the permitting requirement. The justices 
found in Connecticut law a burden (technically, a “prior/previous restraint”) on the free 
exercise of religion (and speech). Cantwell affirmed that the manner of issuing permits 
amounted to a form of censorship, and that  “…a censorship of religion as the means of 
determining its right to survive is a denial of liberty protected by the First Amendment 
and included in the liberty which is within the protection of the Fourteenth.”11 
                                                          
11 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/310/296/#tab-opinion-1936773 [Accessed 13 April 2019]. 
Cantwell concerned the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to proselytize without a state permit. The Court 
decided that the required permit, because it involved the power of the state to decide what qualified as a 
religion and the power of the state to refuse a permit, amounted to the state’s ability to censor religions. 
The Court’s decision reads in part: “We find in the instant case no assault or threatening of bodily harm, 
no truculent bearing, no intentional discourtesy, no personal abuse. On the contrary, we find only an 
effort to persuade a willing listener to buy a book or to contribute money in the interest of what Cantwell, 
however misguided others may think him, conceived to be true religion. 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the 
tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of 
view, the pleader, as we know, at times resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or 
are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of this nation have 
ordained, in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties are, 
in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a 
democracy. 
The essential characteristic of these liberties is that, under their shield, many types of life, character, 
opinion and belief can develop unmolested and unobstructed. Nowhere is this shield more necessary than 
in our own country, for a people composed of many races and of many creeds. There are limits to the 
exercise of these liberties. The danger in these times from the coercive activities of those who in the 
delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of the peace in order to deprive 
others of their equal right to the exercise of their liberties, is emphasized by events familiar to all. These 




Writing for the Court, Justice Owen J. Roberts ruled that “The First Amendment 
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the 
legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”12 By so 
incorporating it, the Supreme Court eviscerated the long-standing literal interpretation of 
the First Amendment, which applied its restrictions to the federal government only. From 
this point on, the First Amendment has been interpreted to apply not only to the United 
States, but to each of the states individually, and to all levels of government, right down 
to the local school board. 
Cantwell formally and explicitly incorporated the Free Exercise Clause, but only 
indicated that the Establishment Clause applied to the states as well. In 1947, the Court 
made the incorporation of the Establishment Clause explicit.13 The question before the 
Court was whether public funds could be used for busing students to Catholic schools. In 
                                                          
12 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), www.oyez.org/cases/1940-1955/310us296 [Accessed 2 
July 2019].  
13 In my review of the literature, Everson (1947) is consistently named the case in which the Establishment 
Clause was formally and explicitly incorporated. However, Everson itself cites Murdoch v. Pennsylvania 
(1943) as a precedent. In Murdoch, the Court explicitly states, “The First Amendment, which the 
Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, declares that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press . . .’” (Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/319/105/ [Accessed 30 August 2019]). The case, like 
Cantwell, involved the right of Jehovah’s Witnesses to evangelize. Whereas the issue in Cantwell was the 
Free Exercise and Free Speech rights to evangelize without a permit (issued by the state only if the 
Secretary determined the cause to be religious), the Murdoch case involved the Free Exercise, Free 
Speech, and Free Press rights to evangelize by selling books without being charged a permitting fee, 
holding that these sales were religious in nature and substantially different from commercial vending, 
which may be subject to a fee: “Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of religion are 
available to all, not merely to those who can pay their own way” and “The power to tax the exercise of a 
privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment… A state may not impose a charge for the 
enjoyment of a right granted by the Federal Constitution.” (Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), 




Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, the New Jersey town’s 
arrangement of reimbursing parents for the cost of public transportation of their children 
to school, regardless of whether the school was public or parochial, was challenged. The 
Court ruled in favor of the town. Nonetheless, the decision is important for recognizing 
that 
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: 
neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass 
laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. 
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church 
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or 
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large 
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever 
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in 
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words 
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to 
erect "a wall of separation between church and State." Reynolds v. United States, 
supra, at 98 U. S. 164.14 
 
Despite the lofty language about separation, the Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld the lower 
court’s ruling, finding the reimbursement of parents’ transportation expenses to be in 
accord with the requirements of the First Amendment. Balancing the demands of the 
Establishment Clause with those of the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Hugo Black wrote 
for the Court: 
New Jersey cannot, consistently with the "establishment of religion" clause of the 
First Amendment, contribute tax raised funds to the support of an institution 
which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand, other 
language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens 
in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude 
individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, 
                                                          
14 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/330/1/#T23 [Accessed 31 August 2019]. 
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Nonbelievers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their 
faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.15 
 
The Court considered bus transportation for all students to be a neutral act related 
to the general welfare, akin to police, fire, sewer, and highway expenditures, which are 
also extended to, and benefit, religious organizations. Thus, while maintaining that “The 
First Amendment has erected a wall between church and state. That wall must be kept 
high and impregnable. We could not approve the slightest breach,” the Court also ruled 
that the “[First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups 
of religious believers and nonbelievers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. 
State power is no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor 
them.”16 
 Thus, in one and the same case, the Establishment Clause was incorporated into 
the Fourteenth Amendment (and thereby construed to apply to all levels of government), 
the metaphor of a wall of separation between church and state gained further 
constitutional standing, and the judicial concept of neutrality in church and state cases 
became the law of the land. All of these developments have significant bearing on the 




                                                          
15 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/330/1/#T23 [Accessed 31 August 2019]. Emphasis in the 
original. 




3.3 Limits and Latitude—First Amendment Precedents 
 
With the First Amendment incorporated into the Fourteenth, we are now in a 
position to see what precedents the Court set as it began to look at cases involving 
religion and public education. 
 
3.3.1 McCollum v. Board of Education (1948): Religious Education on School Property 
 
Whereas Everson permitted the reimbursement to parents of transportation costs 
related to busing their children to religious schools as a requirement of nondiscrimination 
against religion, the Court felt differently about bringing religious education onto the 
grounds of public schools. In Champaign County, Illinois, public schools allowed, but did 
not require, students to be released from a portion of their normal school routine to attend 
religious instruction on the school property. Vashti McCollum claimed that the “released 
time” program violated her rights as an atheist and a taxpayer—forcing her to support 
religious education—and that it harmed her son by causing him to be ostracized for not 
attending the religious education classes. Although the instructors were chosen and paid 
for by religious denominations outside the school, and although theoretically any 
religious denomination could be included in the program (though there were only three 
options at the time: Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish), and although students had to opt 
into the classes (by their parents’ written consent), the Supreme Court decided 8-1 that 
the arrangement violated the Establishment Clause. The Court found that using the 
system of compulsory public education to provide religious instruction was enough to 
invalidate the release time arrangement. 
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 What is interesting and important for our purposes in this present study is the 
concurring opinion of Justice Robert Jackson. He makes clear that he agrees with the 
majority opinion, stating that “…we may and should end such formal and explicit 
[religious] instruction as the Champaign plan, and can at all times prohibit teaching of 
creed and catechism and ceremonial, and can forbid forthright proselyting in the 
schools…”17 But, he warns about the precedent this case might set: 
Authorities list 256 separate and substantial religious bodies to exist in the 
continental United States. Each of them… has as good a right as this plaintiff to 
demand that the courts compel the schools to sift out of their teaching everything 
inconsistent with its doctrines. If we are to eliminate everything that is 
objectionable to any of these warring sects or inconsistent with any of their 
doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds.18 
 
It is a helpful reminder that educational curricula of any sort, not only when they touch 
directly on religion, remain open to contention. Have we not seen as much with questions 
of sex education, gay rights, the portrayal of Columbus, the manner of celebrating 
Thanksgiving, the teaching of evolution, and many other issues? Tension is to be 
expected in the choosing of curricula, especially for a heterogeneous community. School 
boards and administrators, like (and before) the courts, will need wisdom and courage to 
decide what it objectionable and deserving of change while not giving in to the “demand 
that… schools… sift out of their teaching everything inconsistent” or “objectionable” to 
various individuals and sects. When we look at my curricular proposals for including 
religion(s) in public education, this will be an important point to keep in mind. There will 
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be objections. However, “to eliminate everything that is objectionable” would, indeed, 
“leave public education in shreds.” 
 A second point worthy of notice is that Jackson remains skeptical about the 
possibility of a purely “secular” educational curriculum. He writes in a passage worth 
quoting at length: 
Perhaps subjects such as mathematics, physics or chemistry are, or can be, 
completely secularized. But it would not seem practical to teach either practice or 
appreciation of the arts if we are to forbid exposure of youth to any religious 
influences. Music without sacred music, architecture minus the cathedral, or 
painting without the scriptural themes would be eccentric and incomplete, even 
from a secular point of view. Yet the inspirational appeal of religion in these 
guises is often stronger than in forthright sermon. Even such a "science" as 
biology raises the issue between evolution and creation as an explanation of our 
presence on this planet. Certainly a course in English literature that omitted the 
Bible and other powerful uses of our mother tongue for religious ends would be 
pretty barren. And I should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of 
preparation for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and religions have 
played in the tragic story of mankind.19 
 
Far from endorsing a sterile and hard secularism that suffers from amnesia about the 
important role of religion(s) in history and culture, Jackson recognizes that a total 
separation is both impossible and undesirable. He continues: 
The fact is that, for good or for ill, nearly everything in our culture worth 
transmitting, everything which gives meaning to life, is saturated with religious 
influences, derived from paganism, Judaism, Christianity -- both Catholic and 
Protestant -- and other faiths accepted by a large part of the world's peoples. One 
can hardly respect a system of education that would leave the student wholly 
ignorant of the currents of religious thought that move the world society for a part 
in which he [or she] is being prepared.20 
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More than simply rejecting the notion of a purely secular curriculum, Justice 
Jackson is giving voice to the idea that religion is and has been important across time and 
disciplines; and that to neglect this connection in the curriculum is to do harm to society 
by leaving students unprepared for “the real world.” To leave students ignorant is to 
betray the role of educators. Jackson has it right: “One can hardly respect [such] a system 
of education”! 
 3.3.2 Engel v. Vitale (1962): School Prayer 
 Two cases are especially critical for understanding the constitutionality of 
teaching about religion(s) in our public schools: Engel v. Vitale (1962) and Abington v. 
Schempp (1963). They concern school-sponsored prayer and devotional Bible reading, 
but have much wider implications. 
  In Engel, the Court had to decide whether a prayer composed by the New York 
Board of Regents and authorized (but not required) to be used in the public schools 
violated the Establishment Clause. A group of parents, led by Steven Engel, challenged 
Union Free School District No. 9 in New Hyde Park (under School Board president, 
William J. Vitale, Jr.) when the district required the “prayer to be said aloud by each class 
in the presence of a teacher at the beginning of each school day.”21 The prayer read: 
“Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings 
upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country.”22 Writing for the 6-1 majority (2 
justices did not take part in the case), Justice Black wrote, “…the constitutional 
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prohibition against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least mean that, 
in this country, it is no part of the business of government to compose official prayers for 
any group of the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by 
government.”23 
 The argument that the prayer was ostensibly nonsectarian was dismissed, for it 
nonetheless promoted religion over nonreligion in violation of the standard of neutrality. 
Likewise, the fact that students were not compelled to recite the prayer, nor even to 
remain in the room during the prayer, was not seen by the Court as relevant to the 
violation of the Establishment Clause: 
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon 
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment 
of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to 
coerce nonobserving individuals or not.24 
 
 Significantly, Justice Black indicated some ways that religious language may 
enter into the school day in a constitutionally sound manner. In footnote 21, he wrote: 
There is, of course, nothing in the decision reached here that is inconsistent with 
the fact that school children and others are officially encouraged to express love 
for our country by reciting historical documents such as the Declaration of 
Independence which contain references to the Deity or by singing officially 
espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme 
Being, or with the fact that there are many manifestations in our public life of 
belief in God. Such patriotic or ceremonial occasions bear no true resemblance to 
the unquestioned religious exercise that the State of New York has sponsored in 
this instance.25 
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opinion-1943887 [Accessed 1 September 2019]. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Ibid., Footnote 21.  
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Newt Gingrich’s entire thesis, as we saw earlier, was based on recalling the 
“many manifestations in our public life of belief in God.” To the degree that these 
“patriotic or ceremonial occasions” of reference to belief in God (what Robert Bellah 
called American civil religion) are absent in our public schools, Gingrich and his allies 
are correct in recognizing something gone awry—something significant is missing. It is 
worth noting, though, that these expressions are explicitly NOT rejected as 
unconstitutional by the Court. 
 The Court’s argument against school prayer was not a case of “throwing God out 
of the schools,” as its opponents characterize it. Rather, Justice Black recognized in the 
separation of church and state a protection of religious minorities and a boon to freedom 
of conscience. He drew on the same history we reviewed earlier to conclude: 
When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed behind a 
particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious minorities 
to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain. But the purposes 
underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than that. Its first and most 
immediate purpose rested on the belief that a union of government and religion 
tends to destroy government and to degrade religion.26 
 
These words bring to mind James Madison’s observation that “Religion and government 
will both exist in greater purity, the less they are mixed together.”27 Concluding his 
argument for the majority, Justice Black quotes Madison concerning what we might call 
the slippery slope of violating Church-State neutrality, or simply, an ever creeping 
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opinion-1943887 [Accessed 1 September 2019]. He also referenced “an expression of principle on the part 
of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 
‘unhallowed perversion’ by a civil magistrate,” quoting Madison directly.  
27 Qtd. in Alan Colmes, Red, White, & Liberal: How Left is Right & Right is Wrong (New York: ReganBooks, 
2003), p. 217. 
100 
 
establishment. Thus, while he acknowledges that the prayer in question “does not amount 
to a total establishment of one particular religious sect to the exclusion of all others” and 
“seems relatively insignificant when compared to the governmental encroachments upon 
religion which were commonplace 200 years ago,” nonetheless he considers the danger 
of encroachment to be real. In the words of Madison: 
[I]t is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. . . . Who does 
not see that the same authority which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all 
other Religions, may establish with the same ease any particular sect of 
Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects? That the same authority which can 
force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the support of any 
one establishment may force him to conform to any other establishment in all 
cases whatsoever?28 
 
3.3.3 Abington v. Schempp (1963): Bible Reading and Required Neutrality 
The following year, 1963, the Court heard two cases concerning the Establishment 
Clause as it related to public schools. In Murray v. Curlett, atheist petitioners from 
Maryland, including Madalyn Murray (later, O’Hair), famously (or infamously, 
depending on one’s position) opposed the practice of school-sponsored Bible reading and 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer. The case was decided together with School District of 
Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, in which required Bible reading and 
recitation of the Lord’s Prayer in public schools was also at issue. Over the objections of 
Justice Potter Stewart, who worried that the Court’s majority decision did not achieve 
“the realization of state neutrality, but rather the establishment of a religion of 
                                                          
28 James Madison, “Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments,” in Engel v. Vitale, 370 
U.S. 421 (1962), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/370/421/#tab-opinion-1943887 [Accessed 
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secularism,”29 the eight other justices concluded that state-sponsored Bible readings, like 
state-sponsored prayer, violate the Establishment Clause. 
Let’s attend to these proceedings in more detail. Contrary to the opinion that the 
school prayer cases were the work of atheists intent on destroying religion in America, 
the appellees in Abington were the Schempp family, who were active members of the 
Unitarian faith. The specific statute in Pennsylvania law that the family objected to read: 
At least ten verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the 
opening of each public school on each school day. Any child shall be excused 
from such Bible reading, or attending such Bible reading, upon the written request 
of his parent or guardian.30 
 
At Abington Senior High School, the ten Bible verses, followed by the reading of the 
Lord’s Prayer, were read over the intercom and thus broadcast into every classroom. In 
the various classrooms, students were asked to stand and recite the Lord’s Prayer together 
with the student reader on the intercom.  According to the revised version of the statute, 
“The students and parents are advised that the student may absent himself from the 
classroom or, should he elect to remain, not participate in the exercises.”31 
 The issue of Bible reading “without comment” proved troublesome. A Jewish 
expert, for example, noted that many verses of the New Testament portray Jews in a very 
negative light. Dr. Solomon Grayzel testified before a lower court that with careful 
commentary students might come away from such readings without harm; but, without 
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Dissent, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/203/#tab-opinion-1944457 [Accessed 23 
September 2019]. 
30 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), 





commentary, the verses “could be, and, in his specific experience with children… had 
been, psychologically harmful to the child…” and had become “a divisive force” in the 
school.32 
 In Baltimore, a similar issue had arisen from the Board of School Commissioners’ 
rule requiring the "reading, without comment, of a chapter in the Holy Bible and/or the 
use of the Lord's Prayer."33 Madalyn Murray and her son William J. Murray III protested 
the rule, as they were atheists. They contended that their rights under the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments were violated by the practice… 
in that it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium on belief as against 
non-belief and subjects their freedom of conscience to the rule of the majority; it 
pronounces belief in God as the source of all moral and spiritual values, equating 
these values with religious values, and thereby renders sinister, alien and suspect 
the beliefs and ideals of your Petitioners, promoting doubt and question of their 
morality, good citizenship and good faith.34 
 
 
 In rendering an opinion on the two cases, taken together under the name of 
Abington, the Court reflected on the religious history of the country and also its 
dedication to religious freedom, recounting the history we reviewed in the first part of 
this dissertation. Justice Tom C. Clark, writing for the 8-1 majority, reminded us that 
“…the views of Madison and Jefferson, preceded by Roger Williams, came to be 
incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in those of most of our 
States.”35 Furthermore, he noted, as we did earlier, the religious pluralism of the United 
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States: “This freedom to worship was indispensable in a country whose people came 
from the four quarters of the earth and brought with them a diversity of religious 
opinion.”36 Concerning the Free Exercise Clause, then, the Court found that while the 
right to freedom of belief is absolute, the freedom to act may be circumscribed.37 One 
particular boundary was the Establishment Clause itself. The Court wrote, “While the 
Free Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free 
exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the 
State to practice its beliefs.”38 
Concerning the Establishment Clause, and drawing from Everson, Justice Clark 
quoted and reaffirmed the opinion of Justices Rutledge, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton, 
who had previously declared, 
The [First] Amendment's purpose was not to strike merely at the official 
establishment of a single sect, creed or religion, outlawing only a formal relation 
such as had prevailed in England and some of the colonies. Necessarily, it was to 
uproot all such relationships. But the object was broader than separating church 
and state in this narrow sense. It was to create a complete and permanent 
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https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/98/145/ [Accessed 14 October 2019]). In Abington, the 
beginning of a standard of non-coercion was enunciated: “it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to 
show the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion” 
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separation of the spheres of religious activity and civil authority by 
comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for religion.39 
 
 
How, then, were legislatures and courts to determine whether a law achieved this 
“complete separation”? The Court introduced The Secular Purpose and Primary Effect 
Test. 
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of 
the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion, then the 
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the 
Constitution. That is to say that, to withstand the strictures of the Establishment 
Clause, there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect that 
neither advances nor inhibits religion.40 
 
When we consider the teaching of religion(s) in public schools, this test will be 
essential. No curriculum or pedagogy will pass constitutional muster that has as its 
primary purpose and effect the advancement of religion in general or of a specific 
religion in particular. This is precisely the problem with what I have called above The 
Subversive Approach. 
This required “secular purpose” is not the same as imposing “a religion of 
secularism” as Justice Stewart feared. Far from “kicking God out” of our public life and 
public schools, the Abington decision held religion in high regard. Consider the words 
with which Justice Clark re-committed the Court to the position of neutrality: 
The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long 
tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the 
individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience 
that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its 
purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship 
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between [the human person] and religion, the State is firmly committed to a 
position of neutrality.41 
 
Thus, if we have allowed a “religion of secularism” to dominate in some of our 
public schools, it is not because of Abington. It is more likely due to misinterpreting the 
demands of Abington, and out of fear of litigation. In any case, what I have called the 
hostility of neglect is clearly prohibited upon a close reading of the Abington decision. 
For not only is the law constrained from promoting religion(s), but it is equally 
constrained from inhibiting religion and preferring “the religion of secularism” over other 
religious orientations. Neutrality is demanded. 
 The question of whether religion(s) may be discussed and studied in public 
schools, assuming a curriculum and pedagogy that meet the Secular Purpose and Primary 
Effect Test, should be beyond contention. After all, the Court made unambiguous its 
intentions in this regard. On the one hand, the Court took seriously Justice Stewart’s 
dissent. Addressing this, and quoting from the 1952 case Zorach v. Clauson, Justice 
Clark wrote for the majority: 
It is insisted that, unless these religious exercises are permitted, a "religion of 
secularism" is established in the schools. We agree, of course, that the State may 
not establish a "religion of secularism" in the sense of affirmatively opposing or 
showing hostility to religion, thus "preferring those who believe in no religion 
over those who do believe."42 
 
The majority, on the other hand, did not agree with Stewart that the effect of their 
decision would be, in fact, to promote secularism over religious belief. Nonetheless, the 
opinions of both the majority and the dissenter make clear that “hostility to religion” 
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violates the Establishment Clause. Yet, I argue, this very hostility exists in many or most 
public schools through the null curriculum in a hostility of neglect. In many cases, “the 
religion of secularism” has indeed been established. We are not yet meeting the demands 
of Abington. 
 This neglect of religion(s) in the curriculum is a clear violation of the First 
Amendment. Justice Clark was careful to pen an opinion that excluded devotional 
practices as an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, but that continued to support the 
study of religion(s) as part of a “secular program.” Significantly, he wrote these key 
words: 
…it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of 
comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the 
advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of 
study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates 
that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a 
secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First 
Amendment.43 
  
This is precisely the constitutional keystone holding together the arch that 
includes instruction in secular disciplines and the study of religion(s) as part of a 
“complete” education. Without this keystone, the archway of a truly liberal education 
collapses. We deprive our students access to a myriad of fundamental human questions 
and forms of inquiry, which leaves them less educated than we promise, and less capable 
of democratic citizenship in a religiously plural world. 
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3.3.4 Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971): No Excessive Entanglement 
 
Any discussion of the Secular Purpose and Primary Effect Test would be incomplete 
without recognizing the importance of Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) in its further 
development. In an 8-1 decision, the Court held unconstitutional a set of laws from 
Rhode Island and Pennsylvania which arranged for partial funding of non-public (most 
often, religious) schools through either salary supplementation for teachers who do not 
teach religion or reimbursements to schools for secular teaching materials. 
In reaching its decision, the Court quoted extensively from Walz v. Tax Comm'n of 
City of New York (1970), a case in which the tax-exemption granted to religious 
organizations was upheld. In that case, the justices had found that tax-exemption actually 
furthered the desired end of separation of church and state, whereas taxation would 
necessarily entangle the two. Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for the 7-1 majority in 
Walz, had expressed some key constitutional points that relate to our question of the 
study of religion(s) in public education. First, he affirmed the decision of Justice Douglas 
in Zorach v. Clauson (1952), when he wrote for the Court that “The First Amendment… 
does not say that, in every and all respects, there shall be a separation of Church and 
State.”44 Burger then gave this opinion more flesh, writing, 
The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been 
said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally 
established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those 
expressly proscribed governmental acts, there is room for play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist 
without sponsorship and without interference.45 
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As we have seen, the Court had already advanced a legal theory of neutrality 
related to its interpretation of the First Amendment. Here, we have an indication of the 
nature of that neutrality. It is a “benevolent neutrality” that does not require an absolute 
separation of church and state, but rather, has “room for play in the joints.” Astutely, the 
Chief Justice notes that “No perfect or absolute separation is really possible; the very 
existence of the Religion Clauses is an involvement of sorts -- one that seeks to mark 
boundaries to avoid excessive entanglement.”46 This is the key: “excessive entanglement” 
must be avoided. In addition to questioning whether a law has a secular purpose and a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, “We must also be sure that the 
end result -- the effect -- is not an excessive government entanglement with religion.”47 
 It is this last point that Lemon picks up and which makes Lemon an important 
successor to Abington, one which develops its legal doctrine beyond the two prongs of 
secular purpose and primary effect. Here we have the addition of a third prong, The 
Entanglement Test, which taken together with the other two become known as The 
Lemon Test: 
In the absence of precisely stated constitutional prohibitions, we must draw lines 
with reference to the three main evils against which the Establishment Clause was 
intended to afford protection: "sponsorship, financial support, and active 
involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." Every analysis in this area 
must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court 
over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the 
statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary 
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effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion… finally, the statute 
must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."48 
 
Concerning the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania salary and reimbursement 
arrangements, the Court did not find that the laws had anything other than a secular 
purpose. The Court preferred not to opine concerning whether the primary effect was to 
advance religion (though the major beneficiaries in both cases were Roman Catholic 
schools or school personnel). Instead, the Court found the laws to violate the 
Establishment Clause because they required an excessive entanglement between church 
and state, one in which the State would have to surveil and inspect the religious schools 
in question and audit them in ways that would permit an undue influence of the State in 
the religious sphere. 
 Significantly, the Court disposed of the wall metaphor for understanding the 
separation of church and state. Justice Burger wrote, “Judicial caveats against 
entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a 
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship.”49 Thus we have moved from Roger Williams’ and Jefferson’s metaphor of 
a wall to Madison’s “line of separation.”50 For those who would oppose the introduction 
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49 Ibid. 
50 James Madison, “Letter to Rev. Adams,” 1832, in The Founders’ Constitution, Volume 5, Amendment I 
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of any instruction about religion(s) in the public schools, appeal to a wall of separation 
between church and state will not make for a valid constitutional argument. As Yale legal 
scholar Stephen Carter notes, “…the wall has to have a few doors in it.”51 
 
3.3.5 Sherbert v. Verner (1963), Employment Division v. Smith (1990), and RFRA’s 
In 1963, the Court began a protracted battle that would involve Congress and the 
States regarding accommodations based on religious liberty. The flagship case here was 
Sherbert v. Verner (1963), in which a Seventh-Day Adventist woman, Adell Sherbert, 
who was fired for her unwillingness to show up for work on a Saturday when her 
company switched from a 5-day to a 6-day work week, sought unemployment benefits. 
She was denied benefits for her unwillingness to accept other suitable work, which also 
would have required Sabbath violations. She contended that her right to the free exercise 
of religion had been violated. 
In a 7-2 decision, the Court agreed with Sherbert. While acknowledging the precedent 
that free exercise involves both beliefs, which are inviolable, and actions, which may be 
controlled for secular legislative purposes (heretofore related to “some substantial threat 
to public safety, peace or order,”52) the Court nonetheless found that “minority religions 
can easily be ‘trod upon’ by majority practices.”53 Therefore, a test was developed to 
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determine whether a generally-applicable law was unfairly burdening someone’s free 
exercise of religion. The test has come to be known as The Sherbert Test:  
First, it must be determined whether government’s conduct imposes a “substantial 
burden” on the person’s free exercise of religion. If it does, then we must ask 
whether that interference can be justified by a “compelling state interest.” … It 
must be an unusually weighty interest. And the law must be narrowly tailored to 
achieve this interest in the least burdensome manner possible: “no alternative 
forms of regulation” could be envisaged that would advance that interest “without 
infringing First Amendment rights.”54 
 
 This question of “compelling state interest” relates to public schools and their 
curricula. Two cases will help to illustrate the relationship. First, in Wisconsin v. Yoder 
(1972), 
Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller, both members of the Old Order Amish religion, 
and Adin Yutzy, a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, were 
prosecuted under a Wisconsin law that required all children to attend public 
schools until age 16. The three parents refused to send their children to such 
schools after the eighth grade, arguing that high school attendance was contrary to 
their religious beliefs.55 
 
The Court acknowledged that “…the values of parental direction of the religious 
upbringing and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high 
place in our society.”56 The question was whether the state had a compelling interest in 
mandating two years of schooling beyond what the families found religiously acceptable. 
                                                          
54 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 137. 
55 Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972). “Facts of the Case,” Oyez, www.oyez.org/cases/1971/70-110 
[Accessed 11 November 2019]. 
56 Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/#tab-
opinion-1949691 [Accessed 11 November 2019]. 
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The Court found no such compelling interest, especially in light of a very substantial 
burden on the free exercise of religion particular to the Amish way of life. 
 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger first asserted that “Although a 
determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to constitutional 
protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty 
precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in 
which society as a whole has important interests.”57 This caveat will lead to a full-blown 
reversal of course in 1990, as we shall see, but for now it remains as a reminder that the 
“substantial burden” prong of the test must be met, and that not every conscientious 
objector will have success in such a claim. Concerning the case at hand, though, the 
Court found that “…the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of 
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction…,” one that warrants 
accommodation.  
Martha Nussbaum offers the cynical view that the Amish also “get a break in part 
because they are wealthy and established, and don’t pose any big challenge to majority 
Protestant values of thrift and virtue.”58 Nonetheless, she admits that “Sherbert produced 
a climate of heightened sympathy to religious interests, particularly those of small and 
odd minorities”59 such as the Amish in the Yoder case. She presents important evidence: 
A recent thorough study of all Free Exercise cases after Sherbert shows clearly 
that minorities (particularly small sects and denominations) are the standard 
plaintiffs in such cases and that, while they lose more than half the time, they do 
                                                          
57 Wisconsin v. Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/406/205/#tab-
opinion-1949691 [Accessed 11 November 2019]. 
58 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 145. 
59 Ibid., p. 147. 
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much better under the Sherbert framework, and under the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act [RFRA], which restored the Sherbert framework, than they did 
under the more restrictive framework established by the Smith decision in 1990.60  
 
 Let’s turn, then, to Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith (1990). The question 
before the Court was whether banning the religious ritual use of an illegal drug was an 
unconstitutional abridgement of one’s right to the free exercise of religion. Alfred Smith 
and Galen Black argued that they were unjustly fired and then denied unemployment 
benefits for ingesting peyote, an illegal drug under Oregon law, although their use of the 
drug was part of a ritual with the Native American Church. Justice Antonin Scalia, 
writing for a 6-3 majority, dispensed with the Sherbert Test and found in favor of the 
State of Oregon. His reasoning ignited a constitutional wildfire that spread to Congress, 
back to the Court, and to the states. 
 According to Scalia, the issue was not a question of weighing the state’s 
compelling interest against the substantial burden placed on the individual’s free exercise 
right, but rather a question of whether the burden was “merely the incidental effect of a 
generally applicable and otherwise valid provision.”61 Quoting from Reynolds v. United 
                                                          
60 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 146. Warren A. Nord gives a different perspective, stating that “Yoder was the 
only case other than a series of unemployment compensation cases in which the Court used the Sherbert 
Test to protect free exercise. Almost always the Court decided that whatever the government interest, it 
was sufficiently compelling to override the right of free exercise. Nonetheless, the test did seem to 
capture something of what a broad consensus of jurists believed to be the proper way to adjudicate free 
exercise clauses.” (Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in our Schools 
and Universities (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 112-13).  
61 Employment Division v. Smith., 494 U.S. 872 (1990), 




States (1878), in which the Court had rejected Mormon claims to free exercise and 
affirmed the authority to decree polygamy illegal, Scalia wrote, 
To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's 
coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is 
‘compelling’ -- permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, ‘to become a law unto 
himself,’… -- contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.62 
 
It would require the courts to determine the relative significance and centrality of 
religious beliefs and practices, and it would invite exemptions from all sorts of civic 
duties and generally applicable laws, from the military draft and taxes that support the 
military to health and safety regulations and child labor laws. In short, it would be 
“courting anarchy” and the danger “increases in direct proportion to the society's 
diversity of religious beliefs.”63 The proper recourse for a minority religion’s oppression 
under generally applicable laws, according to Scalia, would be to engage the democratic 
process and change the law, not to ask the courts for accommodations. Perhaps the key 
line from the ruling is this: 
It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will 
place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely 
engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be 
preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which 
judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all 
religious beliefs.64 
 
 Employment Division v. Smith was immediately condemned in many quarters for 
abandoning the Sherbert Test and for failing to give religious freedom its due. Stephen 
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Carter called the case, “…much criticized—and justly criticized…”65 while also pointing 
to the case as a bellwether of the late twentieth century’s judicial orientation concerning 
religious liberty. He feared that the United States was becoming “…a world in which 
citizens who adopt religious practices at variance with official state policy are properly 
made subject to the coercive authority of the state, which can, without fear of judicial 
intervention, pressure them to change those practices.”66 This no longer sounds like 
neutrality. This sounds like hostility. It sounds like the establishment of a state religion, 
perhaps one that matches the majority’s affiliation, or perhaps the religion of secularism 
that Justice Stewart foretold. 
 The wildfire was thus ignited. “The U.S. public was outraged by Smith. Citizens 
of many sorts, and groups of many sorts, rose up to protest it.”67 Congress responded to 
the pressure by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in 1993, with 
nearly unanimous bipartisan support in both chambers. President Bill Clinton signed the 
bill into law in November of the same year. The law articulated displeasure with the 
                                                          
65 Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelief: How American Law and Politics Trivialize Religious Devotion 
(BasicBooks: New York, 1993), p. 127. 
66 Ibid. This, of course, is beginning to look different since the 2016 presidential election. Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell denied President Barack Obama a Supreme Court appointment after the death 
of conservative Justice Antonin Scalia, refusing to even consider his nominee, Merrick Garland on the 
grounds that it was an election year. President Donald Trump filled that vacancy, which did not 
significantly alter the ideological balance on the Court. However, with the resignation of the Court’s swing 
vote, Justice Anthony Kennedy, President Trump was able to move the Court in a more conservative 
direction. Then, with the death of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, McConnell reversed his policy and though 
it was immediately before an election, he allowed Trump to fill that vacancy, significantly altering the 
makeup of the Court. It remains to be seen how this will affect the issues discussed here. It seems fair to 
say that Carter’s assessment of the Court in the late twentieth century no longer holds in the beginning of 
the third decade of the twenty-first.  
67 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 157. Stephen Macedo writes, “The Smith decision caused a torrent of academic 
and political outrage.” (Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural 
Democracy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 155). 
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Smith decision and required the courts, state and federal, to use the Sherbert framework 
of strict scrutiny henceforth in its jurisprudence: 
(a) In general 
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if 
the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided in 
subsection (b). 
      (b) Exception 
            Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it 
            demonstrates that application of the burden to the person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental 
interest.68 
 
In 1997 the Court finally had its chance to revisit the issue in City of Boerne v. 
Flores, and it promptly ruled the RFRA unconstitutional inasmuch as it applied to the 
states. “Although it took a while for this to become clear, RFRA remained valid law as 
applied to the federal government…”69 The wildfire then spread to the states, many of 
which passed their own versions of the RFRA. At this writing, there are 30 states that 
have some version of an RFRA, either passed legislatively or decided by the judiciary.70 
                                                          
68 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (Pub. L. 103–141, § 3, Nov. 16, 1993, 107 Stat. 1488.), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/2000bb-1 [Accessed 17 November 2019]. 
69 Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New 
York: BasicBooks, 2008) p. 159. In the end, even Justice Scalia admitted that “the success of the peyote 
exemption [that Congress passed in 1994] is a ‘demonstration you can make an exception without the sky 
falling.’” (p. 164). 
70 “The National Conference of State Legislatures reports that 21 states have added constitutional or 
statutory provisions similar to the RFRA, while protections in at least 10 other states have come from 
judicial interpretations of existing laws.” (Thomas Jipping and Sarah Perry, “The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act: History, Status, and Threats,” The Heritage Foundation, May 4, 2021, 
https://www.heritage.org/civil-rights/report/the-religious-freedom-restoration-act-history-status-and-
threats#). Wikipedia has the only current and updated list of state RFRA’s that I could find, which is 
unfortunate due to the online encyclopedia’s credibility issues. Nonetheless, for those interested in 
learning more about state RFRA’s, the entry may provide a starting point for further research and 
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As Yoder exemplifies, the reach of the RFRA’s is as local as the schoolhouse. 
Because public schooling is compulsory and is an action of the government, there will be 
cases involving curriculum and pedagogy wherein citizens seek relief from majority-
imposed schooling in areas that are seen to impinge on religious belief. (We need only to 
think of sex education or evolutionary biology to make this point). These cases, inasmuch 
as they involve the First Amendment, and religious liberty in particular, will be decided 
by applying the strict scrutiny required by Sherbert and the RFRA’s. One particularly 
important question in this regard has already reached the courts, although it was not taken 
up by the Supreme Court. That is the question of whether exposure to various religions 
and beliefs in-and-of-itself constitutes a violation of religious liberty. For that question, 
we turn to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
 
3.3.6 Mozert v. Hawkins (6th Cir. 1987): Exposure to Religious Pluralism 
In 1983, fundamentalist Christian families in Tennessee complained about the reading 
series (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston) used in Hawkins County schools from first through 
eighth grade. “It was alleged that the texts taught, among other things, value relativism, 
disrespect toward parents, the theory of evolution, humanistic values, and the notion that 
any belief in the supernatural is adequate to attain salvation.”71 What is especially 
                                                          
verification. See “State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts,” last edited January 22, 2021, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State_Religious_Freedom_Restoration_Acts#Pre_Hobby_Lobby [Accessed 
14 April 2021]. According to this website, the states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, 
Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin. Arizona and Colorado passed RFRA’s 
that were then vetoed. Other states are considering RFRA’s currently. 
71 Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 158. 
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important for our purposes here, and central to the Circuit Court of Appeal’s decision, is 
one additional contention: “If their children were to be taught about the religious views of 
others, the parents insisted, they should learn that the other religious views are false while 
theirs are true.”72 Vicki Frost, one of the parents in the case, argued together with the 
other complainants that mere exposure to the materials was a violation of their religious 
liberty. Stephen Macedo summarizes their argument by saying that “…she and the other 
parents insisted it would be sinful to allow their children to use the readers.”73 This was 
the heart of the case. “This very exposure to diversity, they claimed, interfered with the 
free exercise of their religious beliefs by in effect denigrating the truth of their particular 
religious views.”74 
 Quoting from West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), which 
found it unconstitutional to require Jehovah’s Witnesses to salute the flag against their 
religious beliefs, Chief Judge Pierce Lively wrote, “It is abundantly clear that the 
exposure to materials in the Holt series did not compel the plaintiffs to ‘declare a belief,’ 
‘communicate by word and sign [their] acceptance’ of the ideas presented, or make an 
‘affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.’”75 He thus agreed with the affidavit 
written by the school superintendent, which said: 
Without expressing an opinion as to the plaintiffs' religious beliefs, I am of the 
opinion that plaintiffs misunderstand the fact that exposure to something does not 
constitute teaching, indoctrination, opposition or promotion of the things exposed. 
While it is true that these textbooks expose the student to varying values and 
                                                          
72 Stephen Macedo, Diversity and Distrust: Civic Education in a Multicultural Democracy (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 158. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F. 2d 1058 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1987, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=239927245960083759&q=mozert+v.+hawkins,+827+f.2d+
1058+(1987)&hl=en&as_sdt=40000006&as_vis=1 [Accessed 18 November 2019]. 
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religious backgrounds, neither the textbooks nor the teachers teach, indoctrinate, 
oppose or promote any particular value or religion.76 
 
Judge Lively also noted that the parents, at least in some cases, would not accept 
accommodations to the curriculum except those which would violate the Establishment 
Clause. Nonetheless, this was not the basis of his judgment. He wrote: 
…the requirement that public school students study a basal reader series chosen 
by the school authorities does not create an unconstitutional burden under the Free 
Exercise Clause when the students are not required to affirm or deny a belief or 
engage or refrain from engaging in a practice prohibited or required by their 
religion. There was no evidence that the conduct required of the students was 
forbidden by their religion. Rather, the witnesses testified that reading the Holt 
series "could" or "might" lead the students to come to conclusions that were 
contrary to teachings of their and their parents' religious beliefs. This is not 
sufficient to establish an unconstitutional burden.77 
 
Although the other judges in the case did not agree in full with Judge Lively, they 
concurred in his opinion. Their reservations are worthy of note. On the one hand, Judge 
Cornelia G. Kennedy did not think the ruling went far enough. She argued that even if 
there were evidence that the religious liberty of the plaintiffs had been substantially 
burdened, there was nonetheless a compelling state interest in requiring the reading 
series: 
In Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser… (1986), the Supreme Court stated: 
"The role and purpose of the American public school system was well described 
by two historians, saying `public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in 
the Republic.'" Additionally, the Bethel School Court stated that the state through 
its public schools must "inculcate the habits and manners of civility as values in 
themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation." Id. (quoting C. Beard & M. Beard, 
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New Basic History of the United States 228 (1968)). Teaching students about 
complex and controversial social and moral issues is just as essential for preparing 
public school students for citizenship and self-government as inculcating in the 
students the habits and manners of civility.78  
 
Additionally, she worried that accommodating the curriculum to every 
individual’s religious sensibilities would bring disruption to the school day and would 
lead to segregation of students in their reading programs based on religion. “As Justice 
Jackson stated in McCollum,” she wrote, “every parent:” 
‘has as good a right as this plaintiff to demand that the courts compel the schools 
to sift out of their teaching everything inconsistent with its doctrines. If we are to 
eliminate everything that is objectionable to any of these warring sects or 
inconsistent with any of their doctrines, we will leave public education in shreds. 
Nothing but educational confusion and a discrediting of the public school system 
can result from subjecting it to constant law suits.’79 
 
  Judge Danny J. Boggs disagreed, though he also concurred in the court’s 
opinion. Assessing the religious beliefs of the plaintiffs, he wrote, “Their view may seem 
silly or wrong-headed to some, but it is a sincerely held religious belief.”80 He also 
agreed that the school’s mandatory curriculum imposed a burden. “…Boggs argued that 
the reading program could be likened to requiring Catholic students to read items on the 
Catholic Church’s official index of prohibited books…,”81 conduct that Boggs correctly 
                                                          
78 Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F. 2d 1058 - Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit 1987, Judge 
Cornelia G. Kennedy concurring opinion, 
https://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=239927245960083759&q=mozert+v.+hawkins,+827+f.2d+
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79 Ibid. 
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J. Boggs concurring opinion, 
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Harvard University Press, 2000), p. 161. 
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notes would have been understood as a mortal sin at least until the Second Vatican 
Council, potentially condemning a student to eternal damnation.82 This, however, would 
indeed be evidence “that the conduct required of the students was forbidden by their 
religion.” The question, then, is who gets to decide that? It appears that Judge Lively 
wanted publicly available evidence, such as would be The Index of Forbidden Books for 
Catholics. Judge Boggs accepted the testimony of the parents and their evidence, 
including passages from Scripture, as sufficient. However, not all conscientious objection 
results from evidence so tangible and/or discernible. Later, in Smith (decided three years 
after Mozert), we see that Justice Scalia warned about the Court playing this role. “As we 
reaffirmed only last Term,” he wrote, “‘[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the 
centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' 
interpretation of those creeds.’”83 For Boggs, though, the question was not ultimately 
about professed belief, perceived burdens, or compelling state interest. He concluded that 
the only question that was subject to judicial review was whether the curriculum violated 
the Establishment Clause. Questions related to the burden placed on religious believers, 
he concluded, were to be decided in the political sphere. This, too, seems to anticipate 
Justice Scalia’s view in Smith. 
The case never made it to the Supreme Court, ending in the Sixth Circuit, and so 
that decision stands. From it, we find some constitutional latitude: mere exposure to 
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religious pluralism does not violate the Constitution. We also find some limitations: 
exposure might violate the Free Exercise Clause if there is evidence that the exposure 
clearly violates one’s deeply held religious beliefs and there is no compelling state 
interest to warrant it. In this case, accommodations/exemptions would be a fit remedy. In 
another case, exposure surely would violate the Constitution if it amounted to the 
establishment of religion. Finally, in the post-RFRA judicial environment, and with a 
Court moving more to the right, it seems safe to guess that Mozert would not hold up if 
challenged. The pendulum has swung to a point favoring an individual’s (and even, after 
the Hobby Lobby case in 2014, corporate) religious liberty over the state’s coercive 
authority. I imagine the courts today might find that a single, compulsory reading 
program is not the “least restrictive means” of achieving the state’s “compelling interest.” 
The best way forward for introducing the study of religion(s) in public schools 
will be one that is empowered by Mozert’s recognition that mere exposure to diversity in 
religious beliefs does not violate the Constitution, but which also respects the conscience 
of those who feel otherwise, by providing reasonable accommodations and exemptions. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 Can a proposal to teach about religion(s) in American public schools withstand 
constitutional scrutiny? As this review of cases has shown, the answer is clearly yes. 
More than that, the Supreme Court has unequivocally ruled that the study of religion(s) 
has a proper place in the American educational project. Failure to honor its place amounts 
to hostility, which is emphatically unconstitutional.  
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 What, then, are the requirements for the inclusion of religion(s) in the curriculum? 
The First Amendment Center, whose senior scholar is Charles C. Haynes, reports some 
consensus guidelines for acceptable teaching about religion(s) in public schools (as 
opposed to teaching for religious belief). They are thoroughly consistent with the Mozert 
assertion that exposure to religious diversity is not inherently unconstitutional, and with 
Supreme Court decisions that have required a secular legislative purpose and government 
neutrality. These guidelines are: 
1. The school’s approach to religion is academic, not devotional. 
2. The school may strive for student awareness of religions, but should not press 
for student acceptance of any one religion. 
3. The school may sponsor study about religion, but may not sponsor the practice 
of religion. 
4. The school may expose students to a diversity of religious views, but may not 
impose any particular view. 
5. The school may educate about all religions, but may not promote or denigrate 
any religion. 
6. The school may inform the student about various beliefs, but should not seek to 
conform him or her to any particular belief.84 
    
 Although the traditional distinction here is between teaching about religion(s) 
versus the teaching of or for religion(s), it may be helpful to consider the perspective of 
the learner. While the teacher must avoid indoctrination—teaching for religion—the 
student will always be gaining more than mere information no matter what the subject 
matter. While the curriculum must not force conformity with any religious beliefs, it will 
always necessarily have a role in the formation of the human person. In other words, by 
                                                          
84 Charles C. Haynes and Oliver Thomas, “Finding Common Ground: A First Amendment Guide to Religion 
and Public Schools,” (Nashville: First Amendment Center, 2007), p. 98. Based on guidelines from the 
Public Education Religion Studies Center at Wright State University. 
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addressing religion(s) in the public schools, we will not only be helping students to learn 
about religion(s), but we will be situating them to learn from religion(s) in a more 
equitable and unbiased way, just as they learn from non-religious sources of knowledge 
as well, adhering thereby to the requirement for neutrality. This learning from85 happens 
regardless of the intention of the teacher and it happens without violating the 
Establishment Clause because it is not the doing of the school. We learn from everything 
we study: there is no disembodied mind that simply soaks up information. We are always 
engaged in a lifelong, formative process. A good curriculum and pedagogy are required 
to create an honest approach, where this learning from is recognized, where students 
engage in critical thinking and reasonably consider the available data. We thus empower 
students to make decisions about what counts as wisdom to them, and to be active agents 
in their own formation. This brings us beyond the realm of constitutional law and into the 
realm of political and educational philosophy and epistemology. It is to that inquiry that 
we turn next.
                                                          
85 Learning from religion is a concept especially associated with Michael Grimmitt. See, for example, 
Michael Grimmitt, “When is ‘Commitment’ a Problem in Religious Education?” British Journal of 
Educational Studies Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (February, 1981), pp. 42-53, at 49-50. 
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CHAPTER 4: Philosophical Underpinnings - 
 Teaching About and Learning From Religion(s) 
 
 The Supreme Court has made clear not only that it is constitutional to teach about 
religion(s) in American public schools, as long as neutrality is maintained, but also that it 
may be unconstitutional to fail to teach about religion(s). Justice Clark’s words in writing 
for the Court continue to be underappreciated: 
…it might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of 
comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the 
advancement of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of 
study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates 
that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a 
secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First 
Amendment.1 
 
Nonetheless, the question remains whether what is permissible is, in fact, desirable. This 
gets to the heart of educational philosophy, stated by Diane Moore succinctly as it relates 
to this issue: “What are we educating for?”2 
4.1 Challenging the Reigning Educational Paradigm 
 Increasingly, the aims of education in American public schools appear to be 
narrowing. Since the advent of high-stakes testing, competition in a “race to the top” has 
dominated over cooperation and collaboration. Conceived as such, education becomes 
more about individual success than the common good. The markers of success are 
                                                          
1 School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), 
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/374/203/#tab-opinion-1944457 [Accessed 16 October 
2019]. 
2 Personal recollection from a seminar with Prof. Diane L. Moore at Harvard Divinity School, “Religion, 
Values, and Public Education: A Closer Look at the First Amendment,” Fall semester, 2006. 
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familiar: getting into a good college and getting a good job. A “good college” is one that 
makes it more likely that a student will land a good job. A “good job” is usually 
interpreted to mean, above all, one that pays well and has excellent benefits, prestige, and 
room for advancement. In other words, education is reduced to a sort of job training 
focusing on technical skills. The student becomes homo economicus, and is treated as raw 
material for the marketplace. The student, in this distortion, is a commodity which must 
develop a competitive market value through education in “marketable skills.” He/she is 
also seen as a future functionary in an already established economic machine, just another 
interchangeable and ultimately disposable part. 
While most teachers (and young people themselves) almost certainly do not see 
students through this narrow economic lens, nonetheless the thrust of the educational 
system seems to operate increasingly according to these assumptions. Education, in this 
sense, treats students as “human resources” to keep the economic machine running 
smoothly. Nel Noddings critiques this perspective concerning the aims of education and 
the overall economic arrangement of society when she writes, “Often we equate 
happiness with financial success, and then we suppose that our chief duty as educators is 
to give all children the tools needed to get ‘good’ jobs. However, many essential jobs, 
now very poorly paid, will have to be done even if the entire citizenry were to become 
well educated.”3  
 The high-stakes testing environment is both the product of a diminished 
understanding of education and a contributor to its further diminishment. Rooted in 
                                                          
3 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 22-23. 
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neoliberal economic theory, high-stakes testing not only introduces excessive amounts of 
competition into education, but also fundamentally changes what we mean by knowledge 
and a responsible way of knowing. It engenders an anemic epistemology. By reducing 
knowledge to discreet answers on a multiple choice test, our educational system gives the 
impression—it teaches!—that knowledge (at least worthwhile knowledge) is a closed set 
of precisely that data which we are able to format into multiple choice questions and 
answer with a technical rationality. Intelligence is measured by one’s success in this 
system that Paulo Freire called banking education: “Education thus becomes an act of 
depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor.”4 
He memorably described students in this system as containers being filled by their 
teachers. The best students, of course, are those from whom the deposit can be quickly 
and easily withdrawn on an examination. 
 Eleanor Duckworth rightly critiques this understanding of education from a 
different angle than Noddings and Freire. She invokes the notion of virtues in education 
and reminds us of what is lost when we focus only on “knowing” in this depleted sense. 
She writes, “…knowing the right answer is overrated. It is a virtue—there is no debate 
about that—but in conventional views of intelligence it tends to be given far too much 
weight.”5 Why is it overrated? After all, a critic might reply, isn’t getting the right answer 
generally agreed to be not only a sign of intelligence, but the sign? She worries that this 
                                                          
4 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1970) p. 58. Professor Fred Lawrence at Boston College memorably described this understanding of 
education in class by saying, “The notes of the teacher enter into the notes of the student without passing 
through the minds of either.” (Personal recollection from his course “Foundational Theology I: Faith and 
Reason (Soundings),” Fall semester, 2010). 
5 Eleanor Duckworth, “The Having of Wonderful Ideas” and Other Essays on Teaching and Learning (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2006), p. 63. 
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overemphasis of one virtue—getting the right answer—obscures other critical virtues, 
which she calls “the virtues of not knowing.”6 According to this understanding, a great 
amount of learning happens when we get things wrong. Education should not focus only 
on right answers, but on intelligent processes. (This will be one of the strong arguments 
for the study of religion(s) in the public schools: such studies do not yield easy answers 
but engage students in important discussions in a way that values critical thinking and 
collaborative learning.) Duckworth suggests posing problems, something Freire also 
promoted,7 as key to strengthening the virtues associated with not knowing. These virtues 
include: courage to put forth ideas and have them scrutinized by others, courage to voice 
disagreement, and willingness to change one’s position as the evidence warrants. She also 
lists “sitting alone, noticing something new, wondering about it, framing a question for 
oneself to answer, and sensing some contradiction in one’s own ideas.”8 Finally, she 
includes “accepting surprise, puzzlement, excitement, patience, caution, honest attempts, 
and wrong outcomes as legitimate and important elements of learning…”9 Far from the 
focus on “outcomes” associated with technical standards-based conceptions of education, 
Duckworth concentrates on the value of “figuring it out.”10 She writes, “The virtues 
involved in not knowing are the ones that really count in the long run… It is, moreover, 
quite possible to help children develop these virtues.”11 On the other hand, high-stakes 
                                                          
6 Eleanor Duckworth, “The Having of Wonderful Ideas” and Other Essays on Teaching and Learning (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2006), p. 63. 
7 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1970), pp. 66ff. 
8 Eleanor Duckworth, “The Having of Wonderful Ideas” and Other Essays on Teaching and Learning (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2006), p. 67. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p. 63. 
11 Ibid., p. 67. 
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tests are decidedly not the way to achieve the development of these lesser-prized virtues. 
She concludes: 
The only difficulty is that teachers are rarely encouraged to do [this type of 
teaching]—largely because standardized tests play such a powerful role in 
determining what teachers pay attention to. Standardized tests can never, even at 
their best, tell us anything other than whether a given fact, notion, or ability is 
already in a child’s repertoire. As a result, teachers are encouraged to go for right 
answers, as soon and as often as possible… It would make a significant difference 
to the cause of intelligent thought in general, and to the number of right answers 
that are ultimately known, if teachers were encouraged to focus on the virtues 
involved in not knowing…12 
 
 
 I agree with Duckworth. Ironically, an overemphasis on standardized testing 
(done in the name of gathering data and rooted in the idea of applying the scientific 
method to education) moves learning away from the scientific method and into the 
banking method. Moreover, the high-stakes testing environment introduces an unhealthy 
amount of competition into education and turns what should be a cooperative effort into 
an individualistic endeavor. 
A critic might respond with a capitalist retort that the competition of individuals 
benefits the whole society.13 Far from being individualistic, they might argue, this version 
of educational theory highlights competition in order to establish a true meritocracy that 
yields the best results for all. Because of structural injustices built into the system, such 
                                                          
12 Eleanor Duckworth, “The Having of Wonderful Ideas” and Other Essays on Teaching and Learning (New 
York: Teachers College Press, 2006), p. 68. 
13 Without mentioning competition, the landmark report, A Nation at Risk (1983), from the National 
Commission on Excellence in Education (NCEE) made the connection between individual economic 
advancement and the good of society: “All, regardless of race or class or economic status, are entitled to a 
fair chance and to the tools for developing their individual powers of mind and spirit to the utmost. This 
promise means that all children by virtue of their own efforts, competently guided, can hope to attain the 
mature and informed judgement needed to secure gainful employment, and to manage their own lives, 
thereby serving not only their own interests but also the progress of society itself.” 
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [Accessed 17 July 2020]. Italics in the original.  
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as those documented by Jonathan Kozol for example,14 this argument is flawed from the 
start. Racial and economic inequality belie any attempt to qualify America’s public 
schools as a true meritocracy. Moreover, even prescinding from that question, the 
argument that competition benefits all of society is deeply flawed. The initial error lies in 
conflating the economy with the society. The common good is more than the economy. 
We will come back to this point in the next chapter. 
    Increasingly in the United States, there has been a narrowing of the curriculum 
and a diminishment of holistic education. Beginning in the post-Sputnik (1957) “space 
race” era, the United States felt that is was falling behind the USSR and was losing the 
Cold War. New educational initiatives began that promoted greater knowledge in science 
and mathematics.15 By 1983, the National Commission on Excellence in Education 
(NCEE) reported bluntly, in alarmist terms, that “Our Nation is at risk.”16 The report 
“stirred up considerable public concern,”17 especially with its premise that “Our once 
unchallenged preeminence in commerce, industry, science, and technological innovation 
is being overtaken by competitors throughout the world.”18 The “gains in student 
achievement made in the wake of the Sputnik challenge” had been “squandered” and “the 
                                                          
14 See, for example, Jonathan Kozol, Amazing Grace: The Lives of Children and the Conscience of a Nation 
(New York: Broadway Paperbacks, 1995) and Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities: Children in America’s 
Schools (New York: Broadway Books, 2012). Thomas Groome writes, “A substantial literature portrays 
contemporary schooling as marked by rampant individualism and competition, as focused on serving the 
interests of unbridled capitalism…” (Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every 
Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: Thomas More, 1998), p. 195). Groome refers us especially to the work of 
Henry Giroux and Ira Shor. (Ibid., p. 213n18). 
15 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), pp. 35-36. 
16 National Commission on Excellence in Education, “A Nation at Risk,” 1983, 
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [Accessed 17 July 2020]. 
17 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 37. 
18 National Commission on Excellence in Education, “A Nation at Risk,” 1983, 
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [Accessed 17 July 2020]. 
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educational foundations of our society [were] presently being eroded by a rising tide of 
mediocrity.”19  
A new educational paradigm came into being that Andy Hargreaves and Dennis 
Shirley call “The Second Way of Markets and Standardization,”20 which was 
international in its sweep. In the United States, it was born under Ronald Reagan, who 
redefined “citizens… as clients, customers, or consumers,”21 and thus influenced the 
schooling of those citizens accordingly. This Second Way came to fruition with the 
presidency of Bill Clinton. During this era, “…statewide high-stakes tests were 
increasingly administered to all students—even those who were newly arrived from 
abroad, without the barest rudiments of English. Standards were easy to write and 
inexpensive to fund; they spread like wildfire.”22 This Second Way combined in the early 
2000’s with a renewed concern that American students were not being prepared for a 
changing economy, which demanded skills in Science, Technology, Engineering, and 
Mathematics (STEM). According to the bipartisan Congressional STEM Education 
Caucus at the time, “Our knowledge-based economy is driven by constant innovation. 
                                                          
19 National Commission on Excellence in Education, “A Nation at Risk,” 1983, 
https://www2.ed.gov/pubs/NatAtRisk/risk.html [Accessed 17 July 2020]. 
20 Andy Hargreaves and Dennis Shirley, The Fourth Way: The Inspiring Future for Educational Change 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2009), pp. 8-12. The earlier “First Way of Innovation and Inconsistency” was 
an age of educational experimentation, social reconstruction theory, and child-centered learning. The 
later “Third Way of Performance and Partnerships” was barely ever tried in the U.S. according to the 
authors, who say that “The federal government [at the start of the 21st century] remained resolutely stuck 
in the rut of failed Second Way solutions” (p. 17). Concerning their proposed “Fourth Way,” the authors 
write: “A world dominated by wealth and might has diminished and almost destroyed us. But in the 
depths of crisis, a new spirit is emerging in which service and sacrifice in a commonwealth of hope can 
elevate us to a higher purpose and a humane exercise of our powers… Greed and a culture of narcissism 
can give way to a public spirit. Secrecy and surveillance can give way to transparency and democracy. 
There is no finer place to pursue this quest than through the education of the young… This is the moment 
that has summoned our effort to chart a better course in social and educational change—a Fourth Way of 
innovation, inspiration, and sustainability” (p. xii). 




The foundation of innovation lies in a dynamic, motivated and well-educated workforce 
equipped with STEM skills.”23 Exercises in technical rationality increased, leaving ever 
less room in the curriculum to address formative questions of meaning and morality. We 
focused on giving students the tools they would need for “success,” never stopping with 
them to ponder what would be worthwhile to build.  
 The George W. Bush Administration put forth its plan, No Child Left Behind 
(NCLB) in this environment. Nonetheless, “Despite its urgent insistence on improvement 
and equity, NCLB legislation, alongside endless and contradictory systems of statewide 
and districtwide testing… narrowed and dumbed down the curriculum.”24 The initiatives 
were never fully funded, making the situation worse for the states.25 In the Obama 
Administration, states competing to receive federal “Race to the Top” grant money were 
given extra points for prioritizing STEM education.26 Diane Ravitch noted in a sharp 
criticism of “Race to the Top” that it was “an aggressive version of the Bush 
administration’s No Child Left Behind, under which many schools have narrowed their 
curriculum to the tested subjects of reading and math.”27 She writes,  
This poor substitute for a well-rounded education, which includes subjects such as 
the arts, history, geography, civics, science and foreign language, hits low-income 
children the hardest, since they are the most likely to attend the kind of “failing 
school” that drills kids relentlessly on the basics. Emphasis on test scores already 
compels teachers to focus on test preparation. Holding teachers personally and 
                                                          
23 Judith Hallinen, “STEM,” Encyclopædia Brittanica, June 28, 2019, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/STEM-education [Accessed 17 July 2020].  
24 Andy Hargreaves and Dennis Shirley, The Fourth Way: The Inspiring Future for Educational Change 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2009), p. 17. 
25 Ibid., p. 18. 
26 Edward E. Kaufman, “STEM Education: A Race to the Top,” Education Week, 29 no. 18 (January 11, 
2010), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/01/08/18kaufman.h29.html. [Accessed 17 July 2020].  
27 Diane Ravitch, “The Big Idea—it’s bad education policy,” Los Angeles Times (March 14, 2010), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-14-la-oe-ravitch14-2010mar14-story.html [Accessed 
17 July 2020]. Note well the focus on reading and math, and not science, despite the focus on STEM. 
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exclusively accountable for test scores—a key feature of Race to the Top—will 
make this situation even worse.28 
Though some schools have turned STEM into STEAM by adding the Arts back 
in, the narrowing of the curricular focus to STEM appears to be a hallmark of our times, 
as does the focus on testing and standards. “At the beginning of the twenty-first century,” 
writes Noddings, “educational discussion is dominated by talk of standards, and the 
reason for this is almost always economic.”29 
The narrowing of the curriculum, whether to reading and math in the younger 
grades, or to STEM subjects in secondary schools, is, as Noddings notes, tied to the 
economy. A Nation at Risk and The STEM Education Caucus told us as much. The aims 
which undergird the movement are two-fold according to Noddings: first, “to keep the 
United States strong economically” and second, “to give every child an opportunity to do 
well financially.”30 She is critical of both aims. While a strong economy is vital, the focus 
on standards in schools to achieve that goal seems disingenuous. After all, these 
proposals were not made during the Carter years, but during the boom years that 
followed. If anything, the schools seem to have been doing something right. “Why should 
the schools be accused of undermining the American economy during a time of 
unparalleled prosperity?”31 she asks. “It is demonstrably false that downward fluctuations 
in the economy can be traced to the poor performance of our schools.”32 More 
                                                          
28 Diane Ravitch, “The Big Idea—it’s bad education policy,” Los Angeles Times (March 14, 2010), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-14-la-oe-ravitch14-2010mar14-story.html [Accessed 
17 July 2020]. 
29 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 84. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid., p. 198. 
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importantly, she critiques the idea that a standardized curriculum is the correct response 
for the goal of financial success for every student. 
It is especially hard to understand why educators have joined policymakers in 
recommending more academic mathematics and science for all students. The 
country does not need more mathematicians and scientists, and almost certainly it 
can turn out enough engineers and computer workers by providing a fine 
scientific education for those whose interests and talents lie in these areas.33  
 
It is important to note that she does not deny the value of having a citizenry that is 
educated in math and science; indeed, she explicitly states “I am not suggesting that 
mathematical and scientific literacy is unimportant.”34 Instead she breaks out of the 
narrow curriculum mindset that the standards movement and the STEM laser-focus have 
created. She says, “I am claiming that other goals are even more important. Moreover, it 
is entirely possible to integrate these concerns in ways that will enhance all of them.”35 
What are some of these other “more important” goals of education? 
Given the state of the world and the documented loss of happiness among 
individuals, perhaps we should be more concerned with understanding and 
preventing violence, offering more courses in peace education, understanding and 
treating substance abuse, promoting self-understanding and interpersonal 
relations, protecting the environment, teaching love of place, parenting, spiritual 
                                                          
33 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 199. She 
would agree with Alfred North Whitehead (in fact she quotes him approvingly multiple times) who long 
ago said, “There is only one subject-matter for education, and that is Life in all its manifestations. Instead 
of this single unity, we offer children—Algebra, from which nothing follows; Geometry, from which 
nothing follows… Let us now return to quadratic equations… Why should children be taught their 
solution? Unless quadratic equations fit into a connected curriculum, of course there is no reason to teach 
anything about them. Furthermore, extensive as should be the place of mathematics in a complete 
culture, I am a little doubtful whether for many types of boys [and girls] algebraic solutions of quadratic 
equations do not lie on the specialist side of mathematics... Fortunately, the specialist side of education 
presents an easier problem than does the provision of a general culture… undoubtedly the chief reason is 
that the specialist study is normally a study of peculiar interest to the student. He [or she] is studying it 
because, for some reason, he [or she] wants to know it. This make all the difference.” (Alfred North 
Whitehead, The Aims of Education and Other Essays (New York: The Free Press, 1929), p. 7, 11). 




awakening, preparation for a congenial occupation, encouraging lasting pleasure 
in the arts, and developing sound character and a pleasing personality.36 
 
Thus, she criticizes not only each of the two-fold economic aims of the standards 
movement, but the economic orientation of those goals itself, stating, “There is more to 
individual life and the life of a nation than economic superiority.”37 
 Noddings helps us to see that the model of standardization, which treats the 
student as a generic homo economicus, is limiting and harmful. Diane Ravitch concluded 
recently that “For almost twenty years, the Bush-Obama-Trump program of standardized 
testing, punitive accountability, and school choice has been the reform strategy. It has 
utterly failed.”38 She makes a distinction between what she calls traditional “reformers” 
and the “disruptors” of the last two decades or more. “Reformers have historically called 
for more funding, better trained teachers, desegregation, smaller class sizes. The 
disruptors, however, banked on a strategy of testing, competition, and punishment, which 
turned out to be ineffective and harmful.”39 
                                                          
36 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 200. 
Elsewhere she writes, “Our society does not need to make its children first in the world in mathematics 
and science. It needs to care for its children—to reduce violence, to respect honest work of every kind, to 
reward excellence at every level, to ensure a place for every child and emerging adult in the economic and 
social world, to produce people who can care competently for their own families and contribute 
effectively to their communities. In direct opposition to the current emphasis on academic standards, a 
national curriculum, and national assessment, I have argued that our main educational aim should be to 
encourage the growth of competent, caring, loving, and lovable people.” (Nel Noddings, Educating Moral 
People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 2002), p. 94). 
37 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 84. 
38 Diane Ravitch, “The Education Reform Movement Has Failed America. We Need Common Sense 
Solutions That Work.” TIME (February 21, 2020), https://time.com/5775795/education-reform-failed-
america/ [Accessed 17 July 2020]. 
39 Ibid.  
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Noddings and Ravitch invite us to step back and to consider whether we have 
gotten too far away from the demands of a truly liberal education that is holistic and 
humanizing. Hargreaves and Shirley believe we have, proposing their Fourth Way: 
This New Way should…express and advance democratic and humanitarian 
values. It should attend to the advancement of the economy and the restoration of 
prosperity but not at the price of other educational elements that contribute to the 
development of personal integrity, social democracy, and the advancement of 
human decency.40 
 
 This brings us back to Diane Moore’s question: What are we educating for? 
Noddings indicates that one aim of education should be to allow students to pursue the 
knowledge that interests them. In this, she follows John Dewey who wrote, “…the value 
of recognizing the dynamic place of interest in an educative development is that it leads 
to considering children in their specific capabilities, needs, and preferences.”41 Far from 
standardization, Dewey recognized that “…all minds [do not] work in the same way…” 
and that we must take into account “…difference of natural aptitude, of past experience, 
of plan of life, and so on.”42 This is an important counterweight to the standardization 
movement that has held so much sway. Noddings also echoes Dewey in tying this 
conception of education to democracy: 
Many of us believe that the greatest fault in NCLB (and in the current reform 
movement generally) is that it misconstrues the aims of education… The bedrock 
concept of liberal democracy is choice (or freedom). A system of schooling that 
provides few choices and fails to prepare its students to make well-informed 
                                                          
40 Andy Hargreaves and Dennis Shirley, The Fourth Way: The Inspiring Future for Educational Change 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2009), p. xi. For the previous Three Ways, see footnote 20. 




choices in the future does not deserve the label education, and it undermines the 
liberal democracy it should support.43 
 
Still there is a danger here. If the primary aims are to educate students either a) 
according to their own interests, and/or b) in a way that prepares them for personal 
financial success, we are surely failing to grasp education as a social good and instead 
treating it both instrumentally and individualistically. Thus, Michael James and his 
collaborators remind us that John “Dewey’s aim… was a form of learning directly suited 
to building democracy as a participatory, moral, and justice-building framework for lives 
lived in common.”44 I share their concern that, contrary to Dewey’s vision, “…the 
overriding operative educational philosophy in contemporary American society generates 
an intensely individualized model of learning.”45 This is the paradox of our age: by 
providing an education that takes little note of each person’s unique learning needs and 
instead proposes a one-size-fits-all set of technical standards we have nonetheless 
promoted individualism and a loss of sense of belonging and care for the common good. 
Noddings is careful to balance a learner-centered approach to education with a 
social orientation. Thus, she expresses the aims of education in various ways throughout 
her works. In one place, she writes, “But if the school has one main goal, a goal that 
guides the establishment and priority of all others, it should be to promote the growth of 
students as healthy, competent, moral people… Intellectual development is important, but 
                                                          
43 Nel Noddings, When School Reform Goes Wrong (New York: Teachers College Press, 2007), p. 7. She 
writes elsewhere, “Educational aims always reflect the aims—explicit or implicit—of the political society 
in which they are developed. A totalitarian state will engender educational aims that primarily benefit the 
state. A liberal democracy should generate aims more focused on the needs of individuals.” (Nel 
Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 88). 
44 Michael James, Thomas Masters, and Amy Uelmen, Education’s Highest Aim: Teaching and Learning 




it cannot be the first priority of schools.”46 She contrasts that with the almost neurotic 
focus on standards, which she critiques harshly: “The pervasive goal is control: control of 
teachers, of students, of content.”47 Elsewhere, she elaborates on the aims of education, 
writing, 
All students should be engaged in a general education that guides them in caring 
for self, intimate others, global others, plants, animals, the environment, objects 
and instruments, and ideas. Moral life so defined should be frankly embraced as 
the main goal of education. Such an aim does not work against intellectual 
development or academic achievement. Rather, it supplies a firm foundation for 
both.48 
 
Finally, Noddings ties all of this together with the idea of happiness in education, 
the conviction that learning ought to be an enjoyable experience at least most of the time, 
and that happiness relates education to both the personal realm and the public. In 
promoting happiness as an important aim in education, she writes, “…school is still 
boring, and in some ways it is worse today than it was in the 1960s, when reformers were 
clamoring for change. The effects of standardized testing have aggravated an already dull 
way of life.”49 Apart from the dull pedagogy, she claims that the curriculum itself has 
been so narrowed as to bore most students. On the other hand, “Happy children, growing 
in their understanding of what happiness is, will seize their educational opportunities with 
delight, and they will contribute to the happiness of others.”50 Happiness, then, is the 
                                                          
46 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 10. 
47 Ibid., p. 9. 
48 Nel Noddings, Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2002), p. 99. 
49 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 244-5. 
50 Ibid., p. 261. 
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linchpin between educating holistically for the growth of each unique student and 
educating for the common good.  
Our purpose of schooling should be to develop the intellect, but that does not 
mean to stuff the heads of children with material arbitrarily chosen by experts and 
designed to rank and sort them. It means rather to guide students toward the 
intelligent use of their intellectual capacities in both personal and public life. It 
means equipping them with the power to evaluate and direct change, to resist 
harmful changes and promote those that contribute to human flourishing. Almost 
any subject matter of genuine interest to students, well taught, can contribute to 
this end.51 
 
 Bel hooks writes similarly about happiness. Following Freire, she is most 
concerned to delineate a theory of education that puts liberation at the center as “the 
Practice of Freedom.” She is critical of Freire, though, writing, “Neither Freire’s work 
nor feminist pedagogy examined the notion of pleasure in the classroom.”52 She writes 
that “…the classroom should be an exciting place, never boring” and is motivated by 
“The idea that learning should be exciting, sometimes even ‘fun,’…”53 Hooks writes 
from the perspective of a college/university setting, yet her insights apply to our 
discussion of public primary and secondary schools as well. For example, she writes that 
“Progressive, holistic education, ‘engaged pedagogy’… emphasizes well-being,”54 which 
she considers to include “…spiritual well-being… care of the soul.”55 
These are some of the greatest losses in our current educational moment, where 
the student is largely reduced to his/her mind (and more specifically for many testing 
                                                          
51 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 260. 
52 bel hooks, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom (New York: Routledge, 1994), 
p. 7. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid., p. 15. 
55 Ibid., p. 16. 
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purposes, memory) and future contributions to the economy, and where the sense of the 
common good is lost to competitive individualism. Parker Palmer writes in the same vein 
as hooks, “…I am… passionate about not wanting to violate the deepest needs of the 
human soul, which our educational system does with some regularity.”56   
 Hooks and Noddings help us to expand our notion of the educational project 
beyond its current boundaries. They also help us to envision education as oriented to both 
personal growth and social benefit. “Finally,” says Noddings, “basically happy people 
who retain an uneasy social conscience will contribute to a happier world.”57 A happier 
world, in her philosophy, is a better world, a world more peaceful and just. 
4.1.1 What are we educating for? 
A common thread that runs through Dewey, Noddings, and Hargreaves and 
Shirley is that we are educating for good citizens in a democratic society. Unfortunately, 
the current emphasis on the economy in education takes our eyes off this important goal. 
Worse, by promoting competitive individualism, it actually undermines the goal. Thus, 
James and his companions write, “…the ideal of an educational philosophy such as 
Dewey’s that gives priority to democratic relationships often founders on the twin shoals 
of entrenched individualism, discernibly at the core of American culture, and the weight 
of institutional inertia.”58 
                                                          
56 Parker J. Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the 
Human Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p. 123.  
57 Nel Noddings, Happiness and Education (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 261. 
58 Michael James, Thomas Masters, and Amy Uelmen, Education’s Highest Aim: Teaching and Learning 
Through a Spirituality of Communion (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2010), p. 20. 
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 What should be clear from this diagnosis of the current trend in American public 
education is that there is little room for the study of religion(s). When formal education is 
narrowed, not completely but significantly, to its service to the economy, then any subject 
matter must prove its worth in the curriculum in economic terms. We saw that the 
standards and STEM movements have done exactly that. Other subjects that sometimes 
make the curriculum cut, such as the arts when STEM is re-envisioned as STEAM, 
nonetheless fall lower on the hierarchy, and are often seen as non-essential—as budget 
cuts make clear in times of economic woe. In this environment, the introduction of the 
study of religion(s) into the curriculum has had little traction. Moreover, I do not think 
that supplying traction in terms of economic utilitarianism is the way to go. We should 
avoid attempting to justify the study of religion(s) through its economic usefulness, 
refusing to follow big businesses like Google who have turned, for example, to Buddhist 
meditation techniques in order to promote lower healthcare costs and higher 
productivity—a practice known disparagingly as McMeditation and McMindfulness.59 
Some schools, in fact, teach mindfulness techniques in order to reduce stress and bolster 
student performance. I think this is a terrible mistake. Instead, we should argue for 
religion(s) in the curriculum in ways that promote a healthier and more robust 
understanding of education itself. Defending the study of religion(s) only in economic 
terms seems to me a Faustian bargain. I do not want religion to lose its soul. 
 
                                                          
59 See, for example, Ronald E. Purser, McMindfulness: How Mindfulness Became the New Capitalist 
Spirituality (New York: Random House, 2019), and Robert Rosenbaum and Barry Magid, eds., What's 
Wrong with Mindfulness (And What Isn't): Zen Perspectives (Somerville, MA: Wisdom Publications, Inc., 
2016). I thank Alexander J. Green for first introducing me to this concept. 
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4.2 Curriculum Philosophies to Ground Religious Education in Public Schools 
 To find the proper place for the study of religion(s) in the curriculum, we must 
attend to curriculum philosophy. Michael Stephen Schiro argues that there are four 
“curriculum ideologies” that compete for dominance in American schools. He calls these 
four: Scholar Academic (SA), Learner Centered (LC), Social Efficiency (SE), and Social 
Reconstruction (SR).  
“Scholar Academics,” writes Schiro, “believe that over the centuries our culture 
has accumulated important knowledge that has been organized into the academic 
disciplines found in universities. The purpose of education is to help children learn the 
accumulated knowledge of our culture: that of the academic disciplines.”60 Secondary 
school students study subjects, usually taught in isolation from one another, that 
correspond to the disciplines of higher education. Their work is seen as an introduction to 
the academic work of the various disciplines. Thus, students perhaps learn the origins of 
the various fields of study, their ways of thinking and reasoning, the types of questions 
they ask and seek to answer, their methodologies, their conception of what counts as truth 
and evidence, the disputes, the branches of study, and especially their current store of 
knowledge. Students study biology, for instance, in order to think like biologists. The 
goal, from a societal perspective, is to ensure a constant supply of new researchers in 
each professional field, and thus collectively to hold onto the “funded capital of 
civilization”61 and to develop it further. 
                                                          
60 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 4. 
61 John Dewey, in Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent 
(Allen, TX: Thomas More, 1998), p. 220. 
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Unfortunately, the study of religion(s) does not fit well into this curriculum 
ideology in contemporary America. There is practically no debate among Americans, 
with our understanding of separation of church and state, that public schools should not 
be preparing students for specialized fields that are religious in nature such as ministry, 
theology, and religious studies. With the exception of restorationists who would like to 
see the Bible studied in school, even those who would like to see the study of religion(s) 
in our public schools are wary about promoting the study as a field in the SA mindset. 
We have privatized religion to the extent that religious fields of study are not included in 
the “funded capital of civilization” any longer. We may encourage students to go into 
these disciplines if they are so inclined, but our public schools will not prepare them with 
any specialized knowledge to do so. 
The same may be said of the Social Efficiency model. According to Schiro, 
“Social Efficiency advocates believe that the purpose of schooling is to efficiently meet 
the needs of society by training youth to function as future mature contributing members 
of society.”62 Or, more succinctly, “The Social Efficiency ideology views education as a 
social process that perpetuates existing social functions.” It does not endorse the status 
quo exactly, but rather seeks to perpetuate what is best in society and to discard what is 
worst through education.63 Unlike the SA ideology, which focused on preparing students 
for the academic disciplines, the SE model aims to condition students to be good 
members of society and hence to make society better.64 Perhaps what most distinguishes 
                                                          
62 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 4. 
63 Ibid., p. 64. 
64 “The utilitarian education movement [which helped forge the SE ideology] … embodied a reaction to 
academic education in schools, which consisted of generally useless textbook memorizing that prepared 
people only for life in the university.” (Ibid., p. 72). 
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this curriculum theory from others is its methodology. SE practitioners aspire to follow a 
scientific approach toward education, which includes, especially, behavioral and 
cognitive psychology. “The possession of the correct behavior is emphasized over the 
possession of the correct information.”65 Hence the use of the verb “condition” rather 
than “prepare” above. For SE advocates, “information alone is not knowledge… The 
relevant criterion is whether the possessor of information is capable of acting on the 
knowledge represented by the information.”66 Thus, “That which cannot be observed, 
such as some of the ‘spiritual’ dimensions of people’s being, is simply not dealt with.”67 
In practical terms, this has led to education based on clearly stated observable objectives, 
lesson plans that will lead to observable outcomes, and assessments to prove the 
achievement of those outcomes. 
 In the 21st century, we see a strange and powerful merger between the SA and the 
SE models, eclipsing both the LC and the SR theories. Schiro writes: 
By the beginning of the 21st century, with the rise of the standards and 
accountability movements, there was a further shift of emphasis from fulfilling 
social needs to what [Franklin] Bobbitt called raising the “qualitative and 
quantitative standards” that determined the products of schools. The shift 
involved taking as a given the academic programs condoned by the state 
departments of education and emphasizing that high standards be used to assure 
that the academic goals of state curricula are met, that academic achievement is 
promoted, and that “no child is left behind” … As a result, the raising of student 
academic performance became the terminal objective of Social Efficiency 
educators.68 
 
                                                          
65 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 78. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p. 79. 
68 Ibid., pp. 74-5. 
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Thus, we may speak of the current educational climate as being dominated by a SA/SE 
hybrid that has no room for education in religion(s) and spirituality. If we are to make 
space for the teaching of religion(s), it will ultimately not be within the confines of this 
merged SA/SE ideology. We must advocate for a fundamental shift in curriculum 
philosophy, yet without fearing to introduce the teaching of religion(s) now: it may well 
be a prime catalyst for change. 
 Noddings writes primarily as a theorist in the Learner Centered ideology. Here we 
find solid ground for our project. This is the philosophy, after all, that we associate with 
many great educators, including John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Maria Montessori. 
Unlike the SE theory, where a key descriptor of education was training, here the 
prevailing word is growth. “People are… conceptualized as self-activated makers of 
meaning, as actively self-propelled agents of their own growth and not as passive 
organisms to be filled or molded by agents outside themselves.”69 This leads to an 
understanding of education “…involving the drawing out of the inherent capabilities of 
people.”70 Fusing the visions of LC and SR ideologies, bell hooks employs the word 
“self-actualizing” to describe the particular type of holistic growth that allows educators, 
and then by extension, students to also be agents in restructuring society for a more just 
order.71 We might conceptualize such a fusion as the diametric opposite of the SA/SE 
hybrid that reigns in our schools currently. 
                                                          
69 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 103. 
70 Ibid. 
71 bell hooks, Teaching to Transgress: Education as the Practice of Freedom (New York: Routledge, 1994), 
pp. 15ff. Groome reminds us that “self-actualizing” must not be constricted to an “autonomous self”—a 
fault that bell hooks does not commit—in order to maintain an adequate anthropology that recognizes 
the human person as always in relationship, which of course has ethical implications: “Even without the 
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Nonetheless, as we saw from Noddings earlier, the LC approach does not reject 
the academic disciplines nor intellectual rigor. Rather, it posits that not every student 
should study every subject in exactly the same manner and at the same time. 
Furthermore, it challenges the SA model of breaking the curriculum up into discreet 
subject areas which are studied at fixed times and in fixed ways.72 “The ideal school,” 
writes Schiro, “is an integrated school. It takes a unified rather than an atomistic approach 
to people’s education.”73 This unity is found in the linkages between subject areas 
(“Integrated schools do not view knowledge as broken up into separate disciplines.”74), 
and between home and school life. Most prominently, it is expressed in a holistic 
understanding of the child: “…it treats people as integrated organisms. People are dealt 
with as inseparable conglomerates of intellectual, social, emotional, and physical 
components rather than as creatures whose attributes can be partitioned and dealt with 
separately…”75 Groome, writing out of this same philosophical tradition, uses gift 
language to express and expand the same concept: 
People are multi-faceted mysteries; we have gifts in common and particular ones 
as well. Teachers and parents are to help develop all of learners’ talents and 
                                                          
use of religious language, educators can invite learners to reach beyond self actualization—and beyond 
‘the self’ as the measure of morality—toward universal ideals and values that are grounded in 
transcendence.” (Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent 
(Allen, TX: Thomas More, 1998), p. 305).  
72 Hargreaves and Shirley remind us that even this is susceptible to the market mentality. Hargreaves, in 
particular, discovered that “…personalization, like so many promising Third Way strategies, is sometimes 
equated with ‘the movement from mass production to mass customization.’ … With customized learning, 
students access existing and unchanged kinds of conventional learning through different means—on site 
or off site, online or offline, in school or out of school, quickly or slowly, cooperatively or alone. But the 
nature of the learning itself is not transformed into something deeper, more challenging, and more 
connected to compelling issues in their world and their lives. Customization becomes a tool to market and 
manage learning…” (Andy Hargreaves and Dennis Shirley, The Fourth Way: The Inspiring Future for 
Educational Change (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2009), p. 84). 
73 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 100. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid. He is summarizing the perspective of Noddings in this passage. 
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possibilities, to commit themselves to an integrated education of the whole 
person. We have: physical gifts for manual labor, sports, and entertainment; moral 
gifts for discerning and choosing what is good; spiritual gifts for compassion, 
love, and reaching for the Transcendent; social gifts for relationship and service; 
intellectual gifts for pursuing truth and wisdom; and aesthetic gifts for creating 
and appreciating the beautiful.76 
 
Importantly, the LC ideology emphasizes that students make meaning for 
themselves (though always in a cultural context) as they grow. This constructivism opens 
the doors to educators for assisting students in their personal construction of meaning, 
including questions of ultimate meaning. We may call these existential, religious, or 
spiritual questions, and they are certainly important not only to the history of human 
thought and society77 but to every person’s ongoing quest for purpose in life. Thus, I 
agree with Groome when he writes, “I am convinced that the lack of a spiritual vision is 
an Achilles heel of ‘the American experiment’ in education.”78 Hargreaves and Shirley 
recognize the lacuna as well, and attempt to fill it in their Fourth Way, writing: 
Creativity, innovation, intellectual agility, teamwork, problem solving, flexibility, 
and adaptability to change are essential to the new economy. But if these skills are 
all there is to 21st century schools, they will convert personalization into mere 
customization… Twenty-first century schools must also embrace deeper virtues 
and values such as courage, compassion, service, sacrifice, long-term 
commitment, and perseverance…79  
                                                          
76 Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: 
Thomas More, 1998), p. 100 (emphasis in the original). Groome also notes that the Catholic schools in the 
U.S. have preserved this holistic tradition as one of their defining features: “They provide… holistic 
curricula that embrace… the totality of the person—intellectual, moral, social, aesthetic, physical, and 
spiritual.” (Ibid., p. 51). 
77 “Throughout most of human history, questions about the existence and nature of gods, about the 
meaning of life, about the role of religion in societies, and about moral life with or without gods have 
been recognized as paramount in any examined life and, therefore, central to education… It is only in the 
second half of this [20th] century that we find philosophers and educators ignoring religion entirely.” (Nel 
Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), p. xiii).  
78 Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: 
Thomas More, 1998), p. 15. 
79 Andy Hargreaves and Dennis Shirley, The Fourth Way: The Inspiring Future for Educational Change 




From their experience teaching at Boston College, they turn to the Jesuit paradigm 
concerning finding one’s genuine vocation. They ask in three bullet points, “Do you have 
a passion? Are you good at it, or can you become so? Does it serve a compelling social 
need?”80 Like Noddings and hooks, they tie this together with the concept of joy in 
education: “If your answer to all three questions is ‘Yes,’ then, says Jesuit pedagogy, you 
will experience absolute joy.”81 Here, their Fourth Way, without leaving its necessary tie 
to economic well-being, opens up to holistic learning, even making room for 
spirituality—although they never quite open that door fully. Instead they stop at meaning-
making and addressing existential questions: 
This is meaningful learning and mindful teaching that goes to the heart of the 
human condition. It acknowledges our need for emotional engagement, our quest 
for excellence, and our craving for relatedness and purpose. There is no 
proselytizing here: simply a welcoming into important questions that have 
inspired the greatest thinkers across the ages.82 
 
A return to a more Learner Centered philosophy of education would be fertile 
ground for the study of religion(s), not only to learn about religion(s) as some 
disconnected phenomena outside of the young person’s experience and interest, but as 
integrally connected to their personal search—and the human search across ages and 
                                                          
80 Andy Hargreaves and Dennis Shirley, The Fourth Way: The Inspiring Future for Educational Change 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin, 2009), p. 85. Bullets removed. 
81 Ibid. 
82 Ibid. It is interesting to note that the needs they list (emotional engagement, quest for excellence, and 
craving relatedness and purpose) roughly correspond to the three psychological needs that Edward Deci 
and Richard Ryan propose in their Self-Determination Theory and have tested for decades concerning 
human motivation and development, which are autonomy, competence, and relatedness. See, for 
example, Edward L. Deci and Richard M. Ryan, "Self-determination theory: A macrotheory of human 




cultures—for meaning, wisdom, and connection, perhaps even with the Divine. In other 
words, religious ways of knowing are neither promoted nor disparaged, and students are 
invited to reach beyond learning about and toward learn from religion(s) as they learn 
from so many other sources—if well taught.83 This way of looking at religion(s) would 
certainly help to reverse the narrowing of the curriculum and get our schools and our 
students out of what Charles Taylor calls “the immanent frame.”84 The world is more 
expansive and invigorating than its economic facet; our educational program should 
correspond to the magnitude of life itself and not limit students to their economic 
potential. 
There is a danger in LC ideology if it is not properly balanced. Words like self-
actualization, personalization, autonomy, and individualism are common in this 
curriculum philosophy. They raise a red flag of the danger of what Enlightenment 
thinkers promoted as “the autonomous self.” Parker Palmer reminds us of the problem: 
“…scholars now understand that knowing is a profoundly communal act. Nothing could 
possibly be known by the solitary self, since the self is inherently communal in nature.”85 
The American myth of rugged individualism is just that, a myth. We are always relational 
as human beings. Palmer’s epistemology is implicated in this anthropological 
perspective. “The myth of objectivity,” he writes, “which depends on a radical separation 
of the knower from the known, has been declared bankrupt. We now see that to know 
something is to have a living relationship with it—influencing and being influenced by 
                                                          
83 See, for example, Michael Grimmitt, “When is ‘Commitment’ a Problem in Religious Education?” British 
Journal of Educational Studies Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (February, 1981), pp. 42-53, at 49-50. 
84 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
pp. 539ff. 
85 Parker Palmer, To Know as We Are Known: Education as a Spiritual Journey (New York: HarperOne, 
1993), p. xv. 
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the object known.”86 This living relationship is best expressed in the Social 
Reconstruction ideology, which adds a fine social balance to LC theories. 
According to Schiro, “Social Reconstructionists are conscious of the problems of 
our society and the injustices done to its members, such as those originating from racial, 
gender, social, and economic inequalities. They assume the purpose of education is to 
facilitate the construction of a new and more just society…”87 He quotes Henry Giroux 
who makes the further connection to our democratic responsibility: “At best it teaches 
students to think critically about the knowledge they gain, and what it means to recognize 
antidemocratic forms of power and to fight substantive injustices in a world marked by 
deep inequalities.”88 Elsewhere, Giroux reminds us that “social betterment must be the 
necessary consequence of individual flourishing.”89 In other words, to employ Noddings’ 
language, the care of the self is here coupled with care for both the intimate and 
especially the global other, including the natural environment. 
                                                          
86 Parker Palmer, To Know as We Are Known: Education as a Spiritual Journey (New York: HarperOne, 
1993), p. xv. Note that this brings into question the requirement of the Supreme Court that began this 
chapter: “Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion, when presented 
objectively as part of a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with the First 
Amendment.” What does it mean to teach religion “objectively” when there is no possibility for pure 
objectivity? The Court, as shown in chapter 3, seems to have settled on an implicit definition of 
“objectively” that means “with neutrality: neither promoting nor inhibiting religion.” The tendency to 
strain to teach religion objectively, as in the Modesto Model (see chapter 2), leaves us with a corpse 
instead of a living body of wisdom, history, practices, beliefs, and inquiries with which to engage. 
“Benevolent neutrality,” on the other hand, allows a much richer experience to take place. We may 
engage the material in ways that make meaningful connections and enhance our own inquiry, without the 
school or the teacher either promoting or denouncing religion(s). 
87 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 6. 
88 Henry Giroux, in Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns 
(Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 152. 
89 Ibid., p. 157. 
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When the SR ideology becomes part of our framework for building curricula, we 
find that the opportunity to teach about religion(s) increases beyond what was possible 
with the LC model alone. By focusing our attention on issues of justice and peace in our 
communities and in our world, SR theory indeed demands that religion(s) be examined 
critically both (a) as contributors to oppression, violation of human rights, and to violent 
conflicts throughout history and across the globe, and (b) as promoters of peace, justice, 
liberation, and human rights and dignity. Groome presents this sobering reminder: “One 
need look only to the pages of history or the morning newspaper to find evidence of 
religious sectarianism. A recent count revealed—and the statistics are likely constant—
that of the violent conflicts presently raging in our world, 96 percent of them draw upon 
religious legitimation and some are directly caused by religion.”90 Though he wrote in 
1998, the truth of the statement remains. Groome reminds us that many of these conflicts 
manipulate religion to further other interests: this is good reason for a religiously 
educated public. Furthermore, we must beware the implicit and unconstitutional hostility 
to religion(s) that arises from a curriculum that considers religion(s) only in light of their 
involvement with (a) above. Any honest curriculum must also give students the 
opportunity to examine religion(s) in their best light, (b) above. Nodding writes, “It is… 
unintelligent to ignore either the positive or the negative side of religion.”91 Rather than 
essentializing religion(s), students must be given the opportunity to examine the subject 
in all its complexity. 
                                                          
90 Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: 
Thomas More, 1998), p. 42. This surely makes the point that uninformed religion has proven to be very 
dangerous—thus the need for good education about religion(s) in our schools. 
91 Nel Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College, 1993), p. xiv. 
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Implicit in this critical examination is a moral education which, though not 
necessarily religious, nonetheless might encourage students to consult religious traditions 
as well as non-religious traditions for social and personal ethics. Neutrality demands as 
much. Knowledge for the SR educator is equated with the moral vision. We are far 
removed from the concept of knowledge as a closed set of data capable of being 
deposited and retrieved from a student’s mind on a multiple-choice test. Because SR 
theory considers knowledge to be a social construct, its value lies in its correlation to 
constructing a good society: genuine knowledge is constructive, even transformative. The 
true is the good. Schiro writes, 
A scientific fact (political interpretation, religious hope, or affiliative emotion) is 
judged by the question, ‘Is it worthwhile intelligence with respect to the analysis 
of the existing society and projection of the future society?’ … Knowledge is of 
worth because it contributes to the attainment of a future good society, and the 
construction of knowledge is a moral activity inseparable from the cultural 
activity of searching for and implementing a satisfactory vision for the future 
good society.92 
 
We will look closely at the question of finding “a satisfactory vision of the future good 
society” in the next chapter. 
 This tour of the four dominant curriculum philosophies helps us to see that 
bringing the study of religion(s) into the curriculum of public schools requires more than 
simply adding another class into the current framework. Advocating for the study of 
religion(s) requires advocacy for a change in curriculum philosophy, away from the 
reigning SA/SE hybrid model with its narrow focus on standards and the marketplace. 
                                                          
92 Michael Stephen Schiro, Curriculum Theory: Conflicting Visions and Enduring Concerns (Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publications, 2008), p. 169. 
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We must move in the direction of Noddings, Hargreaves and Shirley, hooks, Palmer, 
James, and Groome, among others, which is a LC/SR hybrid. Such a philosophical 
paradigm shift would enable students to be “artisans of peace”93 in the memorable words 
of Pope Francis. By allowing them to ask and grapple with spiritual and existential 
questions—questions of meaning and purpose in life—we help them to find peace within 
themselves.94 By assisting them in constructing a vision of a better world, we help them 
to be agents and activists for peace and justice in society. And in the midst of this, 
without coercion or proselytizing, they may find themselves opening (or opening further) 
to the Divine. Or, they may find themselves closing off the possibility of religious faith 
and committing themselves only to a secular form of humanism. Whatever the case may 
be, I agree with Noddings that educators are there to facilitate the questioning, excited to 
bring students into the age-old conversation surrounding Big Questions and Big Ideas, 
and to present students with religion(s) as a “live option.”95 Ultimately, we hope they will 
choose intelligently. Noddings writes: 
An education for intelligent belief or unbelief puts great emphasis on self-
knowledge, and that knowledge must come to grips with the emotional and 
spiritual as well as the intellectual and psychological. To believe without either 
the evidence required by scientists or the logic promoted by the scholastics is not 
                                                          
93 Pope Francis, “Message of His Holiness Pope Francis for the Celebration of the 52nd World Day of 
Peace,” January 1, 2019, http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/messages/peace 
/documents/papa-francesco_20181208_messaggio-52giornatamondiale-pace2019.html [Accessed 31 July 
2020].  
94 David Brooks summarizes from Lisa Miller’s book, The Spiritual Child: “…teenagers commonly suffer a 
loss of meaning, confidence and identity. Some of them try to fill the void with drugs, alcohol, gang 
activity and even pregnancy. But others are surrounded by people who have cultivated their spiritual 
instincts. According to Miller’s research, adolescents with a strong sense of connection to a transcendent 
realm are 70 percent to 80 percent less likely to engage in heavy substance abuse. Among teenage girls, 
having a strong spiritual sense was extremely protective against serious depression… Ignoring spiritual 
development in the public square… is to amputate people in a fundamental way, leading to more 
depression, drug abuse, alienation and misery.” (David Brooks, “Building Spiritual Capital,” The New York 
Times (May 22, 2015): A27). 
95 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 169. 
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irrational. But to believe without thinking through the questions that arise 
regularly in life—to merely accept or reject—is surely not intelligent. It is also 
unintelligent to ignore either the positive or the negative side of religion. 
Education for intelligent belief or unbelief is as much education of the heart as it 
is education of the mind.96  
 
4.3 Pragmatism: The Operative Philosophy of American Education 
 Public education in the United States is largely grounded in the distinctively 
American philosophy of pragmatism. Charles Sanders Peirce explained the philosophy 
(in somewhat contorted language) in what is known as the pragmatic maxim: “…consider 
what effects which might conceivably have practical bearing we conceive the object of 
our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our 
conception of the object.”97 William James expresses it more clearly: “Mr. Peirce, after 
                                                          
96 Nel Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College, 1993), p. xiv. 
Noddings, much more like John Dewey than William James when it comes to personal religious belief, 
nonetheless shows her roots in the pragmatist tradition of James in her openness to intelligent belief. 
James argued against the strict empiricist position of William Kingdon Clifford: “If [a] belief has been 
accepted on insufficient evidence… the pleasure is a stolen one… It is sinful because it is stolen in defiance 
of our duty… to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly master our own 
body and then spread to the rest of the town… It is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one, to 
believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” James retorts, “…pure insight and logic, whatever they 
might do ideally, are not the only things that really do produce our creeds.” Furthermore, he justifies 
these other things besides pure reason, in a wonderfully holistic anthropology: “Our passional nature not 
only lawfully may, but must, decide an option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual 
grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, ‘Do not decide, but leave the question open,’ is itself a 
passional decision—just like deciding yes or no—and is attended with the same risk of losing the truth.” 
He adds, “…Clifford’s exhortation has to my ears a thoroughly fantastic sound. It is like a general informing 
his soldiers that it is better to keep out of battle forever than to risk a single wound.” (William James, “The 
Will to Believe,” (1896), in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The Classic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing Company, 1982), p. 191, 193, 199 (italics removed from original)). 
97 Charles Sanders Peirce, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878) in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The 
Classic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 88. John Dewey explained this 
concept against its critics thusly: “It is often said of pragmatism that it makes action the end of life. It is 
also said of pragmatism that it subordinates thought and rational activity to particular ends of interest 
and profit. It is true that the theory according to Peirce’s conception implies essentially a certain relation 
to action, to human conduct. But the role of action is that of an intermediary. In order to be able to 
attribute a meaning to concepts, one must be able to apply them to existence. Now it is by means of 
action that this application is made possible. And the modification of existence which results from this 
application constitutes the true meaning of concepts. Pragmatism is, therefore, far from being that 
glorification of action for its own sake which is regarded as the peculiar characteristic of American life.” 
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pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that, to develop a thought’s 
meaning, we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for 
us its sole significance.”98 The upshot of this is that, “The test and justification of ideas 
lies in their contributory function of shaping future experience.”99 For John Dewey, the 
essence of this “contributory function” is fostering future experiences that are 
increasingly intelligent. He writes that pragmatism aims for “the formulation of a faith in 
intelligence, as the one and indispensable belief necessary to moral and social life.”100 
Noddings, who combines ideas from both Dewey and James, would use the words 
“moral” and “caring” together with “intelligent,” expressing a more holistic conception of 
human intelligence. 
Concerning education, Groome observes, “…American education has drawn most 
heavily, almost exclusively, from one school of philosophy—pragmatism…”101 And 
while Groome parts ways with the pragmatists, I suggest that, without accepting the 
philosophy in its totality, we might nonetheless find pragmatism a suitable grounding for 
our project when it is untethered from merely economic objectives.102 In any case, it is 
unlikely that pragmatism, so deeply rooted in our cultural understanding of education, is 
                                                          
(John Dewey, “The Development of American Pragmatism,” (1931) in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The 
Classic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 25).    
98 William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” (1907) in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The Classic Writings 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 210. 
99 H.S. Thayer, in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The Classic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1982), p. 22. 
100 John Dewey, “The Development of American Pragmatism,” (1931) in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The 
Classic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 40. 
101 Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: 
Thomas More, 1998), p. 16. 
102 Groome writes, for example, “The purposes and mode of education I am proposing here are certainly 
in contrast to the pragmatism that presently reigns in Western education.” (Thomas H. Groome, 
Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: Thomas More, 1998), p. 37). 
The merely economic objectives are what Groome means when he writes, “What is true helps to stock the 
refrigerator.” (Ibid., p. 303). 
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soon to disappear. Perhaps we can play the pragmatist’s game and do what is practical by 
accepting the current ground rules while concurrently demonstrating the usefulness of the 
study of religion(s). 
Concerning religious education as faith formation in a religious setting, I agree 
with Groome that “…a purely pragmatic interest would be reductionistic for religious 
education.”103 And I agree that “Pragmatism can lead to relativism, making no distinction 
between necessary and contingent truths and establishing ‘what works’ as the only 
criterion of right and wrong.”104 In their work of making meaning, prominent in both the 
LC and SR ideologies, students will have to grapple with what is true and how to assess 
truth claims, and that is their right and duty.105 As an ethical theory, I do not subscribe to 
consequentialism. In arguing for the study of religion(s) in public schools, though, we 
need focus only on educational theory. The overwhelming harm that is done by 
neglecting to treat of religion(s) in formal education outweighs my concerns about the 
deficiencies of pragmatism as a philosophy. As proponents of a curriculum change, we 
have only to demonstrate that the study of religion(s) is valid because it is intelligent and 
useful, and that its neglect would be detrimental.106 
                                                          
103 Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral 
Ministry, The Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1991), p. 79. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Groome acknowledges as much and sees the role of educator as guide, moving students beyond a 
conception of truth as only what works to a deeper appreciation of wisdom: “Wisdom truth includes 
[cognitive knowing] … and then is more holistic. Yes, teachers and parents should help people learn and 
discern what rings true, makes sense, and is useful, but then should invite them onward to truth as 
relational and as moral imperative.” (Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every 
Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: Thomas More, 1998), p. 303). 
106 Against the critics of pragmatism (which he also called instrumentalism), Dewey argues eloquently: 
“When an American critic says of instrumentalism that it regards ideas as mere servants which make for 
success in life, he only reacts, without reflection, to the ordinary verbal associations of the word 
‘instrumental,’ as many others have reacted in the same manner to the use of the word ‘practical.’ … This 
criticism does not hold. It is by no means the production of beliefs useful to morals and society which 
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4.4 Aims of American Public Education 
What are we educating for? Binding together the best perspectives of the LC and 
SR philosophies, while not neglecting what is good in the SA and SE ideologies as well, I 
propose that American public schools should be guided by two aims: 
1) to provide a liberal and liberating education that nurtures the holistic growth of 
    the young person into a healthy, mature, productive, moral, and responsible 
    adult in society; and 
 2) to promote the civic virtues, vision, knowledge, and abilities required for our 
                common life together, with justice and peace, in this Republic and as members 
                of an increasingly pluralistic and globalized society. 
These two aims help us to answer the question that was asked at the beginning of 
the chapter. Although the Supreme Court has allowed for teaching about religion(s) in the 
public schools, as long as neutrality is maintained, I asked whether what is permissible is 
in fact desirable. My answer is an unequivocal “Yes!” I am confident that the inclusion of 
the study of religion(s) in the curriculum meets the demands of pragmatism, helping to 
shape the future into one which is more intelligent, moral, and caring. Importantly, by 
                                                          
these systems pursue. It is the formulation of a faith in intelligence, as the one and indispensable belief 
necessary to moral and social life. The more one appreciates the intrinsic esthetic, immediate value of 
thought and of science, the more one takes into account what intelligence itself adds to the joy and 
dignity of life, the more one should feel grieved at a situation in which the exercise and joy of reason are 
limited to a narrow, closed and technical social group and the more one should ask how it is possible to 
make all [people] participators in this inestimable wealth.” (John Dewey, “The Development of American 
Pragmatism,” (1931) in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The Classic Writings (Indianapolis: Hackett 




laying out the practical import of the proposed curriculum and pedagogy, it would be 
acceptable to large segments of the American public, formed as they are in pragmatist 
philosophy concerning education. 
Let’s turn our attention to the first aim. I’d like to define the terms in this 
statement of purpose and then briefly show how the appropriate study of religion(s)—
along the lines of the pedagogy favored in this chapter—helps to accomplish the goal. 
We begin with the promise of a “liberal” education. Liberal education is the opposite of 
specialized education. Currently, we have narrowed the curriculum, diminishing it to a 
type of economic and scientific specialization. By focusing on technical standards and 
STEM most emphatically, we have placed the economy at the center of the educational 
project. Returning religion(s) to the curriculum will help broaden it to include the big 
questions of life, meaning, and morality, thus making good on the promise of a liberal 
education. Moreover, it will place the human person at the center. This will contribute to 
making education more “liberating.” Palmer writes: 
…our “liberal arts,” [are] so named because they offer the knowledge necessary 
to live as free (Latin liber) men or women. Knowledge of this sort is liberating not 
only because it steeps us in the wisdom of the past; it also accustoms us to 
ambiguity and paradox, preparing us to find our way into an unpredictable future. 
A liberal education helps us embrace diverse ideas without becoming paralyzed in 
thought or action. It teaches us how to claim our own voices in the midst of the 
clamorous crowd, staying engaged with the communal conversation of a 
democracy in ways that keep opening us to larger versions of the truth.107 
                                                          
107 Parker Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the Human 
Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p. 84. Palmer also writes, “…democracy is not well served when 
our schools are pressured to ramp up science education at the expense of the humanities, whose 
disciplines teach people to look at the world from unconventional angles and ask probing questions. Some 
of that pressure comes from the notion that the main purpose of education is to prepare students for 
technological society where math and science are the only subjects that count. Some of it comes from the 
demand for educational accountability, which means teaching subjects whose outcomes are measurable. 
Graduating employable students is a worthy goal, but not when it is equated with math and science 




 When the human person in society and in the natural world is placed at the 
center, the questions change from “What do we need to be economically competitive?” to 
“What do we need to be more human?” Our lens matters. When the human person is our 
central concern, we begin to ask questions and pose problems that promote “liberty and 
justice for all.” Because religions have been both the perpetrator of dehumanization and 
the hero of humanism, the study of religion(s) will assist students in critically assessing 
their own lives and the human quest for freedom. We will examine in more detail this 
particular aspect of the first aim together with our examination of the second aim in the 
next chapter. 
Returning to the verbiage of our first aim, we seek to nurture “holistic growth of 
the young person” into “healthy” and “moral” adults. Health in a holistic sense means 
physical, emotional, social/relational, mental, intellectual, and spiritual well-being. 
Fostering “growth” resists the standardized treatment of students and instead honors the 
uniqueness of each person, their ways and timetables of learning, and their dreams and 
goals. It challenges them and supports them. By introducing the study of religion(s) into 
their formal education, we take their existential, religious, and spiritual questions 
seriously. We assist them in their important work of making meaning and finding purpose 
in life. We make accessible to them the wisdom of human societies throughout the ages 
and across the globe, and we acknowledge that religious faith and commitment remains a 
                                                          
with tallying up the number of facts students can memorize. Both of these drives create an educational 
bias against the humanities. For most students, courses in philosophy, literature, music, and the arts do 
not translate directly into jobs… But the humanities help form habits of the heart that are crucial to 
democracy’s future…” (Parker Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics 
Worthy of the Human Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p. 134). 
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rational possibility—genuine “living options.”108 From these wells of wisdom, religious 
and non-religious alike, they may draw life-giving waters for facing questions of 
suffering, death, injury and forgiveness, failure, family, community, justice, peace, virtue 
and a vision of the good life. They may also intelligently reject the waters that are 
poisoned by prejudice, division, violence, and oppression. Palmer argues that public 
education has a “right—and obligation—to engage students with questions of 
meaning…”109 He contends that 
An education that pretends to explore only the outer world is disingenuous and 
incomplete. A good education is intentional and thoughtful about helping students 
find an inner orientation to what is “out there” that will be life-giving for them 
and the world. In education as well as religion, we must find ways to help people 
conduct an inner search free of any predetermined outcome while providing them 
with the guidance and resources they need to conduct it well. As we do so, we 
will be shaping some of the habits of the heart that make democracy possible.110  
  
By joining students in their inquiry, we validate the inquiry itself. We express 
through our curriculum that, as Noddings said in the quote earlier, “There is more to 
individual life and the life of a nation than economic superiority.”111 Thus, we assist them 
in becoming moral, caring persons, persons who promote human flourishing, who care 
for the earth, and who try to live according to the Golden Rule. Without proselytizing or 
                                                          
108 William James, “The Will to Believe” (1896) in H.S. Thayer, ed., Pragmatism: The Classic Writings 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1982), p. 187. See also Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a 
Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), p. 169. 
109 Parker Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the Human 
Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p. 123. 
110 Ibid., p. 125. He continues, “… Inner-life questions are the kind that our students (and their teachers 
and parents) ask regularly, with or without God-talk: ‘Do I have gifts that the world wants and needs?’ 
Does my life have meaning and purpose?’ ‘Whom and what can I trust?’ ‘How can I rise above my fears?’ 
How do I deal with suffering, my own and that of my family and friends?’ ‘How can I maintain hope?’ 
‘What does my life mean in the face of the fact that I am going to die?’” 
111 Ibid., p. 84. 
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coercing, we invite students to engage in the Big Questions and to join the Great 
Conversations that are, in all their complexity, part of the “funded capital of 
civilization.”112  
 Finally, we aspire to educate in such a way that young people become “mature, 
productive, and responsible adults in society.” Growth into adulthood involves only 
chronological aging; but maturity implies an adulthood that has broken out of selfish 
individualism and engages as a member of the local and global communities. Maturity 
implies “productivity.” Productivity is not merely economic contribution in a job or 
career, though this remains important for most people, but more generally the sharing of 
one’s “talents, time, and treasure” through both work and leisure. It is to give of oneself 
for something larger than oneself. To be productive is to be a contributing member of 
society. Maturity also implies responsibility: a willingness to care for others, for the 
natural world, for excellence in our work, for fairness and commitment in our 
relationships, for the quality of our politics and the justice of our society, for peace in our 
hearts and in our homes and in our world, and for the good of future generations. This 
certainly involves an orientation to service and a willingness to sacrifice. These are 
commitments that may well be nourished by the long centuries of tradition that make up 
the world’s religions. 
Faith, in fact, may be a great motivator for service and sacrifice, though it is not 
necessarily so. It has inspired oppressive Christian colonialism, Al Qaeda, and acts of 
destruction, but it has also inspired Mother Teresa, Mahatma Gandhi, and the building of 
                                                          
112 John Dewey, in Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent 
(Allen, TX: Thomas More, 1998), p. 220. 
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some of civilization’s greatest wonders. Students will have their wrestling with these 
contradictions and complexities validated by their inclusion in what schools consider 
important and worthy enough to be in the curriculum. By teaching about religion(s), we 
give students access to a wealth of reflection and lived experience, which, like all human 
phenomena, involves both heroes and villains. Miroslav Volf writes: 
…religiously inspired zealous violence and irrational foot-dragging are major 
problems in a highly interconnected and interdependent world. Religions are a 
global problem requiring sustained attention. But religions aren’t just a problem. 
They are also an indispensable part of the solution… Arguably, world religions 
are our most potent sources of moral motivation and deliberation. They are also 
carriers of visions of the good life, which billions have found compelling 
throughout history and still find compelling today.113 
 
Implicit in recognizing the power of faith and religious commitments in human 
life and society is an acknowledgement that the scientific method, as valuable as it is in 
the confines of its disciple, is not the only way that humans have come to knowledge and 
truth. We reject scientism—a positivist ideology that excludes anything from the realm of 
truth that cannot be tested scientifically, and that extends the reach of scientific authority 
beyond the rightful bounds of scientific inquiry—in favor of genuine science as one of 
many contributors to human knowledge. This science stands alongside religion, 
philosophy, literature and arts, etc. as ways that human beings have developed knowledge 
and wisdom, and have aspired to something true, good, and beautiful.114          
 In short, teaching about religion(s) is an important, even essential, curricular 
                                                          
113 Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2015), pp. 12-13. 
114 Parker Palmer bemoans the situation currently, in which “…with the rise of science came a new class of 
priests and potentates: the scientists themselves. Very few scientists claim that kind of authority for 
themselves, but laypeople often project it on them.” (Parker Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The 
Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the Human Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p. 133). 
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activity for achieving the first aim of American public education that I propose. In fact, it 
is impossible to reach that goal without teaching about and learning from religion(s). 
How could a curriculum be considered “liberal” if it excluded such a critical component 
of human experience and thought as religion is and has always been? How could a 
curriculum be considered “holistic” if it reduces the student to her mind and her 
marketability and refuses to acknowledge the possibility of a soul and the near-universal 
sense that the human person is a spiritual as well as a bodily being? How can it be 
“liberating” if we cramp students into an “immanent frame”115 when they long for 
transcendence (and are possibly yearning for the Transcendent116)? How can we promote 
growth into responsible adulthood in society if we deny our students knowledge of the 
vast majority of the world’s inhabitants who are religious? Teaching about religion(s) in 
American public schools not only promotes the achievement of our first proposed goal of 
education, but it remains essential to that achievement. Failure to address religion(s) 
conveys what I have called the hostility of neglect. It violates the neutrality demanded by 
the Supreme Court, and it denies our students a liberal, liberating, and holistic education.  
 In the next chapter, we will look in detail at the second aim I propose and the role 
played by the study of religion(s) in its achievement. We will do this by examining the 
concept of the common good in a democratic society and by proposing a methodology 
                                                          
115 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
pp. 539ff. 
116 Augustine famously claimed that this is indeed what we all seek: “…you have made us and drawn us to 
yourself, and our heart is unquiet until it rests in you.” (St. Augustine, The Confessions, Maria Boulding, 
OSB, transl. (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1997), p. 14). Miroslav Volf echoes this ancient sentiment: 
“Relationship to God… belongs to the very makeup of human beings. Whether we are aware of it or not, 
in all our longings, in one way or another, we also long for God. Our lives are oriented toward the infinite 
God and they find meaning in relation to the God who created the world and will bring it to 
consummation.” (Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2015), p. 202).  
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rooted in encountering the other and forging bonds of solidarity that will make the 
realization of this goal possible. In so doing, we will be moving from curriculum to 
pedagogy, from the what to the how of educating about and learning from religion(s).
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CHAPTER 5: Education for the Common Good 
 
Let us return to Dianne Moore’s foundational question regarding the teaching of 
religion(s) in American public schools: what are we educating for? Certainly the 
economy is important, as is personal financial security. However, noted earlier, the 
common good is more than the economy, and education should be for the common good 
and not exclusively for personal financial security and advancement. Pope John XXIII 
was correct when he wrote, “As for the State, its whole raison d'etre is the realization of 
the common good…,”1 and again when he taught that “each one of us is required to make 
his [or her] own contribution to the universal common good.”2 With the Catholic Church, 
I understand the common good to mean “the sum of those conditions of social life which 
allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and ready access to 
their own fulfillment.”3 To use a term favored by Miroslav Volf, the common good 
involves human flourishing, both personally and as a human family.4 
Although human persons and human rights are at the center of its concerns, the 
reach of the common good is truly universal. There is no genuine human flourishing 
without an adequate understanding of the place of human beings in nature, in society, and 
                                                          
1 Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (1961), #20, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-
xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_15051961_mater.html [Accessed 11 October 2020]. 
2 Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (1963), #155, http://www.vatican.va/content/john-
xxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_11041963_pacem.html [Accessed 11 October 2020]. 
3 The Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (1965), #26, 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents/vat-
ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html [Accessed 11 October 2020]. 
4 “Flourishing… stands for the life that is lived well, the life that goes well, and the life that feels good—all 
three together, inextricably intertwined. I use the term interchangeably with ‘the good life’ and ‘life worth 
living.’ It evokes an image of a living thing, thriving in its proper environment… living into our human and 
personal fullness…” (Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2015), p. ix. Emphasis in the original). 
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within the cosmos. In this sense, the common good includes what is good for the earth 
and the air, for animal and plant life, for human persons and societies, and for the entire 
natural world.5 At a moment in U.S. and world history when ideological divisions are 
tearing us apart and threatening to plunge us into violence—and have already done so in 
certain places—and when the balance between human consumption and custodianship of 
the planet has reached a critical tipping point bringing us ever closer to catastrophic 
climate change, the need to educate for the common good could not be greater. For this 
reason, I have proposed a second aim for American public education: to promote the 
civic virtues, vision, knowledge, and abilities required for our common life together, with 
justice and peace, in this Republic and as members of an increasingly pluralistic and 
globalized society who share a “common home.”6 In short, I am proposing education for 
the common good, and the teaching of religion(s) in public schools as a key component 
of that aim. 
The notion of the common good is not self-evident. In fact, David Hollenbach 
reminds us that John Rawls rejected the possibility of the common good—as it is 
traditionally understood—in pluralistic democracies.7 Rawls (consistent with his positing 
                                                          
5 For example, Pope Francis teaches that “The climate is a common good, belonging to all and meant for 
all.” (Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for our Common Home (2015), #23, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [Accessed 11 October 2020]). 
6 A reference to the 2015 encyclical letter of Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for our Common Home, 
which addressed environmental concerns. 
7 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 9. Rawls does, of course, affirm something along the lines of the common good: “A well-ordered 
society… is not, then, a private society; for in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness citizens do 
have final ends in common. While it is true that they do not affirm the same comprehensive doctrine, 
they do affirm the same political conception of justice; and this means that they share one very basic 
political end, and one that has high priority: namely, the end of supporting just institutions and of giving 
one another justice accordingly, not to mention many other ends they must also share and realize 
through their political arrangements.” (John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 202). 
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“political values” over “comprehensive doctrines”8 for supporting political liberalism) 
asserts, according to a helpful summary by Hollenbach, “…that the Aristotelian, 
Thomistic, and Ignatian vision of the common good ‘is no longer a political possibility 
for those who accept the constraints of liberty and toleration of democratic institutions.’”9 
The visions that Rawls’ theory discounts are Aristotle’s understanding that the 
good life “…is oriented to goods shared with others—the common good of the larger 
society…,” which is inseparably linked to the good of individuals but is “a higher 
good.”10 This is in stark contrast to American individualism. “The end and purpose of a 
polis is the good life,” wrote Aristotle, “and the institutions of social life are means to that 
end.”11 The “good life” was a life of virtue, understood socially and politically. Thomas 
Aquinas drew on Aristotle in his own theology and political theory. According to 
Hollenbach, he “…often cited Aristotle on the primacy of the common good in the moral 
life” and deemed it “more ‘godlike’ or ‘divine’ than the good of an individual human 
being.”12 This common good was ultimately divine because it was rooted in God, who is 
The Good, and because it fulfills Christ’s two-pronged Great Commandment of love.13 
St. Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Society of Jesus, drew on these ideas in his 
                                                          
8 John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. xvii, 
454. His claim is that a pluralistic democracy includes multiple competing and contradictory visions of the 
good, or comprehensive doctrines, none of which has general public acceptance. Thus, there must be an 
“overlapping consensus” of these comprehensive doctrines that affirms a political order on which they all 
rest. Political values, not any comprehensive doctrine, are required as the framework of a just political 
liberalism capable of accommodating multiple competing and even contradictory—but still reasonable—
comprehensive doctrines.  
9 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 9. See also fn. 10. 
10 Ibid., p. 3 
11 Aristotle, The Politics, in Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public 
Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 7. 
12 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 




Formula for the Institute. Hollenbach highlights its expression “that all of the order’s 
activities should be directed ‘according to what will seem expedient to the glory of God 
and the common good.’”14 Rawls rejects these conceptions of the common good in 
modern liberal democracies because he claims they rely on a homogenous culture and a 
fairly unified vision of the good life, which “the fact of pluralism”15 makes impossible. 
We do not live in Aristotle’s Greece nor in the Christendom of Aquinas nor in the 
world of Ignatius. In a pluralistic society that knows all too well the history of religious 
warfare in the West following the Reformation (and of the Crusades before that), 
“Political theorists… fear that the outcome of pursuing strong ideas of the common good 
will be war between groups that hold competing ideas of the good life, oppression of 
those holding minority views of the good…, or straightforward tyranny.”16 In a 
pluralistic, constitutional democracy whose citizens adhere to multiple, competing and 
even contradictory visions of the good that Rawls refers to as comprehensive doctrines, 
there is no longer a common ground from which to affirm the possibility of the traditional 
common good. Instead, Rawls affirms the priority of right over good, meaning that in 
place of a political system that pursues the common good as understood within a 
comprehensive doctrine, the best we can establish in pluralistic democracies is a system 
based on individual rights and justice understood as fairness.17 Michael Sandel captures 
Rawls’s position succinctly: 
                                                          
14 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 5. 
15 John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 36. 
16 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 14. 
17 John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 
201ff, especially at 201-2: “…justice as fairness does indeed abandon the ideal of political community if by 
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According to Rawls, a just society does not try to cultivate virtue or impose on its 
citizens any particular ends. Rather, it provides a framework of rights, neutral 
among ends, within which persons can pursue their own conceptions of the good, 
consistent with a similar liberty for others. This is the claim that the right is prior 
to the good, and it is this claim that defines the liberalism of the procedural 
republic.18 
 
Hollenbach, on the other hand, believes there is a way to reclaim a robust 
understanding of the common good, one achieved together in a pluralistic society through 
the virtue of solidarity.19 He argues that it is not only possible but necessary. As things 
stand currently, he argues, the glue that binds us together is the weak adhesive of 
tolerance. He does not support the vision of someone like Samuel Huntington, who 
argued that multiculturalism and the push to recognize diversity are centrifugal forces 
that tear the nation apart.20 Yet, the solution is not a brand of civic republicanism either, 
which seeks to forge a common culture out of many. He notes how often civic 
republicanism has allied itself with power to coerce the virtue it seeks in its citizens.21 
                                                          
that ideal is meant a political society united on one (partially or fully) comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine. That conception of social unity is excluded by the fact of reasonable 
pluralism; it is no longer a political possibility for those who accept the constraints of liberty and 
toleration of democratic institutions… political liberalism conceives of social unity in a different way: 
namely, as deriving from an overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice suitable for a 
constitutional regime… I believe that social unity so understood is the most desirable conception of unity 
available to us; it is the limit of the practical best.” 
18 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: 
The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 290. 
19 “Stress on the importance of the local, the small-scale, and the particular must be complemented by a 
kind of solidarity that is more universal in scope. This wider solidarity is essential if the quest for 
community is to avoid becoming a source of increased conflict in a world already riven by narrowness of 
vision. Commitment to communities with particular ways of life must be complemented by a sense of the 
national and the global common good and the need for a vision shaped by a hospitable encounter with 
traditions and peoples that are different from ourselves.” (David Hollenbach, S.J., "Is Tolerance Enough? 
The Catholic University and the Common Good," Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education (1998): Vol. 13, 
Article 3, p. 8, https://epublications.marquette.edu/conversations/vol13/iss1/3 [Accessed 10 October 
2020]).  
20 Samuel P. Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America’s National Identity (New York: Simon & 
Schuster Paperbacks, 2004), pp. 141ff. 
21 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), pp. 15-17.  
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Instead, Hollenbach calls for a “reconstructed and developed understanding of the 
tradition of the common good… [committed to a community] that is both universal in 
scope and that takes the differences among peoples and cultures with the full seriousness 
they deserve.”22  
If we are to educate for civic virtue, we must look elsewhere than the civic 
republican tradition, or at least modify it along the global lines Hollenbach suggests. How 
can we accomplish this? Rawls gives one possibility. He makes room for civic virtue, but 
redefines it so that it exists as political virtue:  
Even though political liberalism seeks common ground and is neutral in aim, it is 
important to emphasize that it may still affirm the superiority of certain forms of 
moral character and encourage certain moral virtues. Thus, justice as fairness 
includes an account of certain political virtues—the virtues of fair social 
cooperation such as the virtues of civility and tolerance, of reasonableness and 
sense of fairness… The crucial point is that admitting these virtues into a political 
conception does not lead to the perfectionist state of a comprehensive doctrine.23 
 
For Hollenbach, this account of civic virtue—especially its emphasis on tolerance—is not 
sufficient to the task of addressing complex and global problems.24 It certainly doesn’t 
                                                          
22 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 239. 
23 John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 194. 
He also names the political virtues of mutual respect and compromise (pp. 122, 163). Jürgen Habermas 
explains the importance of political virtues this way: “…citizens are expected to make active use of their 
rights to communication and participation, not only in what they rightly take to be their own interests, but 
also with an orientation to the common good. This demands a more costly commitment and motivation, 
and these cannot simply be imposed by law… This is why political virtues… are essential if a democracy is 
to exist. They are the fruit of a socialization in which one becomes accustomed to the practices and 
modes of thought of a free political culture.” (Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas, Dialectics 
of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, Brian McNeil, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), 
p. 30). 
24 “The standard response to the diversity of groups and value systems in Western political culture has 
long been an appeal to the virtue of tolerance. Tolerance is a live-and-let-live attitude that avoids 
introducing conceptions of the full human good into political discourse. This is the prescription of the 
eminent political theorist and moral philosopher, John Rawls. Rawls recommends that we deal with the 
fact of value-pluralism by what he calls ‘the method of avoidance.’ … In my view, this is just what we do 
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put down roots deep enough to nurture our young people in their growth and formation as 
moral agents in society committed to the common good. 
The solution, according to Hollenbach, lies in a new appreciation for the common 
good, one appropriate for a pluralistic society and one that is forged out of deep respect 
and dialogue rather than mere toleration. He calls this understanding of the common good 
“a pluralistic-analogical understanding” and defines it thusly: “…the common good… 
[is] an ensemble of goods that embody the good of communion, love, and solidarity to a 
real though limited degree in the multiple forms of human interaction.”25 Furthermore, he 
also sees this common good extending beyond national borders to become a global 
common good: “In an interdependent world the idea of the common good must take on a 
more universal definition.”26 In this, he reflects the Catholic Church—which he rightly 
calls “the principal bearer of the common good tradition”27—when it teaches in the 
Catechism of the Catholic Church: 
                                                          
not need. The basis of a functioning democracy is not the autonomy of individuals who agree to leave 
each other alone by ‘avoiding’ the question of the good they share in common or the bad that jointly 
threatens them all.” (David Hollenbach, S.J., "Is Tolerance Enough? The Catholic University and the 
Common Good," Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education (1998): Vol. 13, Article 3, p. 8, 
https://epublications.marquette.edu/conversations/vol13/iss1/3 [Accessed 10 October 2020]. 
25 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 136. 
26 Ibid., p. 212. He adds, significantly, “At the same time the institutions that can help both define and 
pursue this global common good are notably underdeveloped.” I would argue that one such 
underdeveloped institution is our schools. 
27 Ibid., p. 242. Pope Francis summarizes the Catholic common good tradition and develops it further to 
include the natural environment. He writes, “An integral ecology is inseparable from the notion of the 
common good, a central and unifying principle of social ethics. The common good is ‘the sum of those 
conditions of social life which allow social groups and their individual members relatively thorough and 
ready access to their own fulfilment’. Underlying the principle of the common good is respect for the 
human person as such, endowed with basic and inalienable rights ordered to his or her integral 
development. It has also to do with the overall welfare of society and the development of a variety of 
intermediate groups, applying the principle of subsidiarity. Outstanding among those groups is the family, 
as the basic cell of society. Finally, the common good calls for social peace, the stability and security 
provided by a certain order which cannot be achieved without particular concern for distributive justice; 
whenever this is violated, violence always ensues. Society as a whole, and the state in particular, are 
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Human interdependence is increasing and gradually spreading throughout the 
world. The unity of the human family, embracing people who enjoy equal natural 
dignity, implies a universal common good. This good calls for an organization of 
the community of nations able to “provide for the different needs of [people]; this 
will involve the sphere of social life to which belong questions of food, hygiene, 
education,… and certain situations arising here and there, as for example… 
alleviating the miseries of refugees dispersed throughout the world, and assisting 
migrants and their families.”28 
Education, it should be noted, is considered part of the work of the common good. 
Hollenbach rightly considers the work of educators essential, even critical, in promoting 
the common good: “Since education is the activity through which culture is sustained and 
                                                          
obliged to defend and promote the common good. In the present condition of global society, where 
injustices abound and growing numbers of people are deprived of basic human rights and considered 
expendable, the principle of the common good immediately becomes, logically and inevitably, a summons 
to solidarity and a preferential option for the poorest of our brothers and sisters. This option entails 
recognizing the implications of the universal destination of the world’s goods, but, as I mentioned in the 
Apostolic Exhortation Evangelii Gaudium, it demands before all else an appreciation of the immense 
dignity of the poor in the light of our deepest convictions as believers. We need only look around us to see 
that, today, this option is in fact an ethical imperative essential for effectively attaining the common 
good… The notion of the common good also extends to future generations. The global economic crises 
have made painfully obvious the detrimental effects of disregarding our common destiny, which cannot 
exclude those who come after us. We can no longer speak of sustainable development apart from 
intergenerational solidarity. Once we start to think about the kind of world we are leaving to future 
generations, we look at things differently; we realize that the world is a gift which we have freely received 
and must share with others. Since the world has been given to us, we can no longer view reality in a 
purely utilitarian way, in which efficiency and productivity are entirely geared to our individual benefit. 
Intergenerational solidarity is not optional, but rather a basic question of justice, since the world we have 
received also belongs to those who will follow us. The Portuguese bishops have called upon us to 
acknowledge this obligation of justice: ‘The environment is part of a logic of receptivity. It is on loan to 
each generation, which must then hand it on to the next’. An integral ecology is marked by this broader 
vision.” (Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for our Common Home (2015), #156-159, 
http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [Accessed 11 October 2020]). 
28 Catechism of the Catholic Church, #1911 [emphasis in the original]. See also Gaudium et Spes (1965), 
#84, and Pope John XXIII, Pacem in Terris (1963), #132. John J. DiIulio, Jr. (the first U.S. “Faith Czar” under 
George W. Bush) agrees with Hollenbach’s assessment of the Catholic Church as bearer of the common 
good tradition, writing, “When it comes to defining the common good in a theologically anchored and 
intellectually coherent yet practical fashion, there is, I believe, no one source better or truer than my 
beloved Catechism [of the Catholic Church], especially the parts that deal with ‘human community.’” 
(John J. DiIulio, Jr. Godly Republic: A Centrist Blueprint for America’s Faith-Based Future (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007) p. 215).  
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developed, the success or failure of a society to realize its common good will be largely 
dependent on its educational endeavors.”29 
Martin Marty defines the common good as “the good of the larger public.” He 
writes that, “The common good is the goal sought by citizens across the personal 
boundaries of religion, race, philosophy, taste, and commitment” and thus, “the common 
good transcends individual interests.”30 In advancing this common good, he, too, sees the 
critical role that education plays, and in particular, the importance of including religion in 
the curriculum: 
…helping high schoolers understand religion and religions is not a task that only 
religious leaders and educators should care about for religious reasons. If 
educators aspire to teach a fairly accurate picture of the world around us, it is both 
necessary and good to have religious themes included in secondary education. 
Also, if we assume that it is unfair to “establish,” privilege, demean, or minimize 
particular faiths, then the common good is furthered by fair-minded, unprejudiced 
teaching about religion and religions.31 
 
5.1 A Minimal Framework for Educating for the Common Good 
What would it look like to educate for the common good in American public 
schools? A comprehensive answer to that question is beyond the scope of this work, but 
there are some key points that deserve to be highlighted for their relationship to the 
question of including religion(s) in the curriculum. Teaching and learning for the 
common good will require, at very least: 1) an adequate vision of the human person in 
                                                          
29 David Hollenbach, S.J., "Is Tolerance Enough? The Catholic University and the Common Good," 
Conversations on Jesuit Higher Education (1998): Vol. 13, Article 3, p. 5, 
https://epublications.marquette.edu/conversations/vol13/iss1/3 [Accessed 10 October 2020]. 
30 Marty E. Marty, Education, Religion, and the Common Good: Advancing a Distinctly American 




society, 2) the promotion of certain civic virtues, 3) the particular virtue and commitment 
of solidarity,32 4) modeling this commitment, 5) opportunities to practice this 
commitment, and 6) especially, the opportunity to practice dialogue, which constitutes 
the key civic virtue needed in our time. Public education has a responsibility to promote 
such moral formation throughout its curriculum. 
5.1.1 An Adequate Vision of the Human Person in Society 
We must admit that education for the common good is not the norm currently, and 
so it would require an apologia of sorts. We need an adequate vision of the human person 
and society, including a healthy conception of patriotism,33 that would justify promoting 
the common good in place of our current tendency to promote market- and rights-based 
individualism coupled with weak communitarianism.34 As the biblical author wrote 
                                                          
32 In describing solidarity, I use the word virtue to express a personal dedication to the common good, and 
I use the term commitment to extend the personal sense to the institutional. As Hollenbach writes, “In 
addition, solidarity is not only a virtue to be enacted by individual persons one at a time. It must also be 
expressed in the economic, cultural, political, and religious institutions that shape society.” (David 
Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 
189). Commitment captures this second sense better than virtue, as the term is rooted in the “Latin 
committere ‘to join together.’” (“Commit,” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/commit [Accessed 22 Jan. 2021]). 
33 Virtue in the Aristotelian sense exists between extremes. Patriotism, I argue, exists between the 
deficiency of disloyalty/treachery or even a strong cosmopolitanism (that makes no room for particularity 
of place and culture) and the excess of nationalism (that makes an idol of one’s nation state and often 
leads to xenophobia, nativism, and other social ills). The question of patriotism in ethics is, of course, 
more complicated. For a discussion and defense of patriotism as a virtue, see Noell Birondo, “Patriotism 
and Character: Some Aristotelian Observations,” March 10, 2020, 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286027524.pdf. 
34 Communitarianism is necessarily weak when individualism is excessive. By “weak communitarianism” I 
mean the tendency to give lip service to “community” and to “service” without a robust commitment to 
either. We tend to view “community” as “the school community” – local and often homogenous. This is 
not adequate to a vision that would include global solidarity let alone solidarity with those outside this 
localized community. Service, too, is problematic when it is either viewed as an occasional requirement or 
when it is compartmentalized. For example, many schools value “serving our country,” but limit the 
meaning to military service. Education for the common good requires a more expansive view.  
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centuries ago, “Where there is no vision, the people perish…” (Proverbs 29:18 KJV). 35 
We need a compelling anthropological and sociological vision, one we are able to share 
with our students. John Dewey reminded us, after all, that “The teacher is engaged, not 
simply in the training of individuals, but in the formation of the proper social life.”36 
Adam Grant provides us with a helpful starting place. Most children and young 
people have likely been asked multiple times in their life, including especially at school 
and in school essays, “What do you want to be when you grow up?” Grant proposes that 
this question is misguided. “My first beef with the question,” he writes, “is that it forces 
kids to define themselves in terms of work” and “When we define ourselves by our jobs, 
our worth depends on what we achieve.”37 (A corollary to his argument relates to 
students asking “Why do we have to know this?” If our response is always along the lines 
of “to get into a good college so you can get a good job,” then we craft a terribly limited 
vision of education and of the human person). Could we ask questions that don’t 
                                                          
35 Accessed at https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Proverbs%2029%3A18&version=KJV 
[Accessed 11 October 2020]. Pope Francis, without reference to the proverb, explains its meaning in the 
current situation: “When people become self-centred and self-enclosed, their greed increases. The 
emptier a person’s heart is, the more he or she needs things to buy, own and consume. It becomes almost 
impossible to accept the limits imposed by reality. In this horizon, a genuine sense of the common good 
also disappears. As these attitudes become more widespread, social norms are respected only to the 
extent that they do not clash with personal needs. So our concern cannot be limited merely to the threat 
of extreme weather events, but must also extend to the catastrophic consequences of social unrest. 
Obsession with a consumerist lifestyle, above all when few people are capable of maintaining it, can only 
lead to violence and mutual destruction.” (Pope Francis, Laudato Si’: On Care for our Common Home 
(2015), #204, http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-
francesco_20150524_enciclica-laudato-si.html [Accessed 11 October 2020]). 
36 John Dewey, “My Pedagogic Creed,” in David J. Flinders and Stephen J. Thornton, eds. The Curriculum 
Studies Reader, third edition (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 41. 
37 Adam Grant, “Stop Asking Kids What They Want to Be When They Grow Up,” New York Times (April 1, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/smarter-living/stop-asking-kids-what-they-want-to-be-
when-they-grow-up.html?fbclid=IwAR2mL-dV-utlASVdsnqughKCpgzDJzJo5SXFIsRo-KuG8efiHsBFKfmEt38 
[Accessed 4 January 2021]. He lists other problems with the question, too: it implies that everyone has a 
definite vocation, that every calling will pay the bills, and that every person should want to do only one 
thing with their life; it also has the potential to short-circuit happiness by creating stress around finding 
that perfect vocation and by failing to convey that happiness can be found in simply having work. 
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reinforce the anthropological vision that a person is merely homo economicus, questions 
that instead promote a holistic understanding of the human person in society? 
Sarah Todd, responding to Grant’s article, shares another question we could ask 
young people instead: “What problems do you want to solve?”38 This question moves us 
away from the individualism that often haunts the “What do you want to be?” question 
and moves us towards a consideration of a person’s place in society, a person with 
responsibilities to the whole and not only rights. We might also ask questions such as 
“How do you want to improve our world?” “How do you imagine using your gifts, 
talents, passions, and personality to help other people?” “With whom would you like to 
cooperate on making society better?” and “How can you bring people together to help 
make our world more peaceful?” Grant himself suggests that a healthier approach would 
be to “invite them to think about what kind of person they want to be — and about all the 
different things they might want to do.”39 In a school that doesn’t discriminate against 
religion(s), shouldn’t the possibilities include being a person of faith and a life of 
religious or spiritual devotion, perhaps even ministry? Shouldn’t religious goals such as 
moksha, salvation, nirvana, enlightenment, submission to God, and moral living in 
                                                          
38 Sarah Todd, “The question we should ask kids instead of ‘What do you want to be when you grow up?’,” 
Quartz (April 5, 2019), https://qz.com/work/1586511/what-to-ask-kids-instead-of-what-do-you-want-to-
be-when-you-grow-up/ [Accessed 4 January 2021]. The conversation continued with a piece by Elizabeth 
Yuko who proposed yet other better questions to ask. See Elizabeth Yuko, “Stop Asking Kids What They 
Want to Be When They Grow Up and Pose These 3 Questions Instead,” Thrive Global (April 8, 2019), 
https://thriveglobal.com/stories/questions-ask-kids-instead-what-want-to-be-grow-up/ [Accessed 4 
January 2021]. 
39 Adam Grant, “Stop Asking Kids What They Want to Be When They Grow Up,” New York Times (April 1, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/01/smarter-living/stop-asking-kids-what-they-want-to-be-
when-they-grow-up.html?fbclid=IwAR2mL-dV-utlASVdsnqughKCpgzDJzJo5SXFIsRo-KuG8efiHsBFKfmEt38 
[Accessed 4 January 2021]. 
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preparation for a final judgment be worthy of consideration for possibly conveying truth, 
meaning, and motivation for a life of service and solidarity?  
One very good reason to include the study of religion(s) in our public schools is 
that religions “…are carriers of compelling visions of flourishing…”40 “…which billions 
have found compelling throughout history and still find compelling today.”41 Miroslav 
Volf argues that “…a vision of flourishing found in the quarreling family of world 
religions is essential to individual thriving and global common good.”42 
Religious voices may also challenge society, critiquing prevailing values and 
practices, offering important alternative visions. In the words of Dermot Lane,  
Religion will offer a critique of the narrowing of reason that is at present taking a 
hold of educational theory and practice… In addition, religious education will 
offer sources of inspiration for ethical action, nuggets of wisdom for practical 
living, and resources for a prophetic critique of the idols of society…43 
 
Consider the field of economics for example, especially since it has such influence over 
the curriculum currently. Warren Nord writes, “Of course, the study of economics by 
almost anyone’s definition (other than an economist’s) is shot through with moral and 
spiritual issues and concerns.”44 These include questions of “unions, social classes, the 
environment, materialism, poverty, justice, rights, codes of ethics, [and] … the dignity of 
human beings.”45 Yet neither the national standards for the study of economics nor the 
                                                          
40 Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2015), p. xi. 
41 Ibid., p. 13. 
42 Ibid., p. 2. 
43 Dermot A. Lane, Religion and Education: Re-Imagining the Relationship (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 
2013), p. 35-36. 
44 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 229. 
45 Ibid., p. 48. 
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commonly-used textbooks give any serious attention to religion(s). Instead, they are 
brimming with a “commitment to neoclassical theory” with its claims that 1) economics 
is a values-free social science and that 2) people “usually” act out of self-interest.46 Is the 
profit motive all we care to teach? Are materialism and consumerism the extent of the 
vision we have for our young people? Do we really want to leave students with the 
impression that economics is a sphere of life innocently devoid of ethics and moral 
reasoning? Students in American public schools study economics with this deficient 
vision of the human person and society, and are not likely to be confronted with the 
criticisms and alternatives that religious voices offer. Nord concludes:  
…the problem is that economic texts and courses teach students to conceive all of 
economics in entirely secular, nonmoral categories. They don’t do anything to 
help students think in an informed and critical way about the moral and spiritual 
dimensions of the economic domain of life. They do nothing to locate students in 
moral, political, or religious traditions that might help guide their value 
judgments, and they totally ignore the rich literature of the last hundred years on 
economics and moral theory.47 
 
Even in schools that do not teach economics, this paradigm reigns as its own sort 
of invisible hand directing education according to the demands of the market economy. 
Without promoting religion over non-religion, or one religion over another, we must 
make the wisdom of religious traditions available to students in order for them to discern 
more fully “what kind of person they want to be” and also to disrupt the effects of radical 
individualism and to promote a vision of the human person and society that orients them 
to the common good. Any education worthy of the name will engage their critical 
                                                          
46 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 49. 
47 Ibid., p. 51. 
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thinking skills by situating them as members of an ongoing, polyphonic conversation 
about motivation, meaning, and morals, not only in economics, but across the various 
dimensions of human life. In short, we need a more robust vision for education that 
includes forming students capable of seeing their lives beyond the limited horizon of self-
interest and opening onto the vast expanse of the common good.  
5.1.2 The Promotion of Certain Civic Virtues  
 Educating for the common good in our public schools also means promoting the 
civic virtues necessary for the desired ethical outcome. In this context, I understand virtue 
in the political sense that Rawls explicates.48 Virtue, then, is not tied to a specific 
comprehensive doctrine (hence, we rule out what Hume called “monkish virtues”49) nor 
even to what the various reasonable comprehensive doctrines have in common in this 
regard. Instead, virtue represents an “overlapping consensus” concerning what moral 
foundation is needed for the good of our political life together.50 
Virtue, though, represents a both an inclination to uphold the common good and 
the ability to do one’s part.51 School officials often complain about receiving government 
                                                          
48 John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 
pp. 194-95. 
49 David Hume, in Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2007), p. 431. 
50 Rawls is clear that the “overlapping consensus” is not the center of a multi-part Venn diagram 
composed of all the possible or actual reasonable comprehensive doctrines (my image, not his), but 
rather a political conception, rooted in justice as fairness, that the various citizens who hold to different 
comprehensive doctrines can agree to. (John Rawls, Political Liberalism expanded edition (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2005), pp. 39-40). 
51 This is similar to Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady’s formulation: “Three factors 
are at the basis of political involvement: the motivation to become politically active, the capacity to do so, 
and involvement with networks of recruitment through which requests for political activity are 
mediated.” (Qtd. in David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge 




mandates, often from state and federal agencies, without receiving the funding to put the 
mandates into practice. This is a fine analogy for the problem of civic virtue. In many 
cases in public education we have at least communicated the “mandate” to students to be 
patriotic and to fulfil their civic obligations, but without supporting the “mandate” with 
adequate training in the necessary skills. For example, high school seniors may be 
advised to vote once they reach the age of 18, but the exhortation may be ineffective if 
students are not helped to develop the requisite voting competencies: how, where, and 
when to register; researching candidates and issues; carefully and critically interpreting 
political campaign messaging; knowing where and when to vote and the details of how to 
fill out a ballot correctly; etc. It can be so overwhelming that some students who 
otherwise might be inclined to vote abstain due to insufficient guidance and confidence. 
Extrapolating from this example, we see that teaching for the common good must include 
both proposing certain civic virtues to students and adequately empowering students to 
act on their inclinations as citizens. This is especially true in American public schools 
today, where traditional civics classes have all but disappeared. 
Teaching about religion(s) has the benefit of developing many of the skills that 
are necessary for acting on the inclination to good citizenship. If we think of virtue as a 
muscle, the classroom can be a fine gymnasium for working out that muscle and 
strengthening it. For this to be true the method of teaching about religion(s) will be 
critical in both senses of the word. If our pedagogy is the banking model that Freire 
decried, then we will be exercising nothing other than memory and recall. There will be 
little or no training in civic virtue. However, if we adopt a methodology in which 
problem-posing and -solving, dialogue, deliberation, collaboration, research, critical 
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thinking, and decision making are all integral parts of the learning process, then we will 
be empowering students with faculties that will serve them well when all the testing and 
grading is done. 
It is important to note that the circumscription of virtues to political virtues in the 
curriculum applies only to what the state may rightfully promote. It does not extend to 
what a student may rightfully learn and pursue. In other words, while studying religious 
traditions, in part to advance our sense of the common good, students may well be 
attracted to particular religious virtues that resonate in their own lives though they are not 
a stated “intended learning outcome” in the curriculum. This is both natural and typically 
welcome.52 A student may find faith attractive as a virtue, for example, after learning 
about the life of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. and how his faith in Christ, nurtured in 
Black Christian churches, led to political activism and sacrifice for the good of others.53 
The public school cannot promote the religious virtue of faith, though it must not 
suppress it either. This will be the same with many other virtues that do not fall into the 
realm of strictly political virtues.54 Thus, while the curriculum is limited to promoting a 
                                                          
52 I say “typically” because we must remain concerned about students who demonstrate a propensity to 
emulate dangerous, anti-social forces that work against the common good: witch hunters, Inquisition 
torturers, practitioners of human sacrifice, mass murderers, suicide bombers, and the like.    
53 Warren Nord points out how often the Civil Rights Movement is taught without reference to its 
rootedness in Black churches, and how often textbooks refer to Dr. King but not Rev. King. (Warren A. 
Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in our Schools and Universities (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 45). 
54 Of course, faith is not only a religious virtue. Concerning faith or belief, it is important to note that 
contrary to scientism and positivism, “belief is as intelligent and reasonable as is the collaboration of 
[people] in the advancement and in the dissemination of knowledge.” (Bernard Lonergan, Collected Works 
of Bernard Lonergan, vol. 3: Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. 
Doran, eds. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), p. 735). Lonergan makes the case that so much 
of what we think we know to be true, we actually believe to be true on the authority of others whom we 
judge trustworthy. Belief, he argues, is central to knowing if we are to advance knowledge together in a 
“human collaboration in the pursuit and the dissemination of the truth” (p. 736). Moreover, belief is not 
irrational, but only mistaken belief is so. Thus, as part of our responsibility in pursuit of the truth, we must 
examine our beliefs for errors, no less than scientists work together to find and extirpate errors in their 
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political conception of virtue, nonetheless the learning that takes place will not 
necessarily be secular humanism. Students may engage quite freely of their own accord 
with the values and virtues that are religious in nature, and which afford a sense of 
transcendence that refuses to be confined to an “immanent frame.”55 
5.1.3 Promoting the Particular Virtue and Commitment of Solidarity 
Hollenbach makes clear that education for the common good requires a 
commitment to the particular civic virtue of solidarity and not mere tolerance. Tolerance 
does not ask much. It simply compels us to mind our own business in a very 
individualistic sense. It says live-and-let-live, without any concern for how the other is 
living, or at least refraining from judgment/intervention in all cases where the other’s 
actions are not impeding my own pursuit of happiness. It is a strategy that developed out 
of the religious wars in Europe as an exhausted way of keeping the peace. As Hollenbach 
has aptly shown, however, peace is extremely tenuous if it is not built on the firm 
foundation of justice; and yet tolerance does not provide us the wherewithal to tackle 
questions of injustice in society and in a globalized world. The adhesive it provides is 
simply too weak to hold us together in the long run. We need the more substantial virtue 
and commitment of solidarity.56 
                                                          
work. Lonergan reminds us that “there exists a widespread blunder that contrasts science with belief,” 
when, in fact, both are at the service of truth and are bound up with one another (p. 733). 
55 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
p. 542. 
56 Jürgen Habermas explains the necessity of solidarity and the danger of its absence in this way: “If the 
modernization of society as a whole went off the rails, it could well slacken the democratic bond and 
exhaust the kind of solidarity that the democratic state needs but cannot impose by law. This would lead 
to precisely the constellation envisaged by Böckenförde: namely, the transformation of the citizens of 
prosperous and peaceful liberal societies into isolated monads acting on the basis of their own self-
interest, persons who used their subjective rights only as weapons against each other.” (Joseph Cardinal 
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Solidarity, though, requires a degree of getting to know the other as well as the 
self. Whereas tolerance can look the other way as long as someone’s exercise of rights 
does not impede my exercise of rights, solidarity cannot look the other way. It demands 
that we face one another and come to appreciate one another as brothers and sisters in the 
same human family.57 This is precisely what the teaching of religion(s) in American 
public schools will help to accomplish. It will make working for the common good 
possible by fostering solidarity in what Pope Francis calls a “culture of encounter.”58 
Robert Putnam and David Campbell claim that “…in spite of religion’s capacity 
to sow division, religious conflict in America is muted…”59 They list as one important 
condition for the possibility of such harmony simply knowing one another personally. 
“America manages to be both religiously diverse and religiously devout because it is 
difficult to damn those you know and love.”60 They explain this phenomenon through the 
concepts of social capital, bonding, and bridging. Social capital refers to “…the norms of 
trust and reciprocity that arise out of our social networks.”61 Such social capital is critical 
for advancing the common good through the virtue of solidarity. “Some social capital,” 
they write, “consists of bonding, or the interconnections among people with a common 
                                                          
Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas, Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, Brian McNeil, trans. 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), p. 35).  
57 Groome uses the term “person” rather than “individual” partly to make this very point: “…I deliberately 
prefer the term ‘person’ for naming ourselves—over individual, self, the subject, and such terms—
because person connotes both autonomy and relationality, individuality and partnership, of being an 
agent who initiates one’s own actions and yet finds identity only within and through relationships. It is 
significant that the Latin persona has its roots in the Greek prosopon, which literally means ‘face to face.’” 
(Thomas H. Groome, Educating for Life: A Spiritual Vision for Every Teacher and Parent (Allen, TX: Thomas 
More, 1998), pp. 72-3). 
58 See for example Pope Francis, Evangelii Gaudium (2013), #220. 
59 Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New 
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), p. 515. 
60 Ibid., p. 517. 
61 Ibid., p. 527. 
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background. Other social capital is bridging in nature, and thus connects people of 
different backgrounds.”62 Bonding may come more naturally, but “…bridging is vital for 
the smooth functioning of a diverse society.”63 Teaching about religion(s) aims at 
creating social capital through such bridging. In this way, we hope to promote the 
common good and build a more peaceful world through encounter with various religious 
and nonreligious people and not merely ideas. We hope to promote respect and bridging 
rather than mere tolerance. We may even foster love and appreciation. In short, by 
including the study of religion(s) in our curriculum aiming at the common good, we hope 
to promote peace by way of solidarity, and solidarity by means of encounter. 
The existence of the public school is itself critical as a place of encounter. “In 
many of our communities—especially our suburbs—,” says Parker Palmer, “there is only 
one institution which reaches throughout the population, only one which has a chance of 
drawing a public to it. I mean the public school.”64 Hollenbach helps to illustrate the 
importance: 
Some years ago the political theorist Michael Sandel stated that “we can know a 
good in common that we cannot know alone.” …Sandel’s statement depends upon 
a sizeable number of people being able to appreciate and value existing bonds of 
                                                          
62 Robert D. Putnam and David E. Campbell, American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us (New 
York: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2010), p. 527. 
63 Ibid. They write, “In sum, we have reasonably firm evidence that as people build more religious bridges 
they become warmer toward people of many different religions, not just those religions represented 
within their social network” (p. 533).   
64 Parker Palmer, The Company of Strangers: Christians and the Renewal of America’s Public Life (New 
York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1981), p. 167. Elsewhere he gives his definition of “public,” 
which is quite relevant to our insistence on the preservation of public schools as places of encounter: “The 
word ‘public’ as I understand it contains a vision of our oneness, our unity, our interdependence… Despite 
the fact that we are strangers to one another—and will stay strangers for the most part—we occupy a 
common space, share common resources, have common opportunities, and must somehow learn to live 
together. To acknowledge that one is a member of the public is to recognize that we are members of one 
another… We need a living process to experience ourselves as a public, a process suggested by the phrase 
‘a public life.’ In such a life, strangers come in daily contact, grow accustomed to each other, learn to solve 
the problems which the common life poses, enrich and expand each other’s lives” (Ibid., p. 22). 
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social connection with each other. This positive experience of social 
interdependence enables persons to learn from one another, thus giving rise to 
understanding of the good life that could not be envisioned apart from their 
connections. But if large numbers of those with whom one rubs shoulders are seen 
as strangers, positive experiences of social unity are unlikely to arise. It is even 
less likely when divergences of culture, tradition, and ways of life make them 
look like threats to each other. When fear of these threats sets the tone, interaction 
with people who are different is perceived as a danger to be avoided. Serious 
interaction and mutual vulnerability can seem more like a “common bad” than a 
good to be shared in common.65 
     
Teaching religion(s) in the public schools can help replace fear of strangers with 
social bridging, setting a tone that even exceeds tolerance and reaches for appreciation 
and respect. It allows us to function as a “we”— We the people— “giving rise to 
understanding of the good life” in a pluralistic setting through our communication and 
communion. Furthermore, by taking religion(s) seriously in formal education, as most 
Americans do in their lives more generally, the public school helps to ensure its own 
survival against private and home school rivals, neither of which might afford students 
the encounter with the pluralistic public that Palmer and Hollenbach both call for.66 The 
religious content of the curriculum helps ensure that “…the school becomes a public 
                                                          
65 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 18. Michael Sandel adds to these thoughts on the public by comparing Rousseau’s “General Will” 
with Tocqueville’s description of deliberative or republican democracy. He writes, “Unlike Rousseau’s 
unitary vision, the republican politics Tocqueville describes is more clamorous than consensual. It does 
not despise differentiation. Instead of collapsing the space between persons, it fills this space with public 
institutions that gather people together in various capacities, that both separate and relate them. These 
institutions include the townships, schools, religions, and virtue-sustaining occupations that form the 
‘character of mind’ and ‘habits of the heart’ a democratic republic requires. Whatever their more 
particular purposes, these agencies of civic education inculcate the habit of attending to public things.”  
(Michael J. Sandel, Democracy’s Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: The 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 320-21). 
66 See the points made by James Fraser and Michael Apple in this dissertation’s first chapter, especially fn. 
113. For a different opinion, see Michael W. McConnell, “Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic 
Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling," in Moral and Political Education, edited by 
Stephen Macedo, & Yael Tamir (New York: New York University Press, 2002), pp, 87-146. 
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crossroad”67 and by being such a place of encounter, it has the opportunity to further 
advance solidarity and the common good. 
5.1.4 Modeling Care for the Common Good     
 Educating for the common good will involve role models. Teachers and educators 
themselves will be among the most important role models, challenging students to 
question the reigning understanding of both education (instrumental) and success 
(financial). Returning to the earlier question “What do you want to be?” child 
psychologist Beth Onufrak suggests that we ask students instead which adults they 
admire and why. Elizabeth Yuko summarizes Onufrak’s reasoning, saying, “Their 
answers… give us a chance to challenge — with compassionate directness — their 
emerging perceptions of the world.”68 The question remains pertinent even through 
secondary school. Educating for the common good involves modeling a life dedicated to 
the common good and also prompting students to think about whom they admire and 
why. 
We can categorize student role models as proximate or remote, and also as 
positive or negative (or, more often, a complex combination of qualities that are positive 
and negative). Reflecting on all four types of role models is essential to promoting the 
common good. The teacher is a good example of a proximate role model. Parents, 
coaches, aunts and uncles, grandparents and others who are personally known to the 
                                                          
67 Parker Palmer, The Company of Strangers: Christians and the Renewal of America’s Public Life (New 
York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1981), p. 168. 
68 Elizabeth Yuko, “Stop Asking Kids What They Want to Be When They Grow Up and Pose These 3 
Questions Instead,” Thrive Global (April 8, 2019), https://thriveglobal.com/stories/questions-ask-kids-
instead-what-want-to-be-grow-up/ [Accessed 13 January 2021].  
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young person and are involved in their life are also proximate role models. Nel Noddings 
proposes that moral education “from the perspective of an ethic of caring,” involves “four 
major components: modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation.”69 I have borrowed 
the first three of her components, finding them fitting in describing education for the 
common good. Concerning modeling, she writes, “…we do not tell our students to care; 
we show them how to care by creating caring relationships with them.”70 Likewise, we do 
not only admonish our students to care for the common good; we model for them the kind 
of caring that is required. We should note here that caring, in Noddings’ view, is a robust 
term. It signifies not only an “engrossment” and a “motivational displacement,”71 that 
may originate in the emotions, but also a holistic attention that involves our intellect, will, 
and work as much as our emotions. Caring for the common good, and modeling such 
care, will not be saccharine or sentimental, but engaged and critical. 
Role models may also be remote, having no or little personal contact with the 
student but influencing them nonetheless: sports stars, business tycoons, music and other 
cultural icons, politicians, historical figures, and religious figures such as Jesus, 
Muhammed, The Buddha, the Dalai Lama, and the Pope. Following Onufrak’s advice, 
we may ask students to reflect on their remote role models and challenge them to 
consider whether they promote or detract from the common good, or a complex mixture 
of both. For example, as educators of the common good we challenge “with 
                                                          
69 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 22.  
70 Ibid. 
71 Ibid., p. 15. By engrossment, Noddings means “…an open, nonselective receptivity for the cared-for.” 
She ties it to what other writers, including Iris Murdoch and Simone Weil, term attention. By motivational 




compassionate directness” the reigning icons of a culture of radical individualism. Instead 
of being complicit by our silence about, or our advocacy of, a culture that celebrates 
unlimited wealth accumulation, we insist that students think critically about those people 
our society holds up as heroes. Is it good for a society to publish celebratory lists of the 
world’s richest people? Is the rise of a billionaire class that includes Jeff Bezos and Elon 
Musk something that will benefit the common good or detract from it? How does the 
accumulation of wealth in the hands of a few affect workers, families, human rights, and 
social justice? What effect does it have on democracy? Does the relentless pursuit of 
wealth lead to happiness? Does wealth itself lead to happiness? Is the private 
philanthropy of someone like Bill Gates enough to warrant a celebration of the 
unprecedented wealth accumulation that we see today? 
A critical examination that engages with questions such as these will perhaps lead 
to a search for other role models, either for emulation or comparison. The study of 
religion(s) in the curriculum benefits students in this area. The world’s religions are rife 
with figures and teachings that challenge the idolatry of the rich and that promote a vision 
of brotherhood and sisterhood—community—that requires a greater sharing of resources. 
While I have focused on wealth accumulation here, many religious traditions challenges 
both individualism and tribalism. In teaching for the common good, they are worthy of 
study. 
Nel Noddings reminds us not to skip over the negative role models. Our students 
deserve to know the dark side of human nature and society. Thus, she writes, 
Teenagers need to study accounts of people gone wrong. How does it happen that 
some people become vicious criminals? How does it happen that “good” citizens 
ignore the misery around them? How does patriotism sometimes become warped 
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into cruelty? What makes it possible for one person to torture another? Novels, 
biographies, poetry, films, and historical accounts are all useful here, but they 
cannot be chosen just for inspiration. We need what Jung called “a morality of 
evil” to understand our own propensities toward evil.72 
 
The common good is not served by ignoring that which destroys it. In modeling care for 
the common good, and in facilitating critical conversations about role models, we do well 
to include an examination of those who have harmed society and the dark side of our own 
human nature that must be confronted. 
5.1.5 Opportunities to Practice Caring for the Common Good  
 Educating for the common good in our schools can only be effective if we provide 
students the opportunity to practice the civic virtues, competencies, and commitments 
that are conducive to, and enhance our social cohesion. Noddings considers practice to be 
one of the “great means of nurturing the ethical ideal”73 and is insistent that it is not 
merely the activities that matter but especially the “attitudes and mentalities.”74 She 
writes, 
All disciplines and institutional organizations have training programs designed 
not only to teach specific skills but also to ‘shape minds,’ that is, to induce certain 
attitudes and ways of looking at the world. If we want people to approach moral 
life prepared to care, we need to provide opportunities for them to gain skills in 
caregiving and, more important, to develop the characteristic attitudes [of caring 
people].75  
                                                          
72 Nel Noddings, Educating Moral People: A Caring Alternative to Character Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2002), p. 152. 
73 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2013), p. 182. 
74 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 23. 
75 Ibid., pp. 23-24. Although I do not explicitly apply Noddings’ fourth component, confirmation, it is worth 
a brief description here: “Martin Buber… described confirmation as an act of affirming and encouraging 
the best in others. When we confirm someone, we spot a better self and encourage its development… 




The same is true in regards to caring for the common good. Practice is an essential 
component of the formation of a citizenry who are indeed “We the people” and not 
merely a collection of atomized individuals seeking their own good.  
 The essential field of practice for the school is none other than the school itself. 
Parker Palmer writes, 
The need to practice democracy within the school, along with some guidance for 
doing it, has been articulated persuasively by Scott Nine, executive director of the 
Institute for Democratic Education in America: “If we expect our youth to 
become adults who exercise reflective judgment, [take] responsibility for 
themselves and their community, and… take part in shaping their country and its 
policies, then the environment in which they are schooled must teach them how to 
do that—it must give them practice in real responsibility, real dialogue, and real 
authority…”76 
 
Education for the common good in a democratic republic is not readily compatible with a 
school system that is organized primarily according to hierarchies based on competition. 
If education is a cut-throat pursuit of the highest grades and the best awards, with the 
chief prize being acceptance into an elite college or university followed by a high-paying 
job, then the environment will predictably nurture values conducive to this winner-take-
all, zero-sum, market mentality. The school itself will not be a field for practicing the 
virtues, competencies, and commitments needed for the common good. 
 Instead, the school must become a place where caring for the common good is 
practiced in its everyday operations.77 Noddings writes, “So long as our schools are 
                                                          
76 Parker J. Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the 
Human Spirit (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2011), p. 130. 
77 See John Dewey, Moral Principles in Education (Lexington, KY, 2013), p. 18. 
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organized hierarchically with emphasis on rewards and penalties, it will be very difficult 
to provide the kind of experience envisioned.”78 Individualistic competition will have to 
give way to collaboration and community. This is the vision Michael James and his 
colleagues propose when they speak of the need for a spirituality of communion within 
the educational project, saying “…the highest goal of education is unity—within the 
individual, within the community, within academic disciplines, within human nature 
itself.”79 It is also the vision of Maria Montessori, who critiqued the reigning model of 
education, writing, 
Look at what has happened to the sort of education provided by parents and 
teachers! They tell the child, “Come on. You must buckle down and study. You 
must get that diploma. You must get such and such a job. Otherwise how will you 
live?” Parents and teachers today forget to voice the words that were once the 
very cornerstone of education: “All men are brothers.”80 
 
Noddings refers to the type of practice needed as a “true apprenticeship in caring.”81 
The African concept of ubuntu (or botho in some African languages)82 might 
prove very helpful in creating this type of learning environment. Archbishop Desmond 
Tutu wrote about ubuntu/botho in his memoir No Future Without Forgiveness, reflecting 
on his critical role on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. He 
wrote,  
                                                          
78 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 25. 
79 Michael James, Thomas Masters, and Amy Uelmen, Education’s Highest Aim: Teaching and Learning 
Through a Spirituality of Communion (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 2010), p. 101. 
80 Maria Montessori, Education and Peace, Helen R. Lane, trans. (Amsterdam: Montessori-Pierson 
Publishing Company, 2007), pp. 45-6. I am confident that today she would rephrase it, perhaps as “We are 
all brothers and sisters.” 
81 Nel Noddings, Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2013), p. 187. 
82 Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 31. 
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Ubuntu is very difficult to render into a Western language. It speaks of the very 
essence of being human… It is to say, “My humanity is caught up, is inextricably 
bound up, in yours.” We belong in a bundle of life. We say, “A person is a person 
through other persons.” …A person with ubuntu is open and available to other 
persons, affirming of others, does not feel threatened that others are able and 
good, for he or she has a proper self-assurance that comes from knowing that he 
or she belongs in a greater whole and is diminished when others are humiliated or 
diminished, when others are tortured or oppressed, or treated as if they were less 
than who they are… What dehumanizes you, inexorably dehumanizes me.83 
 
Imagine this being the organizing principle in our schools! We would have a 
setting wherein students could indeed practice caring for the common good and might 
learn to resist the twin attractions of radical individualism and tribalism. We might have 
sporting events, for instance, where instead of fans chiding the losing team and wearing 
T-shirts that say “Second place is the first loser,” both teams (or all competitors) and 
spectators come together after the games to celebrate the sport and each other with a 
pizza party or ice cream. Coaches already emphasize that “there is no ‘I’ in team,” but 
now we might extend that thinking to “there is no ‘I’ in sports.” We might model 
appreciation for the competition (and the referees) instead of permitting student bodies to 
chant slurs at their opponents. Looking beyond sports, we might put more emphasis on 
music and the arts instead of always threatening their place in the budget, recognizing in 
them a universal language of unity and a frequent model for collaboration and harmony. 
                                                          
83 Desmond Mpilo Tutu, No Future Without Forgiveness (New York: Doubleday, 1999), p. 31. The theme of 
his book is forgiveness, which leads us to wonder whether forgiveness is a political virtue (in the 
philosophy of Ubuntu it is indeed) or a religious virtue only. Rather than decide the answer for our 
students, this might make an interesting question for study. Together with Tutu’s account, they might 
read The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness by Simon Wiesenthal, in which a variety 
of persons are asked whether a Jewish survivor of the Holocaust like Wiesenthal should forgive a Nazi 
soldier who asks forgiveness. We might then read Abraham Lincoln’s Second Inaugural Address and 
compare his view of “malice toward none; with charity for all” with the view of the Radical Republicans. In 
all of this, we are trying to grapple together with the intersection of religion, civic virtue, and public policy, 
with an eye to the requirements of the common good. 
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We might abolish individual class rank, and instead promote the myriad wonderful ways 
in which we have learned together. And we might recognize our students with special 
needs and who are differently abled as full members of our communities with a right to 
flourish, to participate and to contribute, and, above all, with a right to respect for their 
human dignity. We might create environments where bullying does not thrive. 
 Aside from organizing the school in such a way that it is conducive to fostering 
care for the common good, we should also provide practice in the particular civic virtues 
and competencies we hope to inculcate. Chief among these is the virtue and commitment 
of solidarity.84 Hollenbach argues for both intellectual solidarity, which is rooted in 
genuine dialogue,85 and social solidarity, which involves working for social justice that 
“enables diverse peoples to participate actively in contributing to and benefitting from the 
emergent patterns of global interdependence that affect them.”86 Both components of 
solidarity may be enhanced through practice. We will look at dialogue separately as the 
final suggestion for creating schools that promote the common good. For now, we will 
focus on how the study of religion(s) in our schools may also help students to practice the 
virtue and commitment of solidarity. 
                                                          
84 Hollenbach links the two concepts in the thought of Pope John Paul II: “The common good of the 
community and the good of the members are mutually implicating,” he writes. “This is the reason John 
Paul II calls commitment to the common good ‘the virtue of solidarity’ …and define[s] this virtue as ‘a firm 
and persevering determination to commit oneself to the common good.’” (David Hollenbach, SJ, The 
Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 189). For my usage 
of virtue and commitment, see fn. 32 in this chapter. 
85 Hollenbach defines intellectual solidarity as the “…common pursuit of a shared vision of the good life…” 
(David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 137). 
86 Ibid., p. 239. 
194 
 
 A common pedagogical error when introducing the study of religions(s) to public 
schools is to treat religions as closed sets of beliefs. Diane Moore critiques approaches in 
which “Traditions are often presented as timeless, uniform, and unchanging systems of 
belief that betray the social/historical dimensions that define all religious expressions and 
interpretations.”87 An additional critique must be registered. The emphasis on “systems of 
belief” is itself problematic in that for some religions orthopraxis—right practice—is at 
least as important as orthodoxy—right beliefs. In fact, for many religions, practice is more 
important than beliefs.88 Any study of religion(s) should take religious practice into full 
account. This includes both ritual practices, which we might more readily recognize as 
religious or spiritual, and service to the community in many different forms. It is in this 
arena where we find the felicitous conjunction with solidarity and the common good. 
 A curriculum that does not engage in the hostility of neglect will readily discuss 
with students that “Faith is a powerful motivator for the good” and that “Highly religious 
people are much more likely to volunteer and donate to charitable causes.”89 When we 
                                                          
87 Diane. L. Moore, Overcoming Religious Illiteracy: A Cultural Studies Approach to the Study of Religion in 
Secondary Education (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 69. 
88Nel Noddings points out that “few religions besides Christianity use belief as a basic test, [though] belief 
is clearly involved in all religions.” (Nel Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 1993), p. xv).  
89 Michael Wear, Reclaiming Hope: Lessons Learned in the Obama White House about the Future of Faith 
in America (Nashville, TN: Nelson Books, 2018), p. 63. The research he cites comes from the Pew Research 
Center in 2016. However, the charitable bent of religious people does not imply that the public social 
safety net is unnecessary. Emma Green, writing for The Atlantic, says, “I spoke with roughly a half dozen 
scholars from a variety of ideological backgrounds who study religious giving, and they were all skeptical 
that churches, synagogues, mosques, and other faith-based organizations could serve as an adequate 
substitute for the government in providing for the needy and vulnerable. The scale and structure of 
government services, the sectarian nature of religious programs, and the declining role of religion in 
public life are all challenges, they argued; if anything, states would have to step in to take on the burden, 
or some current services would go away entirely.” She quotes one of the scholars she interviewed: 
“‘Religious congregations do a lot,’ said Mary Jo Bane, a professor at Harvard University. But ‘the scale of 
what they do is trivial compared to what the government does. Especially if you think about the big 
government programs like … food stamps and school lunches, or health services through Medicaid, what 
religious organizations do is teeny tiny.’” (Emma Green, “Can Religious Charities Take the Place of the 
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survey the American people’s commitment to solidarity, this is what we see according to 
Michael Wear: 
Religious organizations such as Catholic Charities and World Vision are the 
backbone of our nation’s social service landscape and the face of American 
generosity abroad. Few institutions are more valuable in American public 
diplomacy than World Vision, World Relief, Catholic Relief Services, American 
Jewish World Service, Islamic Relief USA, and so many other religious 
organizations that serve abroad, often in partnership with their government.90 
 
Students have a right to know this, and to know that our public schools, like other arms of 
our government, may partner with faith-based organizations as long as neutrality is 
upheld and proselytizing is forbidden and assiduously avoided.91 After all, in practicing 
care for the common good and engaging in social solidarity, students may rightfully want 
to participate in addressing some of the world’s problems. Parker Palmer notes that 
“Involving students with the community beyond the schoolhouse door has benefits that 
are now well known, thanks to the rise of service learning over the past several 
decades.”92 If students are allowed to partner with secular organizations outside the 
school, then they must be allowed to partner with religious organizations as well. To 
                                                          
Welfare State?” The Atlantic (March 26, 2017), 
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exclude organizations that work for the common good simply because they are religious 
would be to violate neutrality. It would also implicitly teach a warped view of reality. 
Michael Wear, who just illustrated for us the importance of religious organizations in 
foreign diplomacy vis-à-vis social services, also points out their domestic importance: 
And at home, it is so often religious people and organizations that are counted on 
to do the hard work of actually serving the poor, the immigrant, and the outcast. 
Religious hospitals account for a large percentage of hospital beds nationwide. 
Religious colleges and universities train up the next generation not simply to grow 
in knowledge, but to direct that knowledge toward what is good and beautiful. 
Religious homeless shelters give respite to those with no other place to go. Faith-
based adoption agencies help children find safe, permanent, and loving homes.93 
 
To ignore this reality in the public schools would be to deprive students of an honest 
account of the society in which they live, would deprive them of the opportunity to 
practice solidarity with religious persons and communities in a common effort to forge a 
more just and peaceful world, would deny them a critical bridging opportunity to 
encounter and collaborate with the other, and would signal to them that religions and 
religious organizations are insignificant or in some way lesser than their secular 
counterparts. This is educationally unsound and is unconstitutional as well.  
 Michael Wear’s view from his role in President Obama’s administration echoes 
the assessment by John J. DiIulio, Jr. from his position as the nation’s first Faith Czar 
under President George W. Bush. DiIulio asks, “…how much America’s total stock of 
social capital [is] actually spiritual capital?” His answer is striking: 
By 2000, this question had proven to be relatively easy to answer, at least in the 
aggregate: roughly half. All the relevant data revealed that churches, synagogues, 
mosques, and other religious organizations supplied enormous amounts of social 
                                                          
93 Michael Wear, Reclaiming Hope: Lessons Learned in the Obama White House about the Future of Faith 
in America (Nashville: Nelson Books, 2018), p. 63. 
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services to their communities and functioned as major civic seedbeds of 
volunteering and philanthropy.94 
 
Considering this sociological reality, should not our students get practice not only 
in caring for the common good, but in encountering and working together with people of 
different religious and non-religious backgrounds as they do so? Wouldn’t this also 
promote the common good by exposing students to a more balanced view of religious 
people than the distortions that often have crept into the curriculum? For example, 
imagine the educational value of Christians, Jews, Hindus, and atheists working 
alongside Muslims in caring for the needy, instead of only hearing about Islam in relation 
to terrorism. The words of President Obama remain relevant: 
…far too often, we have seen faith wielded as a tool to divide us from one another 
– as an excuse for prejudice and intolerance. Wars have been waged. Innocents 
have been slaughtered. For centuries, entire religions have been persecuted, all in 
the name of perceived righteousness… But no matter what we choose to believe, 
let us remember that there is no religion whose central tenet is hate… the 
particular faith that motivates each of us can promote a greater good for all of us. 
Instead of driving us apart, our varied beliefs can bring us together to feed the 
hungry and comfort the afflicted; to make peace where there is strife and rebuild 
what has broken; to lift up those who have fallen on hard times. This is not only 
our call as people of faith, but our duty as citizens of America…95 
 
5.1.6 The Opportunity to Engage in Real Dialogue 
 Finally, public schools that educate for the common good will give students 
practice in dialogue. Much is said these days about promoting critical thinking across the 
                                                          
94 John J. DiIulio, Jr., Godly Republic: A Centrist Blueprint for America’s Faith-Based Future (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2007) p. 155. 
95 President Barack Obama, “This is My Hope. This is My Prayer.” Address to the National Prayer 
Breakfast, February 5, 2009, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2009/02/05/my-hope-my-
prayer [Accessed 24 January 2021]. Quoted in Michael Wear, Reclaiming Hope: Lessons Learned in the 
Obama White House about the Future of Faith in America (Nashville: Nelson Books, 2018), p. 67. 
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curriculum, and rightly so. Learning the skills of healthy dialogue is essential for 
achieving this educational goal. Paulo Freire writes, “Only dialogue, which requires 
critical thinking, is also capable of generating critical thinking. Without dialogue there is 
no communication, and without communication there can be no true education.”96 
The benefits of learning dialogical skills, of course, extend beyond the 
schoolhouse and contribute to the common good. Hollenbach makes the connection clear 
and identifies the high stakes involved:  
In a globalizing world we are fated to interact across the cultural and religious 
boundaries that have for so long divided the world into different camps. Today the 
question is not whether there will be such interaction, but whether it will be 
peaceful or violent, mutual or hegemonic. If it is to be peaceful and mutual, it will 
call for interaction that requires both listening and speaking in a genuine 
conversation across the many kinds of boundaries that have divided the world in 
the past and that continue to divide it today.97  
 
Nel Noddings considers dialogue to be one of the essential components of moral 
education. She says of dialogue, “It connects us to each other and helps to maintain 
caring relations.”98 In defining dialogue, she adopts a similar view to that of Paulo Freire, 
writing: 
Dialogue is open-ended; that is, in a genuine dialogue, neither party knows at the 
outset what the outcome or decision will be… Dialogue is a common search for 
understanding, empathy, or appreciation. It can be playful or serious, logical or 
                                                          
96 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1970), p. 81. 
97 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 239. 
98 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 23. Freire used the word love rather than caring relations, writing, 
“Dialogue is the encounter between [persons], mediated by the world, in order to name the world… 
Dialogue cannot exist, however, in the absence of a profound love for the world and for [people]. The 
naming of the world, which is an act of creation and re-creation, is not possible if it is not infused with 
love. Love is at the same time the foundation of dialogue and dialogue itself.” (Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 1970), pp. 76-78). 
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imaginative, goal or process oriented, but it is always a genuine quest for 
something undetermined at the beginning.99 
 
Dialogue, of course, is not easy: it involves a set of arts and commitments that 
need to be learned and practiced. There are severe potential pitfalls. In discussing “liberty 
of thought and discussion,” John Stuart Mill noted that “The gravest [of offences] …is, to 
argue sophistically, to suppress facts or arguments, to misstate the elements of the case, 
or misrepresent the opposite opinion”100 and it is particularly egregious “…to stigmatize 
those who hold the contrary opinion as bad or immoral [people].”101 The intellectual 
honesty required of participants in genuine dialogue is a quality—a virtue—every school 
should be eager to promote. Mill identified it as “the real morality of public 
discussion.”102    
David Tracy refers to dialogue as conversation, and he helps us to see exactly 
what this particular type of human communication requires: 
Conversation is a game with some hard rules: say only what you mean; say it as 
accurately as you can; listen to and respect what the other says, however different 
or other; be willing to correct or defend your opinions if challenged by the 
                                                          
99 Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to Education (New York: 
Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 23.  
100 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, Charles W. Elliot, ed. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 2004), p. 55. 
101 Ibid., p. 56. Mill continues, “It is, however, obvious that law and authority have no business with 
restraining either [attacks on “infidelity” or religion], while opinion ought, in every instance, to determine 
its verdict by the circumstances of the individual case; condemning every one, on whichever side of the 
argument he [or she] places himself [or herself], in whose mode of advocacy either want of candor, or 
malignity, bigotry or intolerance of feeling manifest themselves, but not inferring these vices from the 
side which a person takes, though it be the contrary side of the question to our own; and giving merited 
honor to every one, whatever opinion he [or she] may hold, who has calmness to see and honesty to state 
what his [or her] opponents and their opinions really are, exaggerating nothing to their discredit, keeping 
nothing back which tells, or can be supposed to tell, in their favor. This is the real morality of public 
discussion; and if often violated, I am happy to think that there are many controversialists who to a great 
extent observe it, and a still greater number who conscientiously strive towards it” (pp. 56-57). I am 
grateful to Nel Noddings for pointing this passage out to me during a visit on August 18, 2019. 
102 Ibid., p. 57. 
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conversation partner; be willing to argue if necessary, to confront if demanded, to 
endure necessary conflict, to change your mind if the evidence suggests it.103 
 
Without practice in dialogue of this sort, our students will be missing skills that are 
critical for life together in a religiously plural and diverse society and in a world that is 
increasingly globalized. 
If our pedagogy follows the banking model critiqued by Freire, then there will be 
no dialogue, no room for conversation. Students might memorize the Five Pillars of 
Islam, for instance, but never have an opportunity to encounter Muslims and to enter into 
conversation with adherents of a multi-faceted, living tradition. They are handed 
knowledge as if it were a closed set, a pristine container of expertise that counts for little 
in real life. We have robbed them of their agency, of their natural desire for inquiry and 
encounter. Palmer critiques this “cult of expertise” in which students “become recipients 
of expert knowledge rather than active participants in a process of inquiry, discovery, and 
co-creation.”104 He pinpoints one of the key problems: “We never learn how to hold 
tension creatively because there are no ambiguities, only claims of certainty, in the cult of 
expertise.”105 Dialogue, on the other hand, will involve tension, and will require learning 
“how to hold tension creatively,” a critical capacity in our diverse and divided society. 
 Dialogue not only promotes the common good, but is essential for naming it in 
the first place. In a society and a world with multiple competing visions of the good 
life—what Rawls called comprehensive doctrines—Hollenbach argues that we can arrive 
                                                          
103 David Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1987), p. 19. 
104 Parker J. Palmer, Healing the Heart of Democracy: The Courage to Create a Politics Worthy of the 




at an understanding of the common good through dialogue rooted in intellectual 
solidarity. 
The shared good of a community of freedom is incompatible with all forms of 
domination or exclusion of one group of persons by another, whether on religious 
or secular grounds… A religiously pluralistic community, by definition, does not 
already share a common vision of the good life. Moving toward such a shared 
vision, even in outline, will take intellectual work. This common pursuit of a 
shared vision of the good life can be called intellectual solidarity… It is a form of 
solidarity, because it can only occur in an active dialogue of mutual listening and 
speaking across the boundaries of religion and culture.106 
 
In short, educating for the common good requires participation and practice in the 
very dialogue that makes possible a workable understanding of the common good in the 
absence of a common worldview. It engenders the types of encounter that are necessary 
for creating bridging capital and for forging caring relationships.107 It requires intellectual 
solidarity, which is “…an orientation that leads one to view differences positively rather 
than with a mindset marked by suspicion or fear.”108 Dialogue allows us to know the 
other; and we cannot love what we do not know. Freire was right to pose dialogue as an 
act of love.109 
                                                          
106 David Hollenbach, SJ, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2002), p. 137. 
107 Hollenbach writes, “…the pursuit of the common good is dialogic. Cultural differences are so significant 
that a shared vision of the common good can only be attained in a historically incremental way through 
deep encounter and intellectual exchange across traditions. It is also dialogic because it sees engagement 
with others across the boundaries of traditions as itself part of the human good.” (David Hollenbach, SJ, 
The Common Good and Christian Ethics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 153). 
108 Ibid., p. 138. 
109 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1970), pp. 78-80: “If I do not love the world—if I do not love life—if I do not love [people]—I cannot enter 
into dialogue… Founding itself upon love, humility, and faith [in people], dialogue becomes a horizontal 




 Teaching about religion(s) offers critical opportunities to engage in genuine 
dialogue and thus to contribute to the common good. Palmer rightly critiques “…the 
disastrous conclusion which Americans have drawn from pluralism—that diversity 
requires religion to retreat into private, to withdraw from the public realm.”110 He 
counters that perspective by proposing that “The key to the maintenance of a healthy 
pluralism is continual dialogue between religious traditions…” Unfortunately, “When we 
remove faith from public discourse, the dialogue stops…”111 Thus, Pope Benedict XVI is 
correct to note that “The Christian religion and other religions can offer their contribution 
to development only if God has a place in the public realm, specifically in regard to its 
cultural, social, economic, and particularly its political dimensions.”112 What pertains to 
the public realm certainly pertains to public schools, which both engage students in the 
life of the society and prepare them for further participation. “The exclusion of religion 
from the public square,” writes Benedict, “…hinders an encounter between persons and 
their collaboration for the progress of humanity.”113 
 Perhaps the most important lesson that dialogue teaches our young citizens is an 
epistemological lesson: religious ways of knowing cannot be discounted simply for being 
religious, and are worthy of their place in the public forum as valid and compelling ways 
of knowing, and thus appropriate for the public school. Nobody expresses this better than 
Jürgen Habermas in his later writings: 
                                                          
110 Parker J. Palmer, The Company of Strangers: Christians and the Renewal of America’s Public Life (New 
York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1981), p. 157. 
111 Ibid. 
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…religious convictions have an epistemological status that is not purely and 
simply irrational… [and] in the public political arena, naturalistic [secular] world 
views… do not in the least enjoy a prima facie advantage over competing world 
views or religious understandings… When secularized citizens act in their role as 
citizens of the state, they must not deny in principle that religious images of the 
world have the potential to express truth. Nor must they refuse their believing 
fellow citizens the right to make contributions in a religious language to public 
debates. Indeed, a liberal political culture can expect that the secularized citizens 
play their part in the endeavors to translate relevant contributions from the 
religious language into a language that is accessible to the public as a whole.114 
 
Engaging with religious and non-religious voices in dialogue as a civil effort to pursue 
peace and the common good, and to forge genuine understanding and care for the other: 
this is a worthy and indispensable educational activity in the public schools of a 
pluralistic, democratic republic. 
                                                          
114 Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Jürgen Habermas, Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason and Religion, 
Brian McNeil, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006), pp. 51-52. Notice how this differs from the 
Rawlsian proviso, which required religious citizens to translate their public contributions into terms 
accessible as public reason. Habermas puts the burden of translation on the body politic. Together, in 
dialogue, we find the truth that can guide our life together, whether that truth was originally expressed in 
religious language or not. Habermas joined the chorus of critics concerning the proviso: “Rawls has 
sparked a lively discussion with his proposal for the rather restricted role of religion in the public sphere: 
‘Reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, may be introduced in public political 
discussion at any time, provided that in due course proper political reasons… are presented that are 
sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support.’ This Rawlsian 
‘proviso’ has been confronted with the empirical objection that many citizens cannot or are not willing to 
make the required separation between contributions expressed in religious terms and those expressed in 
secular language when they take political stances. Rawls furthermore faced the normative objection that 
a liberal constitution, which also exists to safeguard religious forms of life, must not inflict such an 
additional, and hence asymmetrical, burden on its religious citizens… [Instead,] all citizens should be free 
to decide whether they want to use religious language in the public sphere. Were they to do so, they 
would, however, have to accept that the potential truth contents of religious utterances must be 
translated into a generally accessible language before they can find their way onto the agendas of 
parliaments, courts, or administrative bodies…” (Judith Butler, Jürgen Habermas, et al., The Power of 
Religion in the Public Sphere, Eduardo Mandieta and Jonathan VanAntwerpen, eds. (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011), p. 25). Concerning the translation of religious language, Michael Reder and Josef 
Schmidt remind us that it is a two-way street: “Religious and secular utterances cannot be clearly 
separated in any case, which for Habermas is a further pointer to the need for a process of mutual 
translation” (in Jürgen Habermas et al., An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-
Secular Age, Ciaran Cronin, transl. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2010), p. 7).  
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 In the next and final chapter, we will turn our attention to implementation of these 
many ideas we have been exploring. I will present a plan that I call the Meaningful 




CHAPTER 6: A More Perfect Union - The Meaningful Inclusion Approach 
 
 The question of the proper relationship between religion and education is a 
fraught one. As Dermot Lane has noted, “Religion is a controversial subject at the best of 
times. Equally, education is a contested space. Trying to talk about religion and education 
together is not easy and trying to re-imagine their relationship may even be foolhardy.”1 
The hostility of neglect, however, is worse, being both a betrayal of the promises of a 
liberal education and a failure of education to promote peace through encounter and 
solidarity. We must incorporate the study of religion(s) into our public schools in the 
United States, and the time is now. 
 In this final chapter, we will examine the new context in which we find ourselves, 
and demonstrate why now is an ideal time to make these changes to the public school 
curriculum. Then, I will lay out a proposal for the study of religion(s) in our public 
schools that I call the Meaningful Inclusion Approach (MIA). I will give examples of the 
particular pedagogies upon which this approach is constructed, and I will attend to certain 
questions that will naturally arise, such as teacher and administrator training, violations of 
neutrality, fringe groups and minority religions or philosophies that demand inclusion in 
the curriculum, and building community support. 
6.1 The Post-Secular Context 
 To claim we are in a new context, a post-secular context to be precise, requires an 
explanation and a defense. It is not at all obvious that we are in a post-secular context, 
                                                          
1 Dermot A. Lane, Religion and Education: Re-Imagining the Relationship (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 
2013), p. 5. 
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nor is it obvious that our current situation follows upon a previous secular context. Yet, 
by defining our terms carefully and evaluating the evidence before us, I think it is fair to 
say that we are in a new situation that is, in some way, post-secular, and which is more 
conducive to the incorporation of the study of religion(s) in the curriculum. 
 Charles Taylor distinguishes between three meanings of the term secularity. The 
first refers to public spaces that “…have been allegedly emptied of God, or of any 
reference to ultimate reality.” Secularity 1, then, includes the separation of church and 
state, but also the functioning of  “…various spheres of activity—economic, political, 
cultural, educational, professional, recreational…” that “…generally don’t refer us to 
God or to any religious beliefs; the considerations we act on are internal to the 
‘rationality’ of each sphere…”2 The second sense of secularity is more concerned with 
beliefs and practices than institutions and structures. Taylor says that secularity 2, 
“…consists in the falling off of religious belief and practice, in people turning away from 
God, and no longer going to Church.”3 Thus, France is a highly secular country in the 
sense of both secularity 1 and secularity 2, but the United States is arguably secular only 
in the first sense.4 Secularity 2 can be broken down further. There is a difference worthy 
of note between those on the one hand who reject religious institutions and authority but 
who still have faith in God or gods, and those on the other hand who have lost all 
                                                          
2 Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), 
p. 2. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Taylor suggests one possible reason for the difference: “American society from the very beginning has 
seen itself integrating different elements. ‘E pluribus Unum’ is the motto… This means that a way that 
Americans can understand their fitting together in society although of different faiths, is through these 
faiths themselves being seen as in this consensual relation to the common civil religion… That means that 
one can be integrated as an American through one’s faith or religious identity. This contrasts with the 
Jacobin-republican formula of ‘laïcité’, where the integration takes place by ignoring, sidelining or 
privatising the religious identity, if any” (Ibid., p. 523-4). 
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religious faith. The “nones,”5 in other words, include both the spiritual but not religious 
crowd and atheists and agnostics. This distinction is worth keeping in mind: after all, I 
suspect that many of the self-proclaimed nones (those who check off “none” when asked 
what their religion is) may very well be quite religious and/or spiritual, even Christian in 
many cases, when we scratch beneath the surface—“believing without belonging” in the 
apt phrasing of Grace Davie.6 Taylor describes a third sense of secularity: the condition 
in which religious belief: 1) is no longer the default setting “…in which it was virtually 
impossible not to believe in God…” and 2) has been replaced by a background “…in 
which faith, even for the staunchest believer, is one human possibility among others.”7 In 
summary, Taylor provides us with a helpful taxonomy, three understandings of secularity 
that can be distinguished from one another even as they interact and overlap: 
“…secularity 1 (the retreat of religion in public life) and 2 (the decline in belief and 
practice)… and secularity 3 (the change in the conditions of belief)…”8 
 While Taylor is most interested in Secularity 3, it is Secularity 1 and 2 that matter 
most to my proposal concerning religion and public education. As we have seen, the 
public schools in the U.S. have become secularized over time according to Taylor’s first 
                                                          
5 Pew Research Center, “In U.S., Decline of Christianity Continues at Rapid Pace: An update on America's 
changing religious landscape,” October 17, 2019, https://www.pewforum.org/2019/10/17/in-u-s-decline-
of-christianity-continues-at-rapid-pace/ [Accessed 27 February 2021]. The term nones refers to “all 
subsets of the religiously unaffiliated population.” 
6Grace Davie, qtd. in Tom Heneghan, “’Believing without belonging’ challenges Catholicism – Dolan,” 
Reuters (March 1, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-pope-succession-dolan/believing-without-
belonging-challenges-catholicism-dolan-idUKBRE9200I620130301 [Accessed 27 March 2021].  
7Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007), p. 3. 
Taylor explains his thesis: “I would like to claim that the coming of modern secularity in my [third] sense 
has been coterminous with the rise of a society in which for the first time in history a purely self-sufficient 
humanism came to be a widely available option. I mean by this a humanism accepting no final goal 
beyond human flourishing, nor any allegiance to anything beyond this flourishing. Of no previous society 
was this true” (p. 18). 
8 Ibid., p. 423. 
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definition. There has been some movement in the other direction, as evidenced by 
continuing court challenges since the 1960’s (including allowing public schools to host 
religious “prayer pole” meetings before school and religious clubs after school as long as 
they are student-organized and student-led).9 Nonetheless, American public schools have 
become so secular (secularity 1) as to warrant my accusation that they have violated 
neutrality and are guilty of the hostility of neglect, and Warren Nord’s accusation that 
they are guilty of “…(borderline) secular indoctrination.”10 
When considering secularity 3, Taylor is careful to qualify the importance of what 
he calls “subtraction stories” of secularization. These are theories regarding the process 
of secularization that attribute causal significance to the gradual tearing down of various 
structures that supported religious belief. The loss of an enchanted world by the 
emergence of scientific understanding would be one example of subtraction. Taylor finds 
these stories insufficient for explaining secularity 3, the changing conditions in which 
belief or unbelief operate: there must be some addition as well, something innovative, 
something to fill the void and make the new conditions of modernity possible.11 
                                                          
9 Katherine Stewart, The Good News Club: The Religious Right’s Assault on America’s Children (New York: 
Public Affairs, 2012), p. 69. 
10 Warren A. Nord, Does God Make a Difference? Taking Religion Seriously in Our Schools and Universities 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 98. He also charges that “…many cross the line” (p. 94). 
11 Taylor writes, “…I will be making a continuing polemic against what I call ‘subtraction stories.’ Concisely 
put, I mean by this stories of modernity in general, and secularity in particular, which explain them by 
human beings having lost, or sloughed off, or liberated themselves from certain earlier, confining 
horizons, or illusions, or limitations of knowledge. What emerges from this process—modernity or 
secularity—is to be understood in terms of underlying features of human nature which were there all 
along, but had been impeded by what is now set aside. Against this kind of story, I will steadily be arguing 
that Western modernity, including its secularity, is the fruit of new inventions, newly constructed self-
understandings and related practices, and can’t be explained in terms of perennial features of human 
life.” (Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2007), p. 22). 
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Subtraction stories are also insufficient for understanding the secularization that 
has happened in our schools. Secularization, in its late stages, resulted from a legal effort 
to interpret the First Amendment properly and to extend religious liberty in an 
increasingly pluralistic society. This has involved the subtraction, most obviously, of 
school-sponsored prayer, religious instruction, and Bible readings, but less obviously it 
has involved the subtraction of a Christian telos, ethos, and spirituality from the schools. 
Something has had to fill that gap. What we have today is not merely the remnant of the 
previous educational project once religion had been “sloughed off,”12 to use Taylor’s 
term. Something new is afoot. We have seen that education shifted its aims from the early 
goal of fostering the Christian virtue (largely through biblical literacy), which was 
assumed necessary for a healthy republic, to preparing students to be successful 
contributors to the market economy. In other words, the schools had to operate with a 
vision, and when the religious vision was removed, and economic vision replaced it. 
In the last two chapters we examined the aims of education in order to address 
this distortion, which has been one factor in making the sidelining of religion and 
spirituality possible. I disagree with those who see a radical secular humanist agenda at 
work here, though secular humanists surely are at work to keep the schools free of 
religious influences.13 Their activism promotes one form of subtraction (for example, 
eliminating even student-led prayer at school sporting events and eliminating religious 
                                                          
12 See previous fn. 
13 George Weigel, for example, sees not only a radical secularist agenda at work, but one that is decidedly 
anti-Catholic. “…Weigel argued that the new anti-Catholicism was best understood as a ‘crucial 
component in a more radical and comprehensive campaign to establish secularism’—the outlawing of 
religion from public areas of culture like politics and education—as the official doctrine of the United 
States… ‘The claim of the new secularists, like that of the old nativists, is that Catholicism is not safe for 
democracy’” (Qtd. in Mark Massa, Anti-Catholicism in America: The Last Acceptable Prejudice (New York: 
The Crossroad Publishing Company, 2003), p.46). 
210 
 
holidays from the academic calendar). Critics, argue, though, that in divorcing education 
from religion, the public schools in the U.S. merely shifted from one religious basis 
(Christianity) to another (secular humanism). Where I see economic motives driving 
education, some of these critics see a pernicious and anti-religious motive, which they 
describe as secular humanism.14 In either case, we must admit that subtraction stories do 
not explain the reigning philosophy of our schools today. Something new has filled the 
breach. Secularity 1 in our schools is a result of both the subtraction of the religious 
establishment and the emergence of this something new.  
  It is difficult to deny that our public schools have become secular spaces 
according to the meaning of Taylor’s secularity 1. It is even more difficult to make the 
argument that we are in a new context, a post-secular context. A laser focus on the public 
schools will not yield this perspective. A goal of this dissertation, after all, is to 
encourage schools to move out of the particular type of secular space in which they find 
themselves, a space which is not at all neutral. Thus, we must look beyond the public 
schools, which are lagging behind the society more broadly. When we look at the larger 
context, we will see that a space has opened up for schools to build something new yet 
again. This is a post-secular space in which schools may treat religion(s) with greater 
intellectual honesty and fairness, in which they may address the big questions of human 
                                                          
14 For an early and persistent example of this complaint, see Virgil C. Blum, “Secularism in Public Schools,” 
Crisis Magazine (March 1, 1987), https://www.crisismagazine.com/1987/secularism-in-public-schools 
[Accessed 27 February 2021]. Martin Marty noted this as well, writing, “To many religious adherents, it 
looks as though a competing worldview—such as ‘secular humanism’—has become the established or 
privileged religion by default, while the regular voices of the ‘ordinarily’ religious are shut out.” (Martin E. 
Marty, Education, Religion, and the Common Good: Advancing a Distinctly American Conversation About 
Religion’s Role in Our Shared Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), p. 57).  
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life, purpose, and ethics, unafraid to engage with religious and spiritual thinking in the 
deep human quest for meaning and truth, for goodness and beauty, for justice and peace.  
To demonstrate the new context that has arisen in the last generation, I will point 
to four examples that are of great significance. These examples cover the fields of 
politics/diplomacy, economics and business, sociology and political philosophy, and 
academia. In each case, we will see that, far from the expectations of the secularization 
hypothesis, which anticipated the decline of religious belief and the decline in importance 
of religion(s) as modernity progressed, we are in a context now in which religions are 
growing in numbers and in significance. The time is ripe for our schools to readjust their 
vision and to take religion(s) seriously once again as an integral component of the 
curriculum. 
6.1.1 Politics and Diplomacy 
 In his book review of A. Alexander Stummvoll’s A Living Tradition, Drew 
Christiansen wrote, “The importance of this volume is particularly notable at this moment 
in international diplomacy because, in Douglas Johnston’s phrase, religion has been ‘the 
missing dimension in statecraft.’”15 Earlier and elsewhere, Michael Reder and Josef 
Schmidt claimed that this had changed since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, writing, 
“Religion has also become a central topic on the global political stage, especially since 
September 11, 2001. Today, global political strategies are difficult to conceive without 
reference to the relation between religion and politics.”16 Stummvoll, though, writing in 
                                                          
15 Drew Christiansen, “Prudent and Pragmatic,” America, Vol. 219. No. 5 (September 3, 2018), p. 50. 
16 Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt, “Habermas and Religion,” in Jürgen Habermas et al., An Awareness of 
What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, Ciaran Cronin, transl. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2010), p. 2. 
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2018, would disagree with that sense of centrality. An expert in the field of international 
relations, he reminds us that “The modern Western notion of religion as a set of privately 
held beliefs and doctrines that are separate and distinct from politics, economics, and 
culture is mostly a product of the sixteenth century…”17 He challenges that conception 
and the negligence of a serious analysis of religion in the field of international relations, 
writing, “The relationship between religious ideas and religious actors’ politically salient 
practices remains largely unexamined.”18 If religion is “a central topic on the global 
political stage,” Stummvoll suggests we are missing a key piece of the analysis. We need 
to understand religious ideas and their practical, political implications better. His is not a 
lone voice crying out in the wilderness. 
In 2006, former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright wrote that “Diplomats 
in my era were taught not to invite trouble, and no subject seemed more inherently 
treacherous than religion.”19 She spoke of the secularization that reigned in the field, 
affirming that “…the scholar Michael Novak got it right when he asserted in the early 
1960s, ‘As matters now stand, the one word [that could not be used] in serious 
conversation without upsetting someone is ‘God.’’”20 However, she affirmed that this 
was a blind spot. “Since the terror attacks of 9/11,” she wrote, “I have come to realize 
that it may have been I [and not the religious people] who was stuck in an earlier time.” 
In an age of globalization and technological advances, she wrote that “another force” was 
                                                          
17 A. Alexander Stummvoll, A Living Tradition: Catholic Social Doctrine and Holy See Diplomacy (Eugene, 
OR: Cascade Books, 2018), p. 16.  
18 Ibid., p. 5. He says of his own training in International Relations (IR): “What puzzled me was the extent 
to which IR simply neglected religious ideas and actors” (p. xii). 
19 Madeleine Albright, The Mighty & The Almighty (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), p. 8.  
20 Ibid., p. 7. 
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also at work: “Almost everywhere, religious movements are thriving.”21 Stateside, this 
was true as well. “A reawakening of Christian activism is also altering how we think 
about politics and culture in the United States,” Albright wrote. “In contrast to Michael 
Novak’s observation four decades ago, people now talk (and argue) about God all the 
time.”22 She concluded that we are in a new era, one that must take religion seriously:  
The art of statecraft consists of finding the combination [of military force, 
negotiations, arguments, etc.] that produces the best results. That, in turn, requires 
a clear grasp of what matters most to those we are trying to influence… In world 
affairs, it means learning about foreign countries and cultures; at a time when 
religious passions are embroiling the globe, that cannot be done without taking 
religious tenets and motivations fully into account.23 
 
Her former boss, President Bill Clinton agrees. In the introduction to her book he 
acknowledged the potential for religion to be used for harm: “In the wrong hands, 
religion becomes a lever used to pry one group of people away from another not because 
of profound spiritual insight, but because it helps whoever is doing the prying.”24 Then he 
asks the important and relevant question: “Does this mean that policy-makers should try 
to keep religion walled off from public life? As Madeleine Albright argues, the answer… 
is a resounding no. Not only shouldn’t we do that; we couldn’t succeed if we tried.”25 
 Albright considers the arguments of strict secularism to be foolish. A world 
without religion, she argues, is both unknown (“…although we know what a globe 
plagued by religious strife is like, we do not know what it would be like to live in a world 
                                                          
21 Madeleine Albright, The Mighty & The Almighty (New York: Harper Perennial, 2006), pp. 9-10. 
22 Ibid., p. 10. 
23 Ibid., p. 11. She also wrote that “The religious scholars I have consulted are passionate about the need 
for political leaders to educate themselves in the varieties of faith and to see religion more as a potential 
means for reconciliation than as a source of conflict” (p. 12). 




where religious faith is absent”26) and unlikely. Moreover, we do have hints that a purely 
secular society would not be a utopia. “We have… had clues from Lenin, Stalin, Mao 
Zedong, and I would also argue, the Nazis, who conjured up a soulless Christianity that 
denied and defamed the Jewish roots of that faith.”27 And thus, she gives full-throated 
support to the study of religion: 
Religion is a powerful force, but its impact depends entirely on what it inspires 
people to do. The challenge for policy-makers is to harness the unifying potential 
of faith while containing its capacity to divide. This requires, at a minimum, that 
we see spiritual matters as a subject worth studying. Too often, as the Catholic 
theologian Bryan Hehir notes, “there is an assumption that you do not have to 
understand religion in order to understand the world. You need to understand 
politics, strategy, economics and law, but you do not need to understand religion. 
If you look at standard textbooks of international relations or the way we organize 
our foreign ministry, there’s no place where a sophisticated understanding of 
religion as a public force is dealt with.” …American diplomats will need to take 
Hehir’s advice and think more expansively about the role of religion in foreign 
policy and about their own need for expertise.28 
 
 A decade later, another Secretary of State made similar observations. “One of the 
most interesting challenges we face in global diplomacy today,” wrote John Kerry, “is the 
need to fully understand and engage the great impact that a wide range of religious 
traditions have on foreign affairs.”29 The importance of religion cannot be ignored: 
“…religious actors and institutions are playing an influential role in every region of the 
world and on nearly every issue central to U.S. foreign policy.”30 “Leaders in public life,” 
he wrote, “need to recognize that in a world where people of all religious traditions are 
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27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid. 
29 John Kerry, “Religion and Diplomacy: Toward a better understanding of religion and global affairs,” 




migrating and mingling like never before, we ignore the global impact of religion at our 
peril.”31 As Secretary of State, Kerry decided that “It is not enough just to talk about 
better dialogue” but instead took action by creating the Office of Religion and Global 
Affairs within the State Department.32 “Its mission is clear:” he wrote, “to expand our 
understanding of religious dynamics and engagement with religious actors.”33 In 
summary, Kerry wrote:  
The State Department understands the central role that religion plays in the lives 
of billions across the globe, and we know engagement can open a world of 
possibilities. The challenging array of foreign policy issues we face today 
demands that we recognize a fundamental truth: Our foreign policy needs a more 
sophisticated approach to religion.34 
 
 It is worth noting that both of these Secretaries of State are from Democratic 
Administrations. Contrary to a popular political narrative that sees Republicans as 
friendly to religion and Democrats as a secularizing force (politicians, the press, and 
academics have all asked whether the Democrats have a religion problem35), here we 
                                                          
31 John Kerry, “Religion and Diplomacy: Toward a better understanding of religion and global affairs,” 
America vol. 213, no. 6 (September 14, 2015), p. 14. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., p. 16. 
35 Consider, for example, the following selection of sources: Emma Green, “Democrats Have a Religion 
Problem,” The Atlantic (December 29, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/12/democrats-have-a-religion-problem/510761/;  
Mark Silk, “Do the Democrats have a religion problem?,” Religion News Service (October 31, 2019), 
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Problem’?” Pew Research Center, July 6, 2006, https://www.pewforum.org/2006/07/06/do-the-
democrats-have-a-god-problem/;  David D. Kirkpatrick, “Some Democrats Believe the Party Should Get 
Religion,” The New York Times (November 17, 2004), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/17/politics/some-democrats-believe-the-party-should-get-
religion.html;  Daniel K. Williams, “The Democrats’ Religion Problem,” The New York Times (June 23, 
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have two prominent voices in Democratic Administrations not only taking religion 
seriously, but calling for greater education about religion(s) within the Department of 
State specifically and within the government more generally. Kerry, in particular, had 
been criticized during his presidential campaign for not being Catholic enough: some 
bishops in his own Church publicly did not support him.36 Many commentators have 
contrasted this with John F. Kennedy’s campaign, where in order to win he had to prove 
he was not too Catholic.37 Compare this further to Joe Biden’s recent successful run for 
president. He also had some Catholic bishops opposing him—such as Bishop Thomas 
Tobin of Providence who snidely remarked that there was no Catholic candidate this 
cycle.38 Yet Biden, unlike both Kennedy and Kerry, spoke openly and with ease about his 
faith and his trust in God, quoting Scripture, attending Mass, carrying a rosary with him 
daily, and reciting prayers and hymns.39 Surely something has changed. In any case, the 
recommendations for taking religion(s) seriously in diplomacy and in public policy—as 
something worthy of sophisticated analysis, study, and understanding—bear more weight 
                                                          
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/opinion/democrats-religion-jon-ossoff.html. [All of the 
above accessed 18 April 2021]. 
36 David D. Kirkpatrick and Laurie Goodstein, “Group of Bishops Using Influence to Oppose Kerry,” The 
New York Times (October 12, 2004), https://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/12/politics/campaign/group-of-
bishops-using-influence-to-oppose-kerry.html [Accessed 2 March 2021]. 
37 Richard John Neuhaus noted concerning the election of 1960: “Whatever his intentions might have 
been, then Senator Kennedy was widely perceived to be saying that his Catholicism posed no serious 
threat because he was not a very serious Catholic.” (Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: 
Religion and Democracy in America, second edition (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Company, 1986), p. xi; cf. p. 262). 
38 Jack Perry, “Bishop Tobin stirs up Twitter with Biden tweet,” The Providence Journal (August 12, 2020), 
https://www.providencejournal.com/story/news/coronavirus/2020/08/12/bishop-tobin-stirs-up-twitter-
with-biden-tweet/113796798/ [Accessed 2 March 2021]. 
39 See, for example, Asma Khalid, “How Joe Biden’s Faith Shapes His Politics,” NPR, September 20, 2020, 
https://www.npr.org/2020/09/20/913667325/how-joe-bidens-faith-shapes-his-politics [Accessed 27 
March 2021]. She writes, referring to a Scripture reference Biden made in a speech: “This wasn't a one-off 
religious reference; this is how Biden routinely speaks.” See also Courtney Subramanian, “Biden's faith 
comes through in speech, quoting Catholic hymn and Bible verse,” USA Today (November 7, 2020), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2020/11/07/joe-bidens-faith-comes-through-
speech-quoting-hymn-bible-verse/6210854002/ [Accessed 27 March 2021]. 
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and indicate a new context even more so because they originate from sources not widely 
considered to be very religious. 
6.1.2 Economics and Business 
 The most obvious contextual change that implicates economics and business, and 
by extension education, is the advent of globalization. Miroslav Volf writes that 
“Religion and globalization aren’t two neighbors, each living in its own home separated 
by a tall wall, alternately cooperating, competing, or quarreling.”40 Instead, he argues that 
“Unless we understand these two powerful phenomena in their relation to each other, we 
will neither know what is happening to us and to our world nor be able to act responsibly 
in it.”41 This is because 
More than anything else, with the possible exception of technological innovation, 
globalization and the great world religions are shaping our lives—from the public 
policies of political leaders and the economic decisions of industry bosses, 
investors, and ordinary employees, through the content of the curricula in our 
colleges and universities, all the way to the inner longings of our hearts.42 
 
Developing themes that he says trace their origin to a “Faith and Globalization course 
that Prime Minister Tony Blair and I taught for three semesters at Yale University (2008-
10),”43 Volf defines globalization as “the ‘primarily market-driven and market-values-
embodying-and-promoting’ form of planetary interconnectivity and interdependence and 
a growing sense of humanity’s unity.” He adds, “As I see it, this is only one form of 
                                                          
40 Miroslav Volf, Flourishing: Why We Need Religion in a Globalized World (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 2015), p. 1. 
41 Ibid., p. 2. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid., p. 3. 
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globalization, a form that has become dominant in today’s world.”44 This is indeed a new 
context. 
 The importance of religion in the field of economics may be growing because of 
globalization, but Benjamin Friedman makes the claim that they have been partners from 
the start. “No doubt,” he writes, “economics is far from the only subject of human 
thought and debate that religious thinking has influenced, and continues to influence…”45 
Yet, economics deserves special attention: 
Because it is true that economics emerged from the Enlightenment, and because 
the conventional image of the Enlightenment downplays the importance attached 
to religion in favor of humanistic thinking, the commonplace assumption is that 
economics in turn likewise stands apart from religious ideas. This is not true, nor 
has it been, ever since the inception of economics as a modern intellectual 
discipline. Taking account of the influence of religious thinking is essential to a 
full understanding of one of the great areas of modern human thought.46 
 
This is yet more powerful evidence of a post-secular context, a new era, a time ripe for 
the introduction of the study of religion(s) into the curriculum. 
6.1.3 Sociology and Political Philosophy 
 In 1984, Richard John Neuhaus coined the term “the naked public square” to 
describe the American socio-political context that resulted from what he believed was a 
misreading of the First Amendment. He wrote,  
The naked public square is the result of political doctrine and practice that would 
exclude religion and religiously grounded values from the conduct of public 
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business. The doctrine is that America is a secular society. It finds dogmatic 
expression in the ideology of secularism.47 
 
 Significantly, he recognized that “the public square will not and cannot remain naked.”48 
He claimed that “If it is not clothed with the ‘meanings’ borne by religion, new 
‘meanings’ will be imposed by virtue of the ambitions of the modern state.”49 He said 
emphatically, “…it cannot be denied that the variant [of humanism] called secular 
humanism has had a pervasive and debilitating effect upon our public life.”50 And so he 
made an urgent appeal: “Whatever our political persuasion, if we care about a democratic 
future, we have a deep stake in reconstructing a politics that was not begun by and cannot 
be sustained by the myth of secular America.”51 
 At the heart of his argument against secularism and for the proper reintroduction 
of religion into the public square is the First Amendment. Neuhaus believed that 
secularism had distorted the meaning of religious liberty: 
One idea that has been insinuated and legally rooted is a peculiar reading of what 
the First Amendment means for “the separation of church and state.” It is not, as 
some fundamentalists complain, that God has been taken out of our public schools 
or out of our public life. God, being God, cannot be “taken out” of anything. It is 
the case that truth claims and normative ethics that have specific reference to God 
or religion have been, at least in theory, excluded.52 
 
                                                          
47 Richard John Neuhaus, The Naked Public Square: Religion and Democracy in America, second edition 
(Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1986), p. ix. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. “The emptiness of the public square will be filled by a state-promulgated civil religion, which poses 
a threat of totalitarianism… Or the emptiness will continue until the public square is finally invaded by one 
or another existing belief system, whether of the left or the right” (p. 99). 
50 Ibid., p. 25, italics in the original. 
51 Ibid., p. 113. 
52 Ibid., p. 25. 
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 For Neuhaus, witnessing the rise of the religious right in American politics 
through the Moral Majority, a significant problem was apparent: 
A dilemma, both political and theological, facing the religious new right is simply 
this: it wants to enter the political arena making public claims on the basis of 
private truths. The integrity of politics itself requires that such a proposal be 
resisted. Public decisions must be made by arguments that are public in 
character.53 
  
He nonetheless agreed with the Moral Majority’s diagnosis: “We insist that we are a 
democratic society, yet we have… systematically excluded from policy consideration the 
operative values of the American people, values that are overwhelmingly grounded in 
religious belief.”54 Neuhaus, though, called for public reason, a term that for him is far 
more respectful of religion and religious values, and far less individualistic, than the same 
term applied by Rawls.55  
 Has the situation changed since Neuhaus wrote? I think so. The strongest 
evidence regards the work of Jürgen Habermas. Whether Habermas is familiar with 
Neuhaus’ work across the Atlantic, I do not know. He has, however, clearly moved away 
from endorsing the “naked public square” in liberal democracies to a more generous 
understanding of public reason that accommodates religious believers. Whereas his 
earlier work exemplified a secularist perspective, his later work is, using his own 
terminology, post-secular.56 He believes we are in a new context that requires attention to 
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54 Ibid., p. 37. 
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56 He writes, “…it is in the interest of the constitutional state to deal carefully with all the cultural sources 
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phrase: ‘postsecular society’… This refers not only to the fact that religion is holding its own in an 
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religion(s) and religious values.57 After the terrorist attack of 9/11, Habermas delivered 
his famous “Faith and Knowledge” acceptance speech for the Peace Prize of the German 
Book Trade in October of 2001. In this speech, “Habermas develops the idea that the 
secularization hypothesis has now lost its explanatory power and that religion and the 
secular world always stand in reciprocal relation.”58 In his earlier writings, Habermas had 
fully supported the secularization hypothesis. Reder and Schmidt summarize his position 
this way: 
Habermas [in 1987] assumes that, with the development of modern democratic 
society, the function of religion is essentially transferred to secularized 
communicative reason: “…the socially integrative and expressive functions that 
were at first fulfilled by ritual practice pass over to communicative action; the 
authority of the holy is gradually replaced by the authority of an achieved 
consensus” … Underlying this assessment is the basic idea of communicative 
action, which states that communicatively acting persons reach agreements 
concerning their normative validity claims through rational argument and “only 
those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or could meet) with the approval of 
                                                          
increasingly secular environment and that society must assume that religious fellowships will continue to 
exist for the foreseeable future. The expression ‘postsecular’ does more than give public recognition to 
religious fellowships in view of the functional contribution they make to the reproduction of motivations 
and attitudes that are societally desirable. The public awareness of a post-secular society also reflects a 
normative insight that has consequences for the political dealings of unbelieving citizens with believing 
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that their citizens are living in a secularized society.” (Jürgen Habermas, “Notes on a Post-secular Society,” 
June 18, 2008, http://www.signandsight.com/features/1714.html [Accessed 3 March 2021]). 
58 Michael Reder and Josef Schmidt, “Habermas and Religion,” in Jürgen Habermas et al., An Awareness of 
What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age, Ciaran Cronin, transl. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 
2010), p. 6.  
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all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical discourse… Religion is 
in danger of blocking precisely this communicative action because it does not 
leave the religious participants in discourse free to enter the presuppositionless 
space of rational communication, but instead equips them with clear directives 
concerning the goal of the discourse.59 
 
 Compare that position to what he says in his “Faith and Knowledge” speech and 
we see that we are in a new intellectual space: 
…the search for reasons that aspire to general acceptance need not lead to an 
unfair exclusion of religion from public life, and secular society, for its part, need 
not cut itself off from the important resources of spiritual explanations, if only the 
secular side were to retain a feeling for the articulative power of religious 
discourse. The boundaries between secular and religious reasons are, after all, 
tenuous. Therefore, fixing of this controversial boundary should be understood as 
a cooperative venture, carried on by both sides, and with each side trying to see 
the issue from the other’s perspective.60 
 
Habermas has come to this new respect for the religious voice qua religious voice 
in public discourse through a double necessity. One the one hand, religion(s) aren’t going 
away. He recognizes that the secularization theory is no longer convincing. On the other 
hand, he finds that “…practical reason fails to fulfill its own vocation when it no longer 
has sufficient strength to awaken, and to keep awake, in the minds of secular subjects, an 
awareness of the violations of solidarity throughout the world, an awareness of what is 
missing, of what cries out to heaven.”61 He worries, in other words, that by neglecting 
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“the unexhausted force [das Unabgegoltene] of religious traditions,”62 we neglect a 
strong source of motivation to pursue the common good and “…resources of meaning, 
solidarity, and justice which are becoming depleted.”63 Radical individualism, guided by 
the profit motive and a political overemphasis on individual rights, has led to “a 
breakdown in solidarity”64 and in the social cohesion needed to sustain society. 
“[R]eligion can provide ‘stronger impulses towards action in solidarity’, can help 
overcome the ‘motivational weakness of a (purely) rational morality’, and can ‘offer life 
within community for the support of secular morality’.”65 
 Thus, the same Habermas who once thought religious voices were uniquely 
unsuited for, and disruptive to, public discourse now claims that denying religious 
citizens their rightful voice also deprives the larger public of a spiritual resource that 
ultimately helps protect liberal democracies from radical individualism and moral 
atrophy. And so he makes a claim in political philosophy that is indicative of our new 
context:  
…the secular state… must also face the question of whether it is imposing 
asymmetrical obligations on its religious citizens… May the state require these 
citizens to split their existence into public and private parts, for example by 
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62 Ibid., p. 18. 
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obligating them to justify their stances in the political arena exclusively in terms 
of non-religious reasons?... This not only raises the question of the subsequent 
translation of their rational content into a publicly accessible language. Rather, the 
liberal state must also expect its secular citizens, in exercising their role as 
citizens, not to treat religious expressions as simply irrational. Given the spread of 
a naturalism based on a naïve faith in science, this presupposition cannot be taken 
for granted.66 
 
Not only does this indicate a new context, a post-secular context, but it also 
validates an approach to public education that helps form the civic skills necessary for the 
“complementary learning process in which the secular and the religious sides involve one 
another…”67 It validates an approach to the teaching and learning of religion(s) that goes 
beyond learning about and includes learning from. Now is the time! 
6.1.4 Academia 
 Finally, another indicator that we are in a post-secular period that is uniquely 
conducive to the introduction of religion in the curriculum of public schools comes from 
academia. Because most of our students are being prepared for college, and because 
colleges and universities have tremendous influence in setting the educational agenda, the 
shift in academia concerning the study of religion(s) matters. 
 In a 2018 publication entitled The Resilience of Religion in American Higher 
Education, authors John Schmalzbauer and Kathleen A. Mahoney examine evidence that 
higher education is not the thoroughly secularized space that is often imagined. 
According to one review, their research “finds faith alive and well in American higher 
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education. The authors find that resilience evident both at public and private 
institutions.”68 The publisher writes: 
The Resilience of Religion in American Higher Education documents a surprising 
openness to religion in collegiate communities. Schmalzbauer and Mahoney … 
highlight growing interest in the study of religion across the disciplines, as well as 
a willingness to acknowledge the intellectual relevance of religious commitments 
… Finally, the volume chronicles the diversification of student religious life, 
revealing the longevity of campus spirituality … Far from irrelevant, religion 
matters in higher education.69 
 
 Another set of scholars have reached a similar conclusion. Douglas Jacobsen and 
Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen describe the ethos of American colleges and universities since 
the 1960’s. “These institutions shifted from being quietly secular institutions like 
[William F.] Buckley’s Yale to being more visibly secularist institutions where religion 
was intentionally pushed to the side.”70 This followed a period of renewed academic 
interest in religion(s) in the mid-twentieth century, during which, according to Martin 
Marty, “religious studies began to make a surprising and organized return to higher 
education.”71 Marty reports that, “In the course of half a century, tax-supported 
universities with visible religious studies programs increased from a handful to more than 
nine hundred.”72 Yet, under the throes of the secularization hypothesis, most people 
                                                          
68 Scott Jaschik, “‘The Resilience of Religion in American Higher Education’,” Inside Higher Ed (January 11, 
2019), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2019/01/11/authors-discuss-their-new-book-religion-
american-higher-education [Accessed 6 March 2021]. 
69 Baylor University Press, “The Resilience of Religion in American Higher Education by John Schmalzbauer 
and Kathleen A. Mahoney,” https://www.baylorpress.com/9781481308717/the-resilience-of-religion-in-
american-higher-education/ [Accessed 6 March 2021]. 
70 Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen in Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen, 
eds., The American University in a Postsecular Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 9. 
71 Martin E. Marty, Education, Religion, and the Common Good: Advancing a Distinctly American 
Conversation About Religion’s Role in Our Shared Life (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2000), p. 109. 
72 Ibid. For a more detailed account, see George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From 
Protestant Establishment to Established Nonbelief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Marsden 
writes, for example, “By 1940, not only did virtually all church-related colleges have departments of 
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accepted the secularist arrangement according to the Jacobsens. “If religion was wielding 
less and less influence in society and might soon effectively disappear, why study 
religion at all?”73 They acknowledge that the religious studies departments continued to 
exist, and that “religion… continue[d] to be a subject for analysis in some history, 
anthropology, and sociology departments.”74 Nonetheless, “Religion as a source of 
inspiration or insight concerning human life and thought was rejected… it was not to be 
discussed as an encounter with God or a source of transcendent value.”75 By the end of 
the century, George Marsden was complaining that: 
Today nonsectarianism has come to mean the exclusion of all religious concerns. 
In effect, only purely naturalistic viewpoints are allowed a serious academic 
hearing. As in earlier establishments, groups who do not match the current 
national ideological norms are forced to fend for themselves outside of the major 
spheres of cultural influence. Today, almost all religious groups, no matter what 
their academic credentials, are on the outside… or soon will be…76 
 
 Yet, in a new millennium, something new is happening. The Jacobsens, like so 
many others, note that the secularization hypothesis has not panned out and that religions 
are thriving. “[A] cultural consensus has emerged: religion will likely exercise a 
significant role in human affairs for a long time to come… Religion is not 
                                                          
religion, but so did the vast majority of private colleges and universities, and even 30 percent of state 
universities… Only 27 percent of nationally accredited colleges had no formal offerings on religious topics. 
So great was the increase, especially after 1930, that Clarence Shedd of Yale, one of the leaders in the 
movement, could declare confidently in 1941 that ‘state universities are more concerned today about 
religion than they have been at any time during the present century.’ Although these gains appeared 
considerable, … In a typical year, only about one in twenty-five students at public universities was taking a 
religion course” (p. 337). 
73 Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen in Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen, 
eds., The American University in a Postsecular Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 9 
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
76 George M. Marsden, The Soul of the American University: From Protestant Establishment to Established 
Nonbelief (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 440.  
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disappearing.”77 In fact, they attribute the rise of the New Atheist movement to this 
changed context. “It is no wonder,” they write, “that people like Richard Dawkins, Daniel 
C. Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens have recently published hyperbolically 
critical accounts of religion and its dangers. They sense that the tide has changed…”78 
 What does this new context look like from the vantage point of higher education? 
The Jacobsens write that, “Today religion is everywhere, and it may be more visible at 
colleges and universities than anywhere else.”79 This presence is both diverse and 
pronounced. It calls for something new: 
In many ways it was easier for universities back in the heyday of secularization 
when religion was unobtrusive… Religion could be considered a bit 
anachronistic, yet still maintain a place in the curriculum. Scholars have never 
disputed its immense historical significance, nor have they questioned that ancient 
and contemporary religious texts and practices contribute to the social, economic, 
and political structures of a given culture. But treating religion as a subject that 
might appeal to someone’s historical or social scientific curiosity is far different 
from seeing religion as a valid source of human meaning, as a driving force in 
scholarly research, or a core concern for higher education.80 
 
Surely, American universities have not yet fully emerged from their secularized 
chrysalis, but the movement is already underway. The Jacobsens write, “While it may 
have made sense to ignore religion when everyone thought it was fading away, that 
stance is no longer viable. Whether one likes religion or not, it is time to take it seriously 
and address issues of religion head-on.”81 It took time for American colleges and 
universities to become secularized. Now, the pendulum is swinging the other way, and a 
                                                          
77 Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen in Douglas Jacobsen and Rhonda Hustedt Jacobsen, 
eds., The American University in a Postsecular Age (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 10. 
78 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
79 Ibid., p. 13. 
80 Ibid., p. 14. 
81 Ibid., p. 11. 
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process of de-secularization is taking place. But unlike a pendulum, it is not leading back 
to the place of origin. Establishment is not where we are headed in higher education. This 
new arrangement that is coming into being is indeed something new, something post-
secular. 
Strong evidence of this transition comes from Harvard University, surely both a 
bastion of secularized academia and perhaps a bellwether. Writing for Newsweek, Lisa 
Miller captured the situation well: 
Religion at Harvard doesn’t even merit its own department… A Committee on the 
Study of Religion oversees the courses, but it can’t hire and fire, and it can’t grant 
tenure. Diana Eck, the top scholar of world religions who runs the program, 
argues that its second-class status prevents it from drawing the biggest talent to 
campus… Undergraduates with more than a passing interest in religion are 
pointed to the Divinity School, half a mile away from Harvard Yard… Even now, 
in an era when a presidential candidate cannot get elected without a convincing 
“faith narrative,” the scholars who study belief continue to reside in the Divinity 
School, and when the subject of religion comes up, the scholars on the Faculty of 
Arts and Sciences sniff at its seriousness.82 
  
No one sniffed at its seriousness in 2006 more than the staunch secularist Steven 
Pinker when a faculty committee tasked with changing the undergraduate core 
curriculum came back with a proposal that all students be required to study “Reason and 
Faith.” Pinker led the faculty resistance that ultimately replaced the requirement with a 
“Culture and Belief” component, which has since also been changed. Now, religious-
themed general education courses fall under “Aesthetics and Culture” or “Ethics and 
Civics” requirements.83 Pinker, an evolutionary psychologist usually listed among the 
                                                          
82 Lisa Miller, “Why Harvard Students Should Study More Religion,” Newsweek (February 10, 2010), 
https://www.newsweek.com/why-harvard-students-should-study-more-religion-75231 [Accessed 5 
March 2021]. 
83 Harvard College Program in General Education, “Requirements,” 
https://gened.fas.harvard.edu/requirements [Accessed 6 March 2021]. 
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intellectual New Atheists, may well have been like Harris and Hitchens in the Jacobsens’ 
analysis: reacting strongly out of a defensive recognition that the tide has changed. 
 Concerning Harvard, the Jacobsens sum up the situation and its import: 
The course requirement was ratcheted down, but the Harvard report still strongly 
defends the inclusion of religion in the curriculum. It declares, “Religion has 
historically been, and continues to be, a force shaping identity and behavior 
throughout the world. Harvard is a secular institution, but religion is an important 
part of our students’ lives.” … The university is indeed “resolutely secular”—it 
studies the world as it really exists. But it is not a place dedicated to secularism, to 
the removal of religion from the hallowed halls of learning or from the world at 
large.84 
 
Miller, having noted both the continued relevance of religion in the world and the 
increased presence of religion among students on the Harvard campus, poignantly notes 
that “To dismiss the importance of the study of faith—especially now—out of academic 
narrow-mindedness is less than unhelpful. It's unreasonable.”85 It seems, though, that the 
university is not dismissing the study of faith at all, but grappling with how it fits into the 
curriculum. In other words, it is feeling the birth pangs of the post-secular age, an age in 
which religion continues to matter and demands to be taken seriously in our schools, 
colleges, and universities. 
6.2 The Meaningful Inclusion Approach (MIA) 
 The post-secular context calls for a bold re-thinking of the place of religion in 
American public education. Unfortunately, most of the initiatives that have been 
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proposed require only minor adjustments to the current system: an added course or two 
here, a tweaking of textbooks there. One exception is Nel Noddings, who proposes 
thoroughgoing changes in how we think about and organize schools.86 Her approach to 
religion and existential questions is closest to my own, though I do not think she goes far 
enough. Noddings sees no need for separate courses for the study of religion(s) but 
instead favors the natural inclusion approach. She writes, 
Although a complete course in religious thought would be a welcome addition to 
the curriculum, such a course is not necessarily the best way to emphasize our 
concern. When students hear about religious and moral issues in all of their 
regular classes, they are more likely to be persuaded that we really do regard these 
matters as important.87 
 
Her point is valid. We should indeed teach religion(s) across the curriculum. This is the 
“natural inclusion” argument; and it is a critical corrective to the hostility of neglect. It is 
the essential first step in the Meaningful Inclusion Approach. Noddings has the broadest 
understanding of natural inclusion that I have encountered. Far from limiting it to obvious 
cases, such as discussing religious motivations behind the Civil Rights movement or 
thinking through the ethics of human cloning or psychological experimentation for 
example, she finds opportunities to discuss religion and existential questions in just about 
every corner, even in math class.88 
                                                          
86 She says, for example, “The traditional organization of schooling is intellectually and morally inadequate 
for contemporary society.” (Nel Noddings, The Challenge to Care in Schools: An Alternative Approach to 
Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 2005), p. 173). 
87 Nel Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College, 1993), p. 1. She 
says further, “The discussion so far suggests that this vital material on belief and unbelief not be made a 
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formal curriculum is cast far too specifically and rigidly, examined unappreciatively by partisan and 
sectarian eyes, evaluated by student achievement, and—worst of all—made intolerably boring to all but a 
handful of students passionately interested in the subject” (p. 134). 
88 Ibid., pp. 1ff. 
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 Noddings is correct that including religious and moral questions across the 
curriculum signifies to students that these issues matter. However, this is only one 
signifier, and another is needed. Students know that a subject matter is considered 
important and worthy of study when it has a permanent place in the formal curriculum. 
Indeed, the more important the subject matter, the more secure its place in the 
curriculum. Students know that we take mathematics seriously, for example, because it 
has a regular place in the K-12 curriculum. They expect to study math just about every 
year, if not every year. On the other hand, students sense that our communities really 
don’t value art or physical education as strongly. Those subjects make appearances in the 
curriculum, usually not even earning full-time status, and they disappear quickly with 
budget cuts and when government-set standards lead to a laser-focus on other subject 
areas deemed more important. Most students do not study art every year, nor do they take 
gym classes every year. Though we might give lip service to their importance, kids know 
that that what we really value is securely a part of the regular curriculum. Math matters; 
gym and art do not. For that reason, among others, we should introduce the study of 
religion(s) into the curriculum as a standard longitudinal course of study, not an 
enrichment course, not an elective, and certainly not a piece of curricular jewelry—an 
adornment that can be removed when the budget gets tight. 
 The Meaningful Inclusion Approach requires that the study of religion(s) be 
included in the formal curriculum of public school students from kindergarten through 
twelfth grade. The subject matter is critical and it deserves the full attention of the 
educational establishment and our students. To signify even further that the study of 
religion(s) is indispensable, it should be evaluated as part of a school or school district’s 
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accreditation process. Teachers who instruct in this area should be professionals educated 
in the discipline. Nothing short of this does justice to the enormous reality of religion in 
the world; its power for good and evil; its capacity for promoting peace and human 
dignity or for promoting war and oppression; its ability to give meaning and motivation 
to people’s lives; its influence on everything from family life and community to politics, 
economics, and global environmental responsibility. Furthermore, because human life 
involves existential, moral, and spiritual questions that cannot be adequately addressed 
(or addressed at all) by an educational system in servitude to scientism, secularism, and 
the market economy, a revolution in education is needed. Religions offer ethical visions 
for thoughtful consideration, visions whose grounding claims to be not an “overlapping 
consensus” concerning individual rights and constitutional procedures, but the solid 
ground of an Ultimate Horizon. Students have a right and a need to ask spiritual questions 
and to reflect on the purpose of their lives and our lives together. Education worth its 
name should accompany students in searching for the truth and exploring the long history 
of ideas and commitments that have shaped the human person and society. Students 
should feel at home in their schools asking the most important human questions about 
whether there is a God, whether the human being has an eternal soul, whether there is life 
after death, whether our behavior in this life matters in regards to our eternal destiny, and 
whether faith is a reasonable act of the human heart and mind. We can welcome them 
into the great conversations of philosophy and religion without proselytizing, judging, or 
betraying the First Amendment. To do that, though, we need educators who are experts in 
the field—in both content and appropriate pedagogy. The study of religion(s) must 
become one of the core components of the public school curriculum. 
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 One concern will immediately be the cost. This is a red herring! We know quite 
well that budgets reflect values. When something is as important as the study of 
religion(s), we will find the funding and make it happen. The real question is not the cost, 
but whether we have sufficiently convinced people of the seriousness of the proposal. 
Any major campaign for curricular reform faces the same challenge: inertia. This force 
can be overcome only through a successful communications effort that brings 
stakeholders on board. The seriousness of the issue is worth that effort, and is worth the 
cost in dollars as well. 
A legitimate concern might be that by including religion(s) in the curriculum from 
K-12, it will become stale and boring very quickly. That need not be the case. 
Pedagogical transitions at key points in a student’s career will keep the study fresh and 
relevant. These same transitions will accomplish three of the aims we have already 
discussed: building bridges and forming solidarity through encounter, practicing the art of 
dialogue that will promote peace and the common good, and learning how to translate 
between secular languages and religious languages as citizens committed to democratic 
participation. These three aims are not distinct and they certainly all have a place 
throughout the years of study; nonetheless, each of the three is more appropriate at a 
given stage of a young person’s development and therefore more pronounced at a specific 
moment in the curriculum. 
6.2.1 Primary School      
 From roughly grades K-5 the focus of the study of religion(s) is on encounter. 
This is where the preposition about is most appropriate: students in K-5 are learning 
about religions and religious people, and learning that there are also people without 
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religion and/or who do not believe in God or gods. Above all, we are introducing young 
people to the wide world around them, a world of diversity and wonder. While some of 
this may already be taking place elsewhere in the curriculum—in a geography class, for 
instance—it is important that now it have its own place in the curriculum. It should be a 
part of every student’s course work each academic year, exploring new religions each 
year, and filling the calendar every year with holidays and festivals that are not only 
secular but religious as well. 
Although the focus will be on learning about religions, we must remember that 
learning from religions will naturally take place as well. Good teachers are already quite 
adept at encouraging students to draw knowledge, wisdom, morals, and meaning from 
secular sources; there is no reason they should not do the same, judiciously, with 
religious sources. As I write, it is concurrently the feast of Passover in Judaism, Palm 
Sunday in much of Christianity, and Holi in Hinduism, Jainism, Sikhism, and among 
some Buddhists. Rather than pretend these holy or festival days do not exist, we do well 
to highlight them, imagine why they are important—even central—to the lives of 
believers, and to encourage students to think critically about lessons they might take 
away from these sacred celebrations. Although the themes come from religious sources, 
should we not want all children to celebrate the liberation of slaves, to consider the nature 
of betrayal, to celebrate the victory of good over evil, and to think about the meaning of 
springtime as a season of new life? There is much that a child can learn from these 
religious holidays and holy days that helps them to grow as mature and ethical human 




Remembering that the ultimate goal of including religion(s) in the curriculum is to 
promote a more peaceful society through encounter and solidarity, the selection of which 
religions to study will relate to their relative proximity to this goal. The choice of what to 
study, then, should be based on three criteria: 1) Religions or worldviews that are 
included have global and/or historical significance that require study in order to promote 
peaceful coexistence in a globalized world; or, alternatively, they have an important local 
presence; 2) No religion or worldview is denied a place in the curriculum a priori, but 
only based on the previous rule; and 3) Religions or worldviews that demonstrably 
undermine the goals of encounter, solidarity, dialogue, and peaceful coexistence in a 
pluralist society may be studied, but only under the critical lens appropriate to high 
school students. Thus, some agitator might demand that students in kindergarten learn 
about the Church of the Flying Spaghetti Monster. The request will surely be considered 
(rule 2, because the First Amendment demands neutrality); however, it will likely not 
make the cut (it is difficult to imagine that it meets either requirement of rule 1). On the 
other hand, while including the study of Amish communities might not make the cut in 
every school system since it does not have global significance, it may make it into 
schools in communities with a large presence of Amish. Every school system, though, 
would study Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism, among others, 
simply because of the global and historical significance of each. The growing importance 
of humanism worldwide in its many forms (spanning from atheistic and secular on one 
end to religious on the other) make it an important candidate for study as well. 
Some studies, though, must wait until high school (rule 3). For example, it is 
important for promoting a peaceful world community that students understand something 
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about Wahhabism; however, the critical thinking required is appropriate only to later 
secondary school students. Even then, justice requires that this not be a student’s only 
encounter with Islam. Students will be best served by encountering some of the wide 
diversity of lived expressions within the religion, including Sunnism, Shi’ism, and 
Sufism.  
In all of this, the buy-in required from the public will be critical, and here the 
Modesto Model is indeed worth imitating and further developing. When the various 
stakeholders know what this new approach is about and understand that there will be no 
proselytizing and no denigration of either particular religious faiths or belief/unbelief in 
general, then they will be more likely to support the curriculum and its goals.  
An objection may arise that teachers may miss the mark, either unintentionally 
distorting the message and meaning of a particular faith community or intentionally 
violating neutrality and subverting the study of religion(s). The first case is not a reason 
for significant worry. Noddings writes, 
We profess the fear that teachers do not have the competence to teach the required 
material, but a considerable number of practicing teachers of mathematics do not 
have the mathematical competence of a proficient high school calculus student. 
Yet we do not abandon mathematics teaching. Mathematics is important… and 
we keep trying to improve both teaching and curriculum. An acknowledgement of 
the importance of intelligent belief or unbelief should induce similar efforts.89 
   
The critical nature of the material makes the risk of individual errors worth taking. Good, 
reliable, and well-crafted textbooks will be crucial and will help mitigate the risk. 
Moreover, because the study of religion(s) will be stretched over the course of many 
                                                          




years and will include many teachers, there will be a diluting effect and a built-in 
corrective. One teacher’s error may be corrected by others and may diminish in 
importance in the overall arc of the curriculum. Regular professional development and 
online educator communities will also help to minimize this problem. Most directly, a 
parent or colleague who recognizes that something has been misunderstood and/or 
communicated wrongly to students can always take the teacher aside and educate them. 
This is the most direct form of professional development. In any case, teachers want to do 
their job well and are eager to learn new material and new methods. The fear that an error 
here or there will ruin the project is unfounded. 
 An intentional violation of neutrality, on the other hand, is more serious. Still, it is 
not a significant enough issue to derail the entire proposal. After all, there are already 
violations of neutrality in the schools. Parental involvement and communication with 
administrators is usually enough to address the problem. In rare cases, a school board or 
court challenge is required. This is a good system, and it will continue to serve us well. 
Watchdog agencies already exist, and they will surely continue to keep the public schools 
in line as they have regarding the school prayer and Bible reading decisions. For those 
who fear that the risk of litigation will increase and be costly, I make three arguments. 
First, the cost to society of not teaching about religion(s) is already too high (and is 
already an unconstitutional violation of neutrality) and outweighs the putative cost of 
litigation. Second, with community buy-in, the risk of litigation declines significantly 
(again, consider the Modesto Model as evidence). Third, with proper administrator and 
teaching training, fear of litigation will give way to confidence about the constitutionality 
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of the project and the importance of remedying any violations of neutrality in-house and 
immediately. 
Despite the possibility of subversion, the Meaningful Inclusion Approach trusts 
teachers as the professionals they are. Elementary school teachers are the general 
practitioners of the education world. The work they do with students across multiple 
disciplines is truly astounding. We should expect that they are capable of adding one 
more specialty to their qualifications, and trust that they will do it well. Schools of 
Education will have to adjust to be sure that primary school teachers have the necessary 
knowledge and competencies to implement this component of the curriculum. The 
production of quality textbooks and teaching materials, professional development offered 
by school districts, online courses and summer institutes at Schools of Education, and 
professional forums will all be essential for successful implementation of the curriculum. 
 A mistake in other proposals for teaching about religion(s) is that they add one 
course to the high school curriculum to accomplish what I am describing here as 
encounter. High school is too late. Middle school is also too late. The type of learning 
involved in encounter is natural to our youngest learners. They have a natural curiosity 
about the world and their place in it. It is exciting to them to meet new people and to 
learn about their traditions. Introducing them to the rituals, symbols, basic doctrines, 
beliefs, sacred texts, and cultures of various religions is fun and lends itself to 
differentiated instruction. 
 With this age group, there is no need to address the negative aspects of the various 
religions. Showing religious people and nonreligious people in their best light is 
appropriate. Because we are spreading the study of religion(s) over the entire course of a 
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student’s public school career, we can afford to postpone the critical analysis until later, 
when students’ are developmentally ready. The goal for this age group is encounter: to 
know that the other exists and to form an attitude of both tolerance for diversity and, even 
better, respect and solidarity. Thus, an approach such as the Modesto Model, which 
though it does not stand on its own as a sufficient curriculum for the study of religion(s), 
could nonetheless work very well if adjusted for this age group as a component of the 
overall curriculum. 
The Modesto Model and similar approaches aim to avoid controversy and to 
simply teach about religion. But, even in elementary school, the line between learning 
about and learning from religion will be indistinct. As we have already noted, this is a 
natural part of learning: there is no truly objective learning; we always learn from that 
which we study. Moreover, it is nothing to fear. As Dermot Lane notes, “Learning from 
religion … does not contain any intention of conversion. Furthermore, learning from 
religion requires the exercises of empathy and imagination—activities required in the 
teaching and learning of other subjects in the curriculum.”90 Learning from religion(s) 
simply intends to enhance/inspire the spiritual and ethical life/journey of each person, 
regardless of the personal path, or no path, that they choose. Rather than pretend that 
learning from does not take place, we should embrace the engagement of empathy and 
imagination that are so rich among primary school learners. Asking them to imagine life 
in another’s shoes can lead to reducing the sense of otherness and building the social 
                                                          
90 Dermot A. Lane, Religion and Education: Re-Imagining the Relationship (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 
2013), p. 26. 
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bridges that we need for a peaceful civilization. It will likely help them to know their own 
shoes better as well. 
Students, even at a young age, will readily learn lessons from the study of 
religions that are desirable learning outcomes: the universality of the Golden Rule and the 
importance of family and community, for example. They may also pick up bits of 
wisdom and truth from the various traditions that impact them personally, such as the 
Hindu respect for all forms of life or the Shinto reverence for ancestors. This may worry 
some parents and may be called into question by some secularists, and so the Meaningful 
Inclusion Approach must include instruction for administrators and school boards on 
First Amendment law, and it must include community forums to listen to and address 
concerns. On this particular issue of learning from religion, I agree with Dermot Lane 
who writes, 
…religious identity is not something that is given or fixed or determined at birth 
or at childhood or adulthood, out of which one then decides to enter or not enter 
into a relationship with other religions. Identity is shaped in and through dialogue, 
in and through relationships and the deepening of relationships. It is important 
that children from an early age have a respect for, and an appreciation of, other 
religions… Further, it is also emerging from seasoned practitioners of 
interreligious relations that the experience of and encounter with other religions 
not only promotes tolerance and respect, but also deepens and enriches one’s own 
religious identity.91 
 
Sharing this with parents would not only quell some fears but also invite them to continue 
to share their own religious traditions at home, knowing that what happens in the school 
will not denigrate but rather enrich the experience. Good education in the school never 
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2013), p. 51. 
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replaces the parental duty of education in the home; and good home-school partnerships 
are key to educational success. 
 As elementary school educators know well, the success of the curriculum also 
depends on students being engaged in their own learning: asking and answering 
questions, telling stories, making connections, and demonstrating what they know and 
have learned through art, theater, music, etc. Teachers who are well-prepared will have 
an eye to heading off tokenism and disrespectful forms of cultural appropriation. They 
will be keen to turning such circumstances into learning opportunities. They will also be 
prepared for students whose initial reaction to diversity is to label and judge: people who 
look, believe, dress, or are otherwise different from themselves are “weird.”92 The 
strategies of a good anti-bullying program will be helpful here.93 
 One goal in learning about the various religious and nonreligious traditions is for 
students to locate places on the globe where a given way of life is prevalent. In every 
case, we want our students to know that people who follow this particular worldview are 
also present here in the United States. They should come away from their education 
feeling proud of a country that welcomes people of every creed and none. By fourth or 
fifth grade, they should be able to speak intelligently for their age and development, 
                                                          
92 I find that a helpful tool comes from St. Thérèse of Lisieux, who, like Jesus, preferred to teach using 
images that were common and accessible. Thus, she says, “Jesus deigned to teach me this mystery. He set 
before me the book of nature; I understood how all the flowers He has created are beautiful, how the 
splendor of the rose and the whiteness of the Lily do not take away the perfume of the little violet or the 
delicate simplicity of the daisy. I understood that if all the flowers wanted to be roses, nature would lose 
her springtime beauty, and the fields would no longer be decked out with little wild flowers.” This kind of 
parable need not come from a religious source to be a useful tool for instructing young children on the 
beauty of diversity and difference. (Thérèse of Lisieux, Story of a Soul: The Autobiography of St. Thérèse of 
Lisieux, John Clarke, transl. (Washington, D.C.: ICS Publications, 1976), p. 14). 
93 I make some practical suggestions in my book Teaching Kids to Respect Others: Reflections, Activities 
and Prayers on Bullying and Prejudice (New London, CT: Twenty-third Publications, 2018).  
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about religious freedom, the First Amendment, the separation of church and state, and 
religious pluralism. A healthy patriotism should be balanced with a genuine sense of 
connection to people around the globe, a sense of caring, and a sense of solidarity. 
6.2.2 Middle School  
 By middle school the excitement of learning about different religions and 
religious customs will have largely subsided. The focal point of instruction, therefore, 
will have to shift away from encounter. Middle school students are beginning to think 
abstractly and critically. They push the boundaries of authority to assert independence. 
Friendships and fitting into the crowd take on a heightened importance, as does the 
conflicting drive towards individuality and self-discovery. With the onset of puberty, 
questions of sexuality and relationships become especially important, and likewise, 
varying levels of confidence and insecurity become pronounced as self-esteem suddenly 
matters more than ever before. Students in this age group experience new emotions, 
including the darker feelings of human life such as depression and loneliness. Along with 
all these changes, they have new questions about life and their place in the world. This is 
the prime time for the study of religion(s) to shift into existential, spiritual, and moral 
mode, inviting students to bring the very questions and concerns they have about life into 
dialogue with the great religious and spiritual traditions in the search of meaning. 
 The Meaning Inclusion Approach changes emphasis from primarily learning 
about religion(s) to learning from religion(s) when students enter middle school. The key 
pedagogical tool is no longer encounter but dialogue. Students are invited into the Great 
Conversations that both religious and secular minds have engaged in since the dawn of 
humanity, assured that their contributions to the dialogue are important and unique, for 
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no one has ever been them before. No one has had their experiences, their feelings, their 
friendships, their concerns, and their personality before. In all of human history, they are 
indeed unique. This is important for middle school students to know. Their uniqueness 
makes them uniquely valuable as well. Just as we treasure a rare gem more than others, 
so too their inherent dignity lies partly in the fact of their singularity. From this starting 
point, where their voice in the dialogue is affirmed, we invite them to consider that 
despite each of our unique experiences there are many things that human beings have in 
common. We invite them not only to contribute to the dialogue, in other words, but to 
listen in order to learn and to grow. 
Without ever endorsing one religion over another, or religion over nonreligion, 
we invite students to engage with the expectation that something from the religious and 
nonreligious traditions may speak to them in their circumstances. We invite them to 
engage critically to determine what sounds like wisdom and what doesn’t ring true. We 
help them to avoid snap judgments, stereotypes, and generalizations, and we coach them 
to be careful listeners who have the aim of genuinely understanding what other voices are 
saying. This is the heart of dialogue and the way in which dialogue promotes learning 
from religion, a concept first developed by Michael Grimmitt to help negotiate the 
English school context and, in particular, its Education Act of 1944.94 Describing the 
methodology that is involved in learning from religion, Grimmitt writes: 
                                                          
94Dermot Lane writes, “Education about religion goes back in the English-speaking world to the work of 
Ninian Smart in the 1970’s, and in particular to Michael Grimmitt and his landmark book, Religious 
Education and Human Development (1987). In that book, Grimmitt introduced the concept of learning 
about religion and learning from religion.” (Dermot A. Lane, Religion and Education: Re-Imagining the 
Relationship (Dublin: Veritas Publications, 2013), p. 22). Grimmitt writes, “But in equating R.E. [Religious 
Education; or what in the American context would better be called the study of religion(s)] with a process 
by and through which pupils learn about religion as a social phenomenon and come to an understanding 
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This concern with enabling pupils to learn from religion influences the choice and 
presentation of content… The religious educator gives close attention to the 
‘style’ of religious material and content—to the demands that it makes on the 
pupils’ conceptual abilities, to its remoteness or closeness to their experiences, to 
its capacity for engaging their interests and imaginations and prompting them to 
ask personally relevant questions. He [or she] seeks to devise learning-situations 
which are sufficiently engaging at a personal level to stimulate each pupil to 
become involved in a form of ‘interior dialogue’ characterized by the exploration 
of such questions as: ‘Are these beliefs/values/attitudes attractive or persuasive to 
me?’. ‘Is there something here which teaches me about myself?—about what I 
regard as important?—about what values/beliefs I am committed to or should be 
committed to?—about what or who I am?’95 
 
This correlates well with Thomas Groome’s “Shared Praxis” methodology, 
especially the “dialectical hermeneutics” that he describes in Movement 4 and the 
invitation for personal decision making and lived response in Movement 5.96 Having 
already named and critically reflected upon their present praxis around a generative 
theme, and having been given access to what Groome calls the Story and Vision of the 
given religious tradition, students now begin the work, alone and together, of 
                                                          
of what is distinctive about a religious interpretation of experience, is our description of ‘the process of 
religious education’ complete? Some would say that it is because ‘a secular educator concerned with the 
study of religion’ can do no more and no less than this. Others, however, including myself, disagree… The 
distinctiveness of ‘the process of religious education’, I would suggest, lies in the type of interaction that it 
seeks to promote between the learner and what is learnt—a type of interaction which arises not out of 
R.E.’s exclusive allegiance to the methodological demands of Religious Studies but out of R.E.’s prior 
educational commitment  to furthering the personal development of pupils beyond developing their 
intellects and beyond providing them with more knowledge of an ‘objective’ kind.” … The type of 
interaction which I envisage R.E. encouraging between the learner[s] and what is learnt is not only one 
that enables [them] to learn about religion but also one that enables [them] to learn from religion about 
[themselves].” (Michael Grimmitt, “When is ‘Commitment’ a Problem in Religious Education?” British 
Journal of Educational Studies Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (February, 1981), pp. 48-9). 
95 Michael Grimmitt, “When is ‘Commitment’ a Problem in Religious Education?” British Journal of 
Educational Studies Vol. XXIX, No. 1 (February, 1981), p. 51. 
96 Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral 
Ministry—The Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1991), pp. 249-293. While 
Groome writes from a Catholic Christian perspective, his approach is appropriate and apt for learning 
from the many religious traditions. 
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appropriating the Story and Vision to their own lives, being invited to make decisions for 
their future praxis. Groome writes: 
[Students] are to evaluate both the version of Story/Vision as made accessible and 
the version of present praxis expressed in movements 1 and 2 by bringing these 
two “sources” to “judge” and be appropriated to each other. This requires 
participants to turn to their own interiority, to themselves as subjects, to discern 
how they appropriate community Story/Vision to their own reality, and to test 
their discernment in dialogue with other participants.97  
 
The learning from reaches maturity, in a sense (and for now),98 when students reach 
Movement 5, i.e. they engage both imagination and will to make personal decisions 
concerning their beliefs, feelings, ethics, outlook, and/or relationships—their way of 
being in the world—based on the dialogue with both the Story/Vision (the dialectical 
hermeneutic) and with their fellow students and teachers.99 
 Dialogue as Paulo Freire notes, promotes and draws upon critical thinking,100 and 
that is true whether the dialogue is internal as Grimmitt and Groome hope to inspire, or 
external. Since developing critical thinking skills is an oft-stated goal of public education, 
and education in general, we should have no difficulty justifying this approach to the 
study of religion(s) in the curriculum. Still, there will be detractors. Unlike the 
elementary school program, which was largely devoid of controversy and remained 
positive about religion(s), the middle school program is unafraid to engage in areas that 
                                                          
97 Thomas H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral 
Ministry—The Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1991), p. 257. 
98 Groome regards as wisdom the observation by John Dewey: “Perhaps the greatest of all pedagogical 
fallacies is that people learn the thing they are studying at the time they are studying it.” (Qtd. in Thomas 
H. Groome, Sharing Faith: A Comprehensive Approach to Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry—The 
Way of Shared Praxis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 1991), p. 278). 
99 Ibid., pp. 266ff. 
100 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1970), p. 81. 
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are controversial. Students, for example, may question whether religion and science are 
opposed to one another, or whether creationism better explains the origins of human life 
than scientific explanations—or if both might convey great truths, albeit one scientific 
and the other mythical in nature. They may question the violence of terrorism committed 
in the name of Islam or the violence of the Crusades and the Inquisition done in the name 
of Catholicism. They may resist religions seen as opposed to LGBT people, or they may 
charge religions with superstition, mind control, racism and/or genocide. This is sure to 
stir up controversy. Wonderful! As Nel Noddings says so well, “Without controversial 
issues, critical thinking is nonexistent or, at best, weak.”101 The controversy also adds to 
the excitement: students will be engaged by material that is meaningful to them rather 
than being subjected to boring lessons that attempt to transfer “inert ideas”102 into their 
heads in the “static, cold-storage”103 understanding of knowledge that John Dewey 
decried. 
 Middle school teachers, unlike elementary school teachers, are specialists in 
particular fields, whether math or science, history or music, etc. So it must be with 
religion as well. Middle school teachers of the study of religion(s) will be credentialed 
experts in the field. Since dialogue is our primary pedagogical tool at this stage of 
                                                          
101 Nel Noddings, Critical Lessons: What Our Schools Should Teach (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), p. 1. Noddings also writes, “Not only does the full development of each individual human being 
depend on rational discussion of controversial issues but so does the health of our democracy. As Amy 
Gutmann (1987) puts it: ‘Because conscious social reproduction is the primary ideal of democratic 
education, communities must be prevented from using education to stifle rational deliberation’…” (Nel 
Noddings, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief (New York: Teachers College Press, 1993), p. 141). 
102 The term is from Alfred North Whitehead, “The Aims of Education” (1929), 
https://www.educationevolving.org/files/Whitehead-AimsOfEducation.pdf [Accessed 7 March 2021]. 
103 John Dewy, Democracy and Education (Lexington, KY: Feather Trail Press, 2009), p. 87.  
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development, teachers will develop alongside their expertise in religion a particular art in 
facilitating dialogical learning.  
Schools of Education will readily convert rules of dialogue, such as those 
promoted by Leonard Swidler—rules drawn from the lived experience of interreligious 
dialogue104—into  language accessible to middle school students and applicable to the 
middle school classroom. While the context changes, the substance remains. Our young 
people will be better prepared for adult life in a religiously plural, democratic society for 
having learned how to engage in dialogue instead of always debate, dismissiveness, or, 
worse, diatribe. 
6.2.3 High School 
 Having gained basic religious literacy through encountering the religious “other” 
in elementary school, and then, in middle school, having entered into dialogue with 
religious and nonreligious traditions in the search for meaning and a meaningful spiritual 
and moral outlook, high school students are now well prepared for the next turn in their 
study of religion(s). Although we will not leave learning about religion(s) and learning 
from religion(s) behind—after all, we are ready to encounter religion(s) in more depth 
and with greater sophistication—we will change our perspective once again. At first, 
students learned primarily about religion by being observers of a phenomenon (think of a 
one-way arrow). Then, they opened themselves to a dialogue in order to learn from 
religion(s) (think of a two-way arrow). Now, the stance must be one of solidarity in 
                                                          
104 Leonard Swidler, “Interreligious and Interideological Dialogue: The Matrix for All Systematic Reflection 
Today,” in Leonard Swidler, ed., Toward a Universal Theology of Religion (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 
1987), pp. 14-6. 
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which our students learn with religion(s).105 Together with religious and nonreligious 
people, they look at the problems facing society and work together on solutions. Thus, 
the stance of the high school student is not primarily on their personal development as it 
was in middle school, but on their ability to contribute to the common good. In the 
Meaningful Inclusion Approach, we take a Habermasian point of view that religious 
voices are not going away, that they have the potential to be truth-bearing and meaningful 
beyond their traditions, that they have the potential to motivate and inspire collective 
action, and that they belong in the public square as equal partners in our liberal 
democracies. And so, in high school, students work with religious and nonreligious 
partners (in person, through their writings or other communications, online, etc.) in 
analyzing problems in our world and proposing solutions (Think of multiple arrows in a 
quiver all pointing outward together). 
 The pedagogy implied in this approach is what Freire described as problem-
posing education. He compared banking education (a teacher from on high depositing 
bits of pre-ordained knowledge into the minds of students and demanding recall on 
exams, etc.) with problem-posing education: 
Banking education resists dialogue; problem-posing education regards dialogue as 
indispensable to the act of cognition which unveils reality. Banking education 
treats students as objects of assistance; problem-posing education makes them 
critical thinkers. Banking education inhibits creativity… Problem-posing 
education bases itself on creativity and stimulates true reflection and action upon 
                                                          
105 My own use of the term learning with religion developed organically from reflection upon Grimmitt’s 
concepts learning about and learning from religion. Another use of the term that I have become aware of 
is that of Pim Valkenberg, who uses learning with to describe service-learning events done with the 
religious other. See Pim Valkenberg, “Learning With and From Religious Others,” Teaching Theology and 
Religion, Vol 16, No. 4 (October 1, 2013), p. 391, 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/teth.12143 [Accessed 7 March 2021]. 
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reality, thereby responding to the [human vocation] as beings who are authentic 
only when engaged in inquiry and creative transformation.106 
 
Problem-posing and partnering with religious and nonreligious others will sharpen not 
only a student’s critical thinking and dialogical abilities, but will also equip students as 
citizens capable of translating religious language into a secular idiom, and vice-versa. 
This, Habermas reminds us, is a critical competency in a deliberative democracy that 
recognizes the rightful place of religious voices, qua religious, in our public discourse. 
 Problem-posing education in the study of religion(s) has an additional benefit: it 
helps to unify the curriculum and thus resist the tendency for each subject area to exist in 
an isolated silo. Imagine, for example, that students launch into a study of poverty in a 
specific area of the world. Those students bring their knowledge from many subject areas 
to bear on the problem: the history and geography of the region, economic and political 
policies, the effects of climate change, mathematics, computer modeling, etc. They apply 
specific abilities they learned about dialogue, resisting the temptation to play Savior and 
instead listening to those whose lived experience in the region matters most. Among the 
many subject areas that help them to think about the issue, religion is not dismissed out-
of-hand as has so often been the case in the recent past and in current practice. Instead, 
they apply the same intellectual rigor and critical thinking that bear on their non-religious 
subject areas as they consider religious insights and the unique power of religion to 
motivate people, inspire them to action, and sustain them with hope. 
                                                          
106 Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Myra Bergman Ramos, transl. (New York: The Seabury Press, 
1970), p. 71. 
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Let us take another example. In the Meaningful Inclusion Approach, students 
interested in climate change would take the words of Pope Francis in Laudato Si and the 
Dalai Lama in Our Only Home: A Climate Appeal to the World just as seriously as the 
words of Al Gore in An Inconvenient Truth and Greta Thunberg in her address to the 
United Nations. All these voices, and many others, would be considered worthy of 
critical analysis. Wherever truth, insight, wisdom, and motivation toward solidarity and 
action can be found, the student is equipped to tap into it and to translate its meaning, if 
necessary, into publically accessible language and/or into religiously accessible 
languages that allow us to work together. This is critical because their work in the 
classroom is not a mere academic exercise. It may very well issue forth in political 
activism, awareness-raising activities, non-profit business ventures, or service of one sort 
or another. This, too, keeps the class lively. Few people care to put a tremendous effort 
into something they care deeply about only to earn a grade and then to file it away. On 
the other hand, because this inquiry is tied to creative transformation, true reflection and 
action upon reality (to use Freire’s terms), the classroom is both energized and 
humanized. 
 The study of religion(s) as a way of learning with religious and nonreligious 
others is therefore anything but dull and boring. Looking outward at the world and 
engaging their own interests and activism, students themselves create an intellectually 
stimulating atmosphere. The range of issues that might be addressed are as varied as the 
interests of the pupils involved, and could include human trafficking, climate change, 
racism, sexism, homophobia, genocide, female genital mutilation, forced abortions, 
deforestation, sweatshop and child labor, forced religious conversions, torture, just and 
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unjust war, and the treatment of migrants and refugees, just to name a few. In each case, 
there may be many religious voices and nonreligious voices worth hearing. The teacher, 
fully credentialed in the field, becomes a valuable guide to students in choosing resources 
and evaluating them properly. 
Of course, sometimes a particular expression of a religion may be seen not as a 
source of inspiration and wisdom, but as a source of oppression. The students’ continued 
encounter with religion, begun in elementary school at a lesser level of intensity, now 
deepens. Students grow in their ability to recognize complexity and diversity within 
religions and to recognize the dynamic nature of religion itself. They learn to resist the 
tendency to stereotype, generalize, and essentialize religions and religious people as well 
as nonreligious people. In other words, they move into a deeper type of religious literacy, 
one more in line with Dianne Moore’s understanding of the term than Stephen Prothero’s 
or that of the Modesto Model.107 
 Students who are graduated from a public school system that has treated 
religion(s) fairly through the Meaningful Inclusion Approach will know that religions are 
not museum pieces that only show up in history classes, but are living, dynamic, and 
diverse. They will be familiar with the contributions of religions to human history, 
knowledge, and culture, while also being aware of the darker moments of violence and 
oppression. They will know that religions are live options that the overwhelming majority 
of people in human history and today find meaningful and compatible with reason and 
critical thinking. They will know that intelligent and reasonable people believe in 
                                                          
107 See Chapter 2. 
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God/gods and/or have religious faith, and that other reasonable and intelligent people do 
not believe in any gods and do not have religious faith. They will learn to cooperate with 
both, in ways that exceed mere tolerance and build bridges of solidarity and respect. They 
will also be keen to religious and nonreligious expressions that do not warrant respect and 
that are incompatible with freedom, religious liberty, and human dignity. They will know 
with Stephen Carter that religions are not mere hobbies that deserve attention only in 
one’s private life, but are impactful on our life together and are equal partners in public 
discourse. Graduates will have been treated as whole persons, whose spiritual, moral, and 
religious selves were respected together with their intellectual selves, and will not have 
been treated as only cogs in an economic or academic machine. They will know that 
America is a wonderfully diverse place with a rich and complex religious history, a 
country in which all of the world’s religions have found a home due to our commitment 
to religious liberty, a commitment that must always be nurtured and maintained. And 
they will know that their study of religion(s) has been in accord with the Constitution of 
the United States and has respected freedom of conscience while meeting the demands of 
a liberal education. In short, they will be religiously literate citizens in an increasingly 
pluralistic country and as members of a globalized world where religion has always 
mattered and continues to do so more than ever. As such, they will be positioned well to 
promote peace and the common good through a commitment to solidarity and dialogue. 
Their education in the public schools will benefit their aspiration to live meaningful lives 
and to make meaningful contributions to society as well. 
The recent decades of American history have witnessed the hostility of neglect in 
regard to the study of religion(s) in our public schools. But a new age has dawned! In this 
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post-secular period, we are ideally situated to boldly challenge the curricula of our 
schools, making significant changes to better educate our young people, to ensure the 
health of our Republic, and to promote peace in the world. The days of established 
religion are long gone in America, and the interregnum of neutrality-turned-secularist has 
proven deficient and not up to the task. Mere tolerance, as Hollenbach reminds us, is a 
weak adhesive: we cannot simply “live and let live” when that implies radical 
individualism and a lost sense of community and solidarity. We need the study of 
religion(s) that will promote encounter, respect, solidarity, and a commitment to the 
common good. Our students deserve to have the tools and the guidance to grow as 
healthy persons and as healthy citizens, including those that come by way of religious 
traditions. Religion and education in our public schools have been unnaturally untethered 
for too long. Now is the time for the Meaningful Inclusion Approach. Now is the time for 
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